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 NUMERICAL COGNITION IN RHESUS MONKEYS (MACACA MULATTA) 
by 
Emily Harris Marr 
Under the Direction of Dr. David A. Washburn 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past few decades, researchers have firmly established that a wide range of 
nonhuman animals exhibit some form of numerical competence.  The focus of this research was 
to define further the extent of numerical ability in rhesus monkeys, and specifically to determine 
whether the animals possess a symbolic understanding of Arabic numerals.  This required 
examining the stimulus attributes (e.g., number vs. hedonic value) represented by the numerals, 
as well as the precision (e.g., absolute vs. relative) and generality of those representations.  In 
chapters 2 and 3, monkeys were required to compare and order numerals and were rewarded with 
either proportional or probabilistic rewards.  The results indicated that monkeys were relying on 
the ordinal or absolute numerical values associated with each numeral and not hedonic value or 
learned 2-choice discriminations.  The studies in chapters 4 and 5 indicated that monkeys can use 
numerals to symbolize an approximate number of sequential motor responses.  The study in 
Chapter 6 tested the generality of the monkeys’ symbolic number concept using transfer tests.  
The results indicated that some monkeys are able to abstract number across presentation mode, 
but this ability is only exhibited under limited conditions.  Collectively, these studies provide 
evidence that rhesus monkeys view Arabic numerals as more than sign-stimuli associated with 
specific response-reward histories, but that numerals do not have the same precise symbolic 
meaning as they do for humans.   
INDEX WORDS:  Monkeys, Macaca mulatta, numbers, symbols, numerical ability 
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Chapter 1: Literature review 
In his 1945 book on the role of mathematics in civilization, Eric Bell wrote, “Even 
stranger things have happened; and perhaps the strangest of all is the marvel that mathematics 
should be possible to a race akin to the apes” (p. 594).  Whereas it is amazing that human beings, 
a species sharing common ancestry with the chimpanzee and gorilla, have developed such 
elegant and complicated systems of formal mathematics, it is arguably more interesting that apes 
themselves have shown impressive numerical reasoning abilities.   
The topic of numerical competence in nonhuman animals (hereafter “animals”) has 
fascinated researchers for over a century, but early demonstrations of numerical aptitude were 
often plagued by lack of scientific controls.  The most infamously flawed display of animal 
numerical prowess involved a horse named Clever Hans who lived in Germany in the early 
1900s and was rumored to be able to add, subtract, multiply, and divide Arabic numerals.  When 
it was discovered that the horse was not solving the numerical problems, but instead simply 
responding to small, unintentional cues from its trainer, it cast a shadow of suspicion over the 
entire area of research (Davis & Memmott, 1982).  The positive aspect of this controversial 
history is that subsequent investigators were more conscious of the need for rigorous 
experimental controls when conducting studies of animal numerical abilities and the need for 
caution when interpreting the results.   
These subsequent studies have firmly established that a variety of animals ranging from 
rats (Rattus norvegicus; e.g., Burns, Goettl, & Burt, 1995; Church & Meck, 1984; Davis & 
Albert, 1986; Platt & Johnson, 1971) to dolphins (Tursiops truncates; e.g., Kilian, Yaman, von 
Fersen, & Güntürkün, 2003; Mitchell, Yao, Sherman, & O’Regan, 1985) to chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes; e.g., Beran, 2001, 2004; Boyson & Berntson, 1989, 1995; Matsuzawa, 1985, 
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Murofushi, 1997; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hegel, 1987) possess a sensitivity to 
number.  It is possible that number is not a particularly salient cue for animals and will be used 
only as a “last resort” when alternative cues are not available (Breukelaar & Dalrymple-Alford, 
1998; Davis & Bradford, 1986; Davis & Memmott, 1982), but there is considerable evidence that 
animals routinely and automatically respond to numerical value as readily as they respond to 
perceptual properties such as shape and color (Cantlon & Brannon, 2007; Capaldi & Miller, 
1988; Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel, 1993).   
Associative models of numerical cognition 
Stimulus control by numerousness 
Although the question of whether animals can respond to stimulus numerousness has 
been answered, it remains unclear whether this reflects conceptual knowledge about 
numerousness (a so-called “concept of number”) or conversely is explicable via low-level 
perceptual and associative mechanisms.  The radical behaviorist finds behavioral control by the 
numerousness attribute of stimuli to be no different than stimulus control by other stimulus 
dimensions (e.g., shape, color, size).  Skinner (1963), for example, argued that all behavior can 
be explained as a function of environmental histories and reinforcing consequences.  Rewarding 
an animal for a particular response increases the likelihood that the response will occur again in 
the future.  According to this view, stimulus quantities, and symbols that represent quantities, 
function as fixed parts of a stimulus-response-reward association.  In other words, the animal 
learns the specific response that must be executed in the presence of the numerical stimulus, or 
combination of numerical stimuli, in order to obtain a reward within the confines of that specific 
task.  This perspective is illustrated in more recent discussions by Almeida, Arantes, and 
Machado (2007); Machado and Rodrigues (2007); McGonigle (1988); Mechner and Guevrekian 
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(1962); Silberberg and Fujita (1996); and Smirnova, Lazareva, and Zorina (2000).  As Nevin 
(1988) asked rhetorically, “Is our science more effectively advanced by debating rules for the use 
of terms like ‘counting’ that imply active but unobservable organismic processing, or by 
identifying and quantifying variables that control behavior?” (p. 595). 
Subitizing and other perceptual explanations 
C. Lloyd Morgan (1914), an early critic of animal numerical research, espoused a similar 
view that animals were limited to instinctive behavior, sensory experience, and associative 
learning, rather than higher-order cognitive processes such as concept formation.  He argued that 
nonhuman numerical behavior could be explained in terms of the “simpler” process of timing.  
This untested assumption that timing reflects a more basic mechanism for explaining number-
related judgments, was echoed in the influential literature review by Davis and Pérusse (1988).   
Another explanation of human infant and nonhuman numerical ability which relies on 
relatively low-level perceptual variables is subitizing.  The term subitizing was originally coined 
to refer to the rapid and near-parallel identification of small quantities of stimuli by adult 
humans.  Studies show that when adult humans are asked to identify the number of items flashed 
on a screen, most will identify 1, 2, 3 or 4 stimuli with little difference in accuracy and latency.  
For arrays of about five or more stimuli, however, response time increases linearly with array 
size at a rate of about 200-300 ms per item (Jensen, Reese, & Reese, 1950; Klahr, 1973; Mandler 
& Shebo, 1982; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994).  In addition, when stimuli are presented under 
degraded conditions (e.g., flashed rapidly on a screen or masked after presentation), accuracy 
begins to decline at approximately 5 items (Atkinson, Campbell, & Francis, 1976; Oyama, 
Kikuchi, & Ichihara, 1981; Simon & Vaishnavi, 1996).   
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Although the discontinuous response function has been replicated in a variety of studies, 
researchers are still unclear as to the exact nature of the subitizing process.  Many researchers 
believe that subitizing reflects a perceptual variable, such as pattern-matching or item-grouping, 
and does not reflect counting, enumeration, estimation, or other aspects of cognition that adults 
use to quantify larger displays of items (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978; Logan & Zbrodoff, 2003; 
Wender & Rothkegel, 2000; Wolters, van Kempen, & Wijlhuizen, 1987).  For example, Mandler 
and Shebo (1982) argued that the fast reaction times for arrays of 1 to 3 items are based on 
learned canonical patterns.  One dot forms a point, two dots can be connected by a line, and three 
dots typically fall in a triangular configuration.  The display acts as a retrieval cue which 
activates a numerical response that has been associated with a similar arrangement of items 
through experience.    
In contrast, Trick and Pylyshyn assert that the process of subitizing exploits a limited-
capacity, preattentive mechanism for individuating a small number of items (Pylyshyn, 1989, 
2001; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994).  This mechanism, which they refer to as the FINST mechanism, 
operates after the spatially parallel processes of feature detection and grouping, but before the 
serial processes of spatial attention.  Trick and Pylyshyn argue that FINSTs, like human pointing 
fingers, allow one to select certain items for attentional processing without providing information 
about the item properties.   
In another theory, Harris and Washburn (2008) proposed that subitizing is related to the 
cognitive concept of visual sensory storage, which is often called the “iconic buffer” or “icon.”  
The icon provides persistent access to visual stimuli and can be scanned by attention according 
to physical cues (location, color, size, and so forth).  According to this theory, approximately 
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four items can be identified quickly and comparably because that is the maximum number that 
can be scanned with attention before the icon has faded. 
Subitizing and other direct perceptual processes were originally used by some researchers 
to explain all nonhuman animal and human child numerical abilities.  This tendency was based 
on the observation that performance for both of these groups appeared to break down at the point 
where adults shift from subitizing to counting (approximately four items; Davis & Pérusse, 1988; 
Gast, 1957).  We now know, however, that animals and infants are capable of performing 
numerical tasks with stimuli that far exceed the classic subitizing range (e.g., Beran, 2001, 2004; 
Brannon & Terrace, 1998; 2000; Cantlon & Brannon, 2006; Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Matsuzawa, 
1985; Mechner, 1958; Olthof, Iden, & Roberts, 1997; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991; Xu & 
Spelke, 2000).  This evidence means that subitizing can only be used to explain a portion of 
infant and animal numerical behavior.  For example, Murofushi (1997) trained a chimpanzee to 
label sets of objects with Arabic numerals as large as seven.  Results revealed that the 
chimpanzee’s reaction time function was nearly flat for one to three objects and then generally 
increased as the number of objects increased.  Based on this pattern, Murofushi concluded that 
the chimpanzee subitized when presented with one to three objects and relied on another process 
known as analogue magnitude estimation when presented with higher numbers. 
Although subitizing is usually described as a visual process, Davis and Pérusse (1988) 
argued that it may also form the basis of sequential numerical discriminations.  According to this 
hypothesis, sequential subitizing, also called rhythm discrimination, is based on recognizable 
rhythmic patterns, just as simultaneous subitizing is based on visual patterns.  Thus, subitizing is 
a possible mechanism for both simultaneous and sequential discriminations involving a small 
number of items. 
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Representational models of numerical cognition 
In contrast to the behaviorist view, cognitive interpretations of nonhuman numerical 
ability propose that animals have concepts of number (e.g., of “threeness”, “fourness”, and so 
forth) that emerge from experience and guide behavior.  Conceptual behavior has been defined in 
the literature as correct responses “which do not depend upon prior experience with the specific 
stimuli being presented" (Thomas, 1984, p. 650).  Thomas (1988) distinguished studies of 
numerical competence that examine conceptual processes from studies in which low-level rote 
memorization of particular stimulus exemplars can be used for responding.  According to the 
conceptual view, animals respond correctly in numerical tasks not just because they have been 
conditioned to respond in a certain way when presented with specific numerical stimuli, but 
because they have a concept of number that can be used in (i.e., transferred to) a variety of tasks.  
Thomas and Lorden (1993) cautioned that although there are enough carefully controlled studies 
to conclude that some animals are capable of conceptual use of number, a “conservative and 
cautious view of animals’ use of number is warranted” because many studies do not properly 
control nonnumerical cues that can be used as the basis for responding (p. 129).   
Analog magnitude model 
Other researchers, such as Gelman and Gallistel (1978), are strong champions of the 
conceptual view of animal numerical ability and argued forcefully against the tendency to 
underestimate the cognitive abilities of preverbal children and nonverbal animals.  In response to 
Morgan’s chastisement of researchers who invoke higher-order mechanisms when simpler 
explanations of numerical behaviors are possible, Davis and Memmott (1982) issued a 
contrasting warning that researchers should not “exclude on a priori grounds the possibility of 
control by seemingly more complex stimulus dimensions” (p. 549).  The analog magnitude 
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model of nonverbal numerical ability provides support for the argument that number is different 
from other discriminatory aspects of stimuli.  According to this model, animals form cognitive 
representations of number using a mental accumulator mechanism instead of relying on direct 
perceptual processes.  Behavior is then based on this numerical cognition, reflecting the 
numerical categories (or the symbols that represent the mental categories) that are mapped onto 
this accumulator (Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Meck & Church, 1983). 
The accumulator mechanism was originally proposed by Gibbon (1981) to explain 
timing, but was later modified by Meck and Church (1983) and Gallistel and Gelman (2000) to 
account for nonverbal enumeration.  According to this model, organisms that display numerical 
ability have an internal pacemaker in the brain that emits a stream of pulses at a steady rate and a 
switch gate that can be opened and closed to allow pulses to enter an accumulator.  The 
pacemaker can be used as a timing device if the gate is left open during an event or it can be used 
as a counter if the gate is opened and closed whenever an object or event is enumerated.  At the 
end of the timing or counting process, the accumulator sums the impulses that were allowed to 
enter and transfers that magnitude to working memory.  The animal makes a judgment by 
comparing the current value in the accumulator to values stored in long-term memory.  
According to this model, animals trained with Arabic numerals, or other numerical symbols, 
learn decision rules that allow them to assign a specific symbol to a range of accumulator values 
(Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992). 
An important aspect of the accumulator model is that the memory for magnitudes is 
imperfect and defined by scalar variability.  This means that trial-to-trial variability in 
responding increases in direct proportion to the quantity represented.  Dehaene (1997) likened 
the accumulator to a beaker that gradually fills with water as items are counted and described the 
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variability as sloshing in the beaker.  The sloshing introduces noise into the recalled magnitudes, 
with increasing amounts of noise for larger numbers.  In other words, the value obtained from 
reading the same memory repeatedly varies from reading to reading, with increasing variability 
for larger numbers (Gallistel, 1999).   
 Evidence for these noisy representations can be seen in many numerical studies involving 
animals.  For example, when rats (Mechner, 1958; Platt & Johnson, 1971), pigeons (Columba 
livia; Xia, Emmerton, Siemann, & Delius, 2001; Xia, Siemann, & Delius, 2000), and 
chimpanzees (Beran and Rumbaugh, 2001) are required to make a certain number of responses, 
there is a proportional increase in the variability of responding with increases in target number.  
Additional evidence for the approximate and variable nature of numerical representations can be 
seen in studies requiring relative numerousness judgments.  If the subjects are using analog 
magnitude representations then judgments of numerical inequality, like judgments of physical 
magnitudes such as weight and length, should obey Weber’s law.  This law states that the 
discriminability of two perceived magnitudes is determined by the ratio of their objective 
magnitudes.  This is because the degree of overlap between representations remains constant 
when the ratio of the means is held constant.  The larger the ratio of two subjective magnitudes, 
the greater the overlap in the signal distributions, hence the more difficult it is to discriminate the 
signals from the two different numbers (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Nieder & Miller, 2004; 
Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999).   
 Studies assessing the numerical abilities of nonhuman primates (e.g., Beran, 2001, 2004; 
Flombaum, Junge, & Hauser, 2005; Jordan & Brannon, 2006; Lewis, Jaffe, & Brannon, 2005; 
Rumbaugh et al., 1987) and human infants (e.g., Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Xu & Spelke, 2000; Xu, 
Spelke, & Goddard, 2005) have found evidence of a ratio limit as predicted by Weber’s law.  
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Behavior that conforms to Weber’s law also exhibits distance and magnitude effects.  This 
means that responding increases in accuracy as the numerical distance between comparison items 
increases and responding decreases in accuracy and becomes more variable as the magnitude of 
the quantities increase.  These effects have been reported in many studies of animal numerical 
ability (e.g., Anderson, Stoinski, Bloomsmith, Marr, Smith, & Maple, 2005; Boysen & Berntson, 
1995; Brannon & Terrace, 1998, 2000; Judge, Evans, & Vyas, 2005; Smith, Piel, & Candland, 
2003).   
In recent years, researchers have found a possible neural basis for the observed distance 
and magnitude effects.  Nieder, Freedman, and Miller (2002) and Sawamura, Shima, and Tanji 
(2002) recorded number-sensitive neurons in the parietal and prefrontal cortices of rhesus 
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and found that each cell showed peak activity for one quantity and a 
systematic reduction of activity as the presented quantity varied from the optimal quantity.  
These overlapping tuning curves could produce the distance effect observed in humans and 
animals.  The neurons also became less precisely tuned as their preferred quantity increased, 
which could be the basis of the magnitude effect.     
There are two major cognitive models proposed to explain distance and magnitude effects 
and they differ in the form that the quantity representation takes.  The widely known logarithmic-
compression hypothesis assumes that the subjective number continuum is logarithmically 
compressed so that the representations of 10 and 11 lie closer together on a mental number line 
than the representations of 2 and 3 (Dehaene, 1997, 2003; Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Dehaene 
& Mehler, 1992; Moyer & Landauer, 1967).  According to this theory, it is more difficult to 
discriminate higher numbers because they are subjectively closer together.  An alternative 
hypothesis is that the subjective number continuum is linear and positions farther along the 
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continuum are less precisely located (Brannon, Wusthoff, Gallistel, & Gibbon, 2001; Fetterman, 
1993; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Gibbon, 1977).  Thus, it is more difficult to discriminate higher 
numbers because their locations on the number line are more variable.   
Regardless of whether the distance and magnitude effects are explained by a linear or 
logarithmic mental number line, the accumulator model makes the interesting prediction that 
there is no absolute limit to the numbers that can be discriminated.  Research has shown that 
animals such as rhesus monkeys can discriminate sets as large as 20 and 30, given that the ratio 
is sufficiently small (Cantlon & Brannon, 2006).  Human infants can also discriminate between 
large sets of visual objects and sounds, provided that the ratio of the two choices is small (Lipton 
& Spelke, 2003; Xu et al., 2005).  For example, Xu and Spelke (2000) found that 6-month-old 
infants could discriminate between 8 and 16 elements (1:2 ratio), but not 8 and 12 elements (2:3 
ratio).   
The similarities between the numerical capacities of preverbal human infants and 
nonverbal animals have caused some psychologists to hypothesize that human mathematical 
ability shares an evolutionary past with the numerical abilities observed in animals (Butterworth, 
1999; Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992, 2000).  Although humans demonstrate uniquely 
sophisticated numerical capacities such as division and calculus, the more basic numerical 
representations available to animals such as birds and monkeys may be the building blocks from 
which our mathematical ability was constructed over the course of evolution.  Dehaene, 
Dehaene-Lambertz, and Cohen (1998) argued that number processing in humans and animals is 
based on a shared neural system that provides the foundation for higher-level arithmetic in 
humans.   
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Adult humans obviously have an advantage over human infants and nonhuman animals in 
terms of numerical ability because they can use number words and symbols to communicate 
precise quantities and perform formal operations such as multiplication and division.  Evidence 
suggests, however, that knowledge of symbolic number systems does not eliminate the 
continuous quantitative mode of representation that we share with other animals.  When 
presented with Arabic numerals, human brains automatically access the corresponding analog 
quantity representation, even when it is not necessary and may actually interfere with the task.  
As Dehaene (1997) wrote, “Our brain, like that of the rat, has been endowed since time 
immemorial with an intuitive representation of quantities” (p. 7).   
Moyer and Landauer (1967) first discovered the automatic activation of a continuous 
representation by presenting adults with pairs of Arabic numerals and measuring the amount of 
time required for them to choose the largest digit.  They found that responding was slower and 
less accurate for numerically close numbers such as 5 and 6, compared to more distant numbers 
such as 2 and 9.  For equal distances, reaction time increased and accuracy decreased as the 
numbers became larger.  The same thing happens when humans are asked to judge two physical 
magnitudes, such as weights or line segments.  
The effects of continuous representations are also found for comparisons of two-digit 
numbers that can be performed simply by examining the first digit.  For instance, when people 
are presented with the numbers 72 and 64, the simplest way to determine which number is larger 
is to compare the 7 and 6.  However, experimental data show that the second digit affects 
reaction time.  It takes more time to determine that 71 is larger than 64 compared to the time it 
takes to determine that 79 is larger than 64 (Dehaene, 1997).  Distance effects are also seen in 
experiments requiring participants to judge whether digits are the same or different (Dehaene & 
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Akhavein, 1995).  The presence of distance effects, even when numbers are presented in 
symbolic form, suggests that the human brain converts numbers internally from the symbolic 
format to a continuous, quantity-based, analogical format.  This immediate and unconscious 
conversion is beneficial when we are asked to estimate the outcome of an operation such as 64 + 
132, but creates accuracy and latency costs in simple comparison tasks. 
 A phenomenon known as the SNARC effect also suggests that Arabic numerals 
automatically evoke a non-symbolic representation (Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 1993; Dehaene 
& Mehler, 1992).  When subjects are shown the digits 0 through 9 and asked to respond with a 
left-hand or right-hand key depending on whether the digit is odd or even, larger numbers 
produce faster responses with the right hand and smaller numbers produce faster responses with 
the left hand.  This result suggests that participants possess an internal number line with a left-to-
right orientation. 
Humans can also rely on this non-symbolic system of number processing for estimating 
and combining sets of elements when exact representations are not necessary or possible.  In a 
study by Barth, La Mont, Lipton, Dehaene, Kanwisher, and Spelke (2006), adults performed 
numerical comparison and addition tasks involving large arrays of dots.  The arrays were flashed 
quickly on a screen to prevent the use of formal counting.  Results revealed that accuracy 
depended on the ratios of the compared quantities, which is a hallmark of approximate 
representation.  An additional experiment revealed that 5-year-old children with no relevant 
knowledge of symbolic arithmetic could also perform the visual addition and comparison tasks at 
above-chance levels. 
Whalen et al. (1999) adapted the procedure that Mechner (1958) and Platt and Johnson 
(1971) used with rats to study nonverbal counting in adult humans.  In one task, participants 
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attempted to produce a target number of key presses at a rate that made vocal or subvocal 
counting unlikely.  In another task, participants estimated the number of flashes in a rapid 
sequence.  In both tasks the participants were instructed not to verbally count, but to approximate 
the correct answer.  The mean estimates in both tasks were proportional to the target values and 
variability increased as the targets increased.  This is the same pattern of scalar variability 
obtained with animals in similar studies and supports the idea that adults and other animals share 
a nonverbal magnitude system for representing number. 
 In a study by Beran, Taglialatela, Flemming, James, and Washburn (2006), adults were 
repeatedly shown two sets of sequentially presented items of varying sizes and were asked to 
repeat the alphabet out loud during the trials to prevent them from counting.  Results revealed 
that participants were able to choose the larger quantity at levels greater than chance 
performance, but accuracy decreased and variability in responding increased with increasing set 
size.  These results provide further evidence that adult humans use approximate representations 
of numerosity when precise representations are not possible.   
Based on results of these and other numerical studies with humans, Dehaene (1992) 
proposed a triple-code model of human numerical cognition.  According to this model, adults 
represent numbers in an Arabic, verbal, or analogue magnitude code depending on the task.  
Neural evidence showing a double dissociation between the processing of Arabic and verbal 
numerals and the processing of quantity representations supports this model (Dehaene et al., 
1998; McCloskey & Caramazza, 1987; Warrington, 1982).  
Object-file model 
In addition to the evidence that infants, animals, and adults have an approximate, ratio-
dependent number system, there also is evidence for a more precise and limited nonverbal 
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number mechanism.  The object-file model explains this evidence by postulating that infants and 
animals form a representation of each individual object in the set when performing numerical 
tasks.  According to the model, a separate object-file is opened for each object encountered so 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between objects and files.  This means that representations 
are discrete and not approximate.  The object-file model predicts that representations are limited 
to 3 or 4 items because that is the maximum number that can be simultaneously tracked by visual 
attention (Uller, Carey, Huntley-Fenner, & Klatt, 1999).  The proposed reliance of both 
subitizing and the object-file model on object individuation has led some researchers to argue 
that the object-file model may be a specific case of subitizing (Brannon & Roitman, 2003).  The 
prediction of an absolute numerical limit contrasts with the analog magnitude model, which 
predicts that performance is limited by numerical ratio and not the absolute number of items.   
The majority of support for the object-file model is found in the infant literature.  Infants 
that can easily discriminate 1 versus 2 items and 2 versus 3 items, fail when tested with 
comparisons of 3 versus 4 and 3 versus 5 (Antell & Keating, 1983; Starkey & Cooper, 1980; 
Strauss & Curtis, 1981; van Loosbroek & Smitsman, 1990).  In a more recent study involving a 
manual search task, Carey (2004) found that infants succeeded at representing 1, 2, and 3 hidden 
objects, but failed to differentiate 4 from 2.  Feigenson, Carey, and Hauser (2002) found that 10- 
and 12-month-old infants who watched experimenters place crackers into two opaque boxes 
succeeded in choosing the box with the larger number of crackers for comparisons of 1 versus 2 
and 2 versus 3, but showed no preference for comparisons of 2 versus 4, 3 versus 4, and 3 versus 
6.  It must be noted, however, that the infants could have been using the total amount of food 
rather than the number of crackers to make their choice.  In fact, when the amount of food was 
equated (a choice between 1 large and 2 small crackers), the infants showed no preference.  If the 
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infants in these studies were discriminating based on numerousness, the data suggest an upper 
limit of approximately 4 objects, which contrasts with infant studies showing a ratio limit rather 
than an absolute set size limit (e.g., Lipton & Spelke, 2003; Xu et al., 2005; Xu & Spelke, 2000). 
In addition to infant studies, there are several animal studies that provide support for the 
object-file model.  In a study by Hauser, Carey, and Hauser (2000), monkeys watched 
experimenters place apples, one at a time, into opaque boxes.  Controls were used so that the 
amount of time spent filling the containers was not correlated with the number of slices.  The 
animals reliably selected the box with the larger number of apples for discriminations of 5 versus 
4, but failed with discriminations of 4 versus 8 and 3 versus 8.  These findings provide support 
for an absolute number limit rather than a ratio limit, but it is possible that the limit was due to 
attentional factors rather than the mental mechanism involved.  The untrained monkeys 
performed the task in their natural habitat while surrounded by other group members.  This 
distraction may have caused a decrease in accuracy for sequential presentations requiring 
sustained attention. 
In a study by Pepperberg and Gordon (2005), a parrot (Psittacus erithacus) responded to 
sets of items with verbal number labels.  Its errors were randomly distributed across all set sizes 
tested (0-5) and it made the same number of errors when presented with a set of five items as a 
single item.  This behavior is not described well by the accumulator model, which predicts 
decreasing accuracy with increasing quantities.  It is possible that tests with greater quantities 
will show a clear set-size limit.  These studies contrast with the many animal studies showing 
ratio-dependent performance (e.g., Beran, 2001, 2004; Flombaum et al., 2005; Jordan & 
Brannon, 2006; Lewis et al., 2005; Rumbaugh et al., 1987). 
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 These disparate results have prompted some researchers to suggest that animals and 
infants have two separate systems for representing number (Feigenson, Dehaene, & Spelke, 
2004; Sulkowski & Hauser, 2001; Uller et al., 1999; Xu, 2003).  An analog magnitude system 
may be evoked for representing a large number of items in an approximate manner and an 
object-file system may be evoked for representing a small number of items precisely. 
Furthermore, it is possible that certain methodologies prevent infants and animals from engaging 
the system for representing large numbers, which results in a set-size limit.  Fias and Verguts 
(2004) argued that both systems have an evolutionary basis and together provide a more 
complete picture of nonverbal numerical ability. 
Counting 
The majority of researchers use terms such as “numerical ability,” “numerical 
competence,” or “numerical sensitivity” to describe the performance of animals in studies that 
involve some knowledge of number.  The use of these broad terms leaves open the question of 
whether or not animals can count in the same sense that humans can count.  Most researchers 
define true counting as a formal enumerative process that conforms to the principles proposed by 
Gelman and Gallistel (1978).  True counting, unlike associative mechanisms proposed to account 
for numerical discrimination, involves mental representations of numerousness. 
The first principle proposed by Gelman and Gallistel (1978) is “one-to-one 
correspondence,” which means that each item in the array corresponds to one and only one 
distinct tag.  Adult humans use conventional number words as tags, but Gelman and Gallistel 
argued that it may be possible for nonlinguistic animals and prelinguistic human infants to count 
using nonverbal number tags.  These unconventional tags, called “numerons,” may take any form 
as long as they are unique symbols that bear no physical relation to the items being tagged.   
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 The second principle is “stable order,” which means that the tags corresponding to each 
item in an array must be used in a consistent, reproducible sequence.  In other words, a child 
using the idiosyncratic count sequence, “one, six, three,” is truly counting so long as he or she 
uses the same sequence each time.  The third principle is “cardinality,” which means that the last 
tag used during the count sequence represents the value of the entire set.  Children tend to make 
more mistakes when counting than adults do, but research shows that children younger than 3 
years old can tag items in a stable, one-to-one manner and indicate the cardinal number of the set 
by repeating the last tag in the list (Gelman & Gallistel, 1978). 
 The last two principles, which are the “abstraction” and “order irrelevance” principles, 
concern the applicability of the other three counting principles.  The abstraction principle means 
that any collection of items can be counted.  Adult humans can count heterogeneous visible sets, 
auditory sequences, and even nonphysical constructs.  Klahr and Wallace (1973) argued that 
children first learn to apply the counting procedure to objects that have similar perceptual 
features, but there is evidence that even young children can count heterogeneous sets of items 
(Fuson, Pergament, & Lyons, 1985; Gelman & Tucker, 1975) as well as actions and sounds 
(Wynn, 1990).  The order irrelevance principle means that the order in which items in an array 
are counted is irrelevant.  In other words, any of the count words can be assigned to any of the 
items in an array as long as the one-to-one correspondence principle is observed. 
 Although most researchers agree on this definition of true counting, there is still much 
controversy over where animal numerical ability fits into this structure.  Some argue that the 
term “counting” should be reserved for humans (Davis & Pérusse, 1988), but several studies 
have provided evidence of animal behavior that conforms to one or more of the formal counting 
principles as defined by Gelman and Gallistel (1978).  For example, research has shown that 
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chimpanzees, like young children, tend to touch or point to each item when judging the number 
of items in an array (Boysen & Berntson, 1989; Boysen, Berntson, Shreyer, & Hannan, 1995; 
Boysen & Hallberg, 2000).  These gestures, known as indicating acts, may help the child or 
animal coordinate the tagging process involved in the application of the one-to-one 
correspondence principle.  Although evidence of indicating acts is not necessary to conclude that 
an animal is adhering to counting principles, it does suggest that the animal is using an 
enumerative process indicative of formal counting.   
 In other studies, animals trained to associate Arabic numerals with the corresponding 
number of food pellets were correctly able to order arrays of up to five numerals (Beran et al., 
2008; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991).  This behavior suggests that they understood the order of 
the symbols, as required by the stable order principle.  In addition, there is evidence that 
chimpanzees can reliably apply the correct Arabic numeral to arrays of familiar and novel 
objects.  This evidence suggests that they understand the special status of the last number in a 
count sequence, as described by the cardinal principle (Boysen & Berntson, 1989; Matsuzawa, 
1985; Murofushi, 1997).  Chimpanzees can also contact a number of dots on a computer screen 
equal to an Arabic numeral cue and then indicate the end of the count by contacting the numeral.  
This behavior further demonstrates use of the cardinality principle (Beran, Rumbaugh, & 
Savage-Rumbaugh, 1998; Rumbaugh, Hopkins, Washburn, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1989; 
Rumbaugh & Washburn, 1993).  Furthermore, the chimpanzees in these studies did not always 
contact dots in the same order for the same target numerals, which indicates an understanding of 
the order-irrelevance principle.   
 Gelman and Gallistel (1978) originally envisioned the formal counting process as 
something quite different from the process performed by the accumulator mechanism proposed 
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by Meck and Church (1983).  According to the original theory, formal counting required mental 
tags in the form of discrete symbols rather than analog magnitudes.  In recent years, however, 
researchers including Gallistel and Gelman (1992) and Dehaene (1997) have argued that the 
operation of the accumulator mechanism conforms to the first three counting principles and thus 
may provide the basis for true counting.  According to this recent theory, the accumulator 
conforms to the one-to-one correspondence principle because the gate allows a burst of pulses to 
be emitted into the accumulator once and only once for every item in the to-be-enumerated set.  
The order of different accumulator states is stable from one count to the next because the 
magnitude of the accumulator is proportional to the number of items in the set.  Also, it conforms 
to the cardinal principle because the final state of the accumulator is used to represent the value 
of the whole set. 
 Despite attempts to fit animal behavior ascribed to an accumulator mechanism into the 
definition of formal counting, it is obvious that animals do not count in the same way as adult 
humans do.  When adults count, they use a precise sequence of number words or symbols that 
result in an exact value.  This behavior indicates a more precise representation than the fuzzy 
representations produced by an accumulator relying on inexact analog magnitudes.  In fact, 
scalar variability, which is common in animal numerical studies, is typically not seen in older 
children who can count beyond 10 (Le Corre & Carey, 2007).  Based on these differences, 
animal researchers are typically cautious about applying the term “counting” to animals that may 
be relying on representational mental processes very different from those humans use.  
Determining the nature of numerical cognition 
 The associative and representational theoretical orientations are contrasted in the 
subsequent sections and chapters of this dissertation.  Numerical stimuli, and particularly Arabic 
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numerals that represent quantities, were presented using various paradigms designed to 
determine whether rhesus monkeys, like humans, truly understand the concept of number and the 
symbolic nature of Arabic numerals.  To establish that the monkeys have conceptual knowledge 
of number it is necessary to confirm that behavior is based on the numerousness aspect of stimuli 
rather than perceptual variables or conditioned responses to specific stimuli.  Some researchers 
argue that abstract numerical ability, established through cross-modal and cross-procedural 
transfer testing, is also essential to demonstrating a true concept of number (Davis & Pérusse, 
1988; Seibt, 1982).  In contrast to this view, Thomas and Lorden (1993) argued that evidence of 
generalization to trial-unique numerosities is sufficient evidence to conclude that an animal has a 
true concept of number, given that generalization is not based on physical properties of the 
stimuli and that all other perceptual and associative processes have been precluded.  Regardless 
of whether generalization across procedure is included as one of the criteria for possessing a 
number concept, investigating this ability is important to defining the representations used by 
animals in numerical tasks.  Another important aspect to defining animal numerical ability is 
determining the precision of those representations.  Thus, discovering the nature of the monkeys’ 
number concept required multiple experimental steps, including: 
1. Determining the existence of a number concept by testing whether performance in 
numerical tasks is based on a representation of number or a nonnumerical variable, such 
as hedonic value or a learned matrix of 2-choice discriminations.   
2. Determining the precision of the numerical representation by testing for ordinal versus 
absolute (cardinal) numerical knowledge.  In other words, investigating whether monkeys 
perform numerical tasks using knowledge of the ordinal position of each numeral, or 
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whether monkeys, like humans, understand that numerals represent precise quantities of 
items or events.   
3. Determining the generality of the monkeys’ representations by testing their ability to 
abstract number across different presentation modes.   
Taken together, these studies help to determine whether number is a stimulus attribute that 
comes to control behavior in a stimulus-response-reward associative fashion, or whether animals 
acquire a concept of number that then serves to guide behavior in various numerousness-relevant 
contexts.  In addition, the studies provide information regarding the nature of the monkeys’ 
numerical representations and their understanding of the symbolic nature of Arabic numerals. 
To understand the different steps required to investigate the monkeys’ concept of 
number, it is necessary to understand the benefits and limitations of the different paradigms 
commonly used in animal numerical research, as well as significant findings thus far.  The next 
section of this chapter provides a comprehensive literature review of animal cognition research 
and describes how the studies presented in this dissertation were designed to address unanswered 
questions in the field. 
Quantitative judgments 
In order to conclude that animals understand the conceptual nature of numerical stimuli, 
it is necessary to show that the nonhuman subjects are responding to the numerical dimension of 
the stimuli and not other stimulus attributes (e.g., density, surface area, and configuration) that 
can be used as a cue to responding.  This is important because these perceptual dimensions 
typically covary with number, and thus would produce the same response as number.  In fact, 
some testing paradigms that are considered a part of the numerical cognition literature are 
actually designed to assess general quantitative skills and thus do not control for nonnumerical 
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factors.  In these studies, which are sometimes called “go for more” judgments, animals are 
required to choose between two or more visible quantities.  The quantities are often composed of 
uniform food items, which minimizes the need for training because animals spontaneously 
choose the larger quantity.  The use of uniform food items, however, means that these judgments 
could be based on density, volume, and surface area.  Laboratory studies have shown that many 
species are able to recognize small differences between food quantities, but these judgments are 
most successful when the arrays are relatively small and the difference between the arrays is 
large.  Animals in the wild are also adept at choosing the largest food quantity, which is not 
surprising given the obvious foraging benefits (Menzel, 1960).  
 In an example of a laboratory study involving quantitative judgments, Uller, Jaeger, 
Guidry, and Martin (2003) presented red-backed salamanders (Plethodon cinereus) with two 
clear containers housing differing numbers of fruit flies.  The salamanders chose the container 
with the greatest amount of flies for discriminations of 1 versus 2, 2 versus 3, 3 versus 4, and 4 
versus 6.  Although the salamanders showed an ability to “go for more”, the choice may not have 
been based on number.  The container with the greatest number of fruit flies also had the greatest 
volume of flies and the highest probability of having at least one fly moving around during the 
choice process. 
Beran, Evans, Leighty, Harris, and Rice (2008) presented capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella) with two sets of 1 to 6 uniform cereal pieces.  The sets were originally covered with 
opaque containers and the experimenters revealed the sets sequentially prior to selection.  Thus, 
the two sets were never visible at the same time and the monkeys had to make selections without 
immediate visual access to the sets during responding.  The monkeys were able to retain 
quantitative information in memory and make accurate discriminations.  In a second experiment, 
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the monkeys were presented with sets that had both visible and nonvisible food items in them at 
the time of the response, thus requiring the monkeys to sum the total amount of food that was 
available.  The monkeys again succeeded, which indicates that capuchin monkeys are highly 
sensitive to differences in quantity.  
The great apes have also been tested with differing food quantities and their abilities 
exceeded that of capuchin monkeys and salamanders.  Dooley and Gill (1977) presented a 
chimpanzee named Lana with two quantities of cereal and allowed her to eat the quantity she 
selected.  Lana chose the larger quantity at levels greater than chance for comparisons as large a 
9 versus 10, although performance was better for small quantities that differed by more than a 
few items.  In a similar study, a group of lowland gorillas (Gorilla gorilla) chose the larger of 
two food quantities at levels comparable to the chimpanzee (Anderson et al., 2005). 
 In a study by Beran, Evans, and Harris (2008), chimpanzees were presented with one set 
of graham crackers in a vertical orientation (stacked) and one set of graham crackers in a 
horizontal orientation.  The animals showed some bias for choosing the set with the individually 
largest single food item, but in general they selected the set with the largest total amount of food.  
The ability of the chimpanzees to compare sets with different orientations illustrates the 
flexibility and proficiency of their quantitative comparison skills. 
 Animals in the wild need to be able to compare two quantities of food in order to survive, 
but summing quantities of food located in different places may also provide adaptive benefits.  
There is evidence from the laboratory that animals can perform some basic summation tasks.  In 
a study by Rumbaugh et al. (1987), chimpanzees were allowed to choose between two food 
trays.  Each food tray consisted of two food wells containing 1 to 5 chocolates.  To select the tray 
with the greatest total quantity of chocolates, the chimpanzees had to sum across the spatially 
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separated food wells and compare the two summed values.  The animals chose the tray with the 
greatest value on more than 90% of trials and accuracy was related to the ratio of the sums being 
compared.  The researchers suggested that the chimpanzees were not performing true addition, 
which involves enumerating the items in both sets and combining exact values.  Instead, 
summation could have been accomplished by perceptually fusing the chocolates in adjacent food 
wells to create two total quantities for comparison.  An addendum to this study provided strong 
evidence that the animals were summing the quantities and not simply avoiding the tray with the 
smallest single amount or selecting the tray with the largest single amount (Rumbaugh, Savage-
Rumbaugh, & Pate, 1988). 
Relative numerousness judgments with analog quantities 
Despite the ability of various species to compare and sum differing food quantities, true 
numerical ability can only be assessed by controlling for nonnumerical features of the stimulus 
array including size of the items, total surface area, brightness, and placement of the items within 
the array.  Judgments between two quantities differing in number are often referred to as relative 
numerousness judgments (RNJs), emphasizing the fact that the animal does not need to know the 
absolute value of either array to choose the larger or smaller of the two quantities.   
Thomas, Fowlkes, and Vickery (1980) conducted a study of relative numerousness 
judgments in two squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) using simultaneously visible stimuli.  The 
stimuli consisted of cards displaying an array of circles ranging in number from 2 to 8 and the 
monkeys were reinforced for choosing the smaller numerosity.  To control for area, brightness, 
and specific pattern cues the researchers used three different sizes of circles and a variety of 
patterns for each numerical value.  The monkeys were first trained with one pair of stimuli and 
the numerosities were increased progressively as they learned each combination.  One monkey 
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discriminated pairs up to 7 versus 8 circles and the other performed even better by successfully 
discriminating 8 versus 9 circles. 
In another relative numerousness study, Terrell and Thomas (1990) presented squirrel 
monkeys with different irregular polygons and rewarded them for choosing the stimulus with the 
fewest sides.  Two monkeys met a stringent 90% accuracy criterion when comparing polygons 
with 5 and 7 sides, one met criterion when comparing polygons with 6 and 7 sides, and one met 
criterion when comparing polygons with 7 and 8 sides.  In a second experiment, two polygons 
were presented on each card and the sides had to be summed to determine which card had the 
total fewer sides.  Three monkeys performed better than chance on comparisons of 6 and 8 sides 
and one monkey met the high accuracy criterion for 6 versus 8 and 7 versus 8, indicating that 
they were able to sum the sides of  the polygons. 
In addition to these studies of relative numerousness judgments in primates, there is 
evidence that other animals can discriminate between stimuli based on their relative numerosity.  
For example, pigeons presented with video displays consisting of small squares of red and blue 
elements learned to peck one side of the screen when the blue elements were more numerous 
than the red elements and the other side of the screen when the red elements were more 
numerous.  Control conditions indicated that this behavior was based on the relative 
numerousness of the different colors and not other factors such as the spacing and size of the 
elements (Honig & Matheson, 1995).  Pigeons were also able to discriminate the relative 
numerousness of items that differed in form such as X’s and O’s and images of birds and flowers 
(Honig & Stewart, 1989). 
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Relative numerousness judgments with symbols 
These studies illustrate the systematic control conditions that are necessary to eliminate 
nonnumerical cues when analog stimuli are used to represent number.  Stocklin (1999) has 
suggested that even with stringent control conditions there may be dimensions such as 
complexity that vary with number.  Perhaps a stimulus consisting of 5 squares looks more 
complex than a stimulus consisting of 3 squares because of the extra corners and edges, 
regardless of the size of the squares or the density of the stimulus arrays.  An alternative is to use 
arbitrary symbols, such as Arabic numerals, to represent number.  The use of symbols eliminates 
the need for many of the control conditions used with analog stimuli.  However, the lack of 
inherent numerical value means that the animals must be trained to associate the symbols with 
different numbers.  
Mitchell et al. (1985) trained dolphins to associate 6 unique objects with differing 
numbers of fish.  On each trial, dolphins were allowed to choose from an array of 2 or more 
objects and each object was consistently rewarded with a certain number of fish ranging from 0 
to 5.  After approximately 2,000 trials the dolphins learned to choose the available object that 
represented the greatest amount of fish for most pairings.  This indicates that the dolphins were 
able to learn the relations among the stimuli.  
In a series of studies, Boysen and her colleagues found evidence that the use of symbols 
can actually improve performance in tasks involving reverse contingency reinforcement.  In one 
study, chimpanzees were trained to select among two different amounts of candy ranging from 1 
to 6 pieces.  The array that was chosen by the chimpanzee was then given to another chimpanzee 
observing the experiment.  The active chimpanzee received the remaining nonselected array.  
Thus, the optimal strategy for the active chimpanzee was to choose the smaller array.  The 
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chimpanzees consistently selected the larger candy array even though it resulted in a smaller 
reward, but performance greatly improved when Arabic numerals were substituted for the candy 
arrays.  In addition, performance increased as the numerical distance between the Arabic 
numerals increased even though the opposite was true for the candy arrays.  The use of symbols 
allowed the chimpanzees to inhibit their natural instinct to choose the larger food array, thereby 
optimizing performance (Boysen & Berntson, 1995).  This was also true when the nonselected 
choice was simply removed instead of given to an observer animal (Boysen, Berntson, Hannan, 
& Cacioppo, 1996) and when the chimpanzees were presented with mixed symbol-candy choices 
(Boysen, Mukobi, & Berntson, 1999).  These results suggest that symbols can have an adaptive 
function because they represent number without exhibiting the same distracting properties as 
food items.  It is possible that the adaptive benefit is limited to chimpanzees, however, because a 
similar study with orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) found that the use of numerals did not increase 
performance (Shumaker, Palkovich, Beck, Guagnano, & Morowitz, 2001). 
Despite the facilitative effects that Arabic numerals can have on some numerical tasks, a 
large number of training trials are usually required before the animal learns to select the 
numerals in the correct sequence (e.g., Olthof & Roberts, 2000; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991).  
Beran, Beran, Harris, and Washburn (2005) devised a system that facilitated rapid learning of the 
relations among symbols representing different quantities of food.  They used colored plastic 
eggs as the symbols because color is a highly salient property for most nonhuman species.  The 
use of eggs also ensured close spatial contiguity between the stimuli and the food items they 
represented because the food could be placed directly inside of the eggs.  Results revealed that 
two chimpanzees and a rhesus macaque rapidly learned the relations between five colored eggs 
when all eggs of a given color contained a specific number of identical food items (e.g., blue 
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eggs always contained four food pellets).  However, all animals failed in a summation task, in 
which a single container was compared with a set of 2 containers of a lesser individual quantity 
but a greater combined quantity.  This finding indicates that the animals had difficulty evaluating 
the sets of colored containers on the basis of more than one dimension (color and quantity). 
Although the use of symbols and other stringent controls of nonnumerical features in 
these judgment tasks allow researchers to conclude that animals are sensitive to number, there 
are important limitations to this research paradigm.  One limitation is that it is difficult to 
determine whether the judgments are based on the absolute or relative number of stimuli.  For 
example, it is possible to judge that a set of 5 elements is greater in number than a set of 4 
elements without knowing the exact number of elements in either set.  If animals have a true 
understanding of the symbolic nature of Arabic numerals, their representations should include 
both relative and absolute numerical knowledge.  
To test for absolute numeral knowledge, Beran et al. (2005) presented the primates in 
their study with trials involving one colored egg and one visible set of food items.  All three 
animals performed at high levels, indicating that the animals had learned the approximate 
quantity of food items in eggs of a given color.  Other researchers have devised alternative 
paradigms to investigate knowledge of absolute number in animals, which will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
Ordinal numerical judgments with analog quantities 
Another limitation of relative numerousness studies is that some do not make it clear 
whether the animals understand the ordinality of these stimuli or whether they are simply 
learning pair-wise comparisons.  Ordinality refers to the ability to place items in a particular 
sequence based on some quantitative property, such as size or number.  The monkeys in the 
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Thomas et al. (1980) and Terrell and Thomas (1990) studies were trained with one pair of 
numerosities after another and could have performed discriminations such as 2 versus 3 and 3 
versus 4 by learning that the numerosity 3 is rewarded when it is paired with 4, but not when it is 
paired with 2.  This is not the same as knowing the ordered rule: 2 is less than 3, which is less 
than 4.   
To conclude that animals are representing the numerical values associated with numerals 
and not simply responding to numerals as conditioned stimuli, it is necessary to determine that 
animals are not responding to numeral pairs based on learned 2-choice discriminations (e.g., if 
the stimuli are 4 and 5, pick 5 to get the reward; if the stimuli are 4 and 3, pick 4; and so forth).  
One way to show that an animal’s performance is based on knowledge of numerical order is to 
train them on a range of numerosities and then test them on novel values outside of that range.  
Emmerton, Lohmann, and Niemann (1997) trained pigeons to differentiate visual arrays 
according to the relative number of their elements.  Initially, the pigeons were reinforced for 
pecks to one response key when the stimulus depicted “many” elements (6 or 7) and were 
reinforced for pecks to a different response key when the stimulus depicted “few” elements (1 or 
2).  In subsequent tests, the novel intervening numerosities 3, 4, and 5 were introduced and 
nonnumerical factors such as brightness, size, shape, area, and contour of the elements were 
systematically controlled across tests.  The pigeons were reinforced on all trials involving novel 
numerosities, regardless of their response.  The investigators found that variations in 
performance corresponded to the values of the new numerosities.  As the number of elements in 
each stimulus increased, so did the percentage of “many” choices made by the pigeons.  The 
subjects responded to these novel numerosities as if they belonged on a continuum between the 
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stimuli representing few and many.  This indicates that they did not view the numerosities as 
disconnected categories, but instead recognized the relationship between them. 
In another study involving transfer to novel numerosities, Kilian et al. (2003) trained a 
bottlenose dolphin to discriminate between two simultaneously presented stimuli differing in 
numerosity.  The dolphin was trained with the numerosities 2 and 5 and then tested with 
nonreinforced trials involving all combinations of the novel numerosities 1 through 6.  The 
dolphin showed evidence of immediate transfer for all of the novel numerosity pairs excluding 4 
versus 5, which indicates that dolphins are also capable of representing ordinal relations among 
some numerosities. 
In a frequently cited study of ordinal knowledge in animals, Brannon and Terrace (1998) 
trained two rhesus monkeys to respond to exemplars of the numerosities 1 to 4 in ascending 
order.  The configuration of the exemplars was varied randomly between trials and the exemplars 
were controlled for nonnumerical features such as size, density, and color.  The monkeys were 
then tested on their ability to order pairs of the numerosities 1 through 9.  No reinforcement was 
provided for pairs involving novel numerosities and new exemplars were used on each trial so 
that the monkeys could not memorize the individual exemplars.  Both monkeys responded in 
ascending order on each type of numerical pair, including those involving novel numerosities.  
As was true for many of the studies already discussed, accuracy was highest for small 
numerosities and those separated by a large numerical distance.  Subsequent studies using similar 
procedures demonstrated that brown capuchin monkeys (Judge et al., 2005), as well as a 
hamadryas baboon (Papio hamadryas) and a squirrel monkey (Smith et al., 2003) could 
represent and order the numerosities 1 through 9 and rhesus monkeys trained to order the values 
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1 through 9 could correctly order pairs of the novel numerosities 10, 15, 20, and 30 (Cantlon & 
Brannon, 2006). 
Although the two monkeys trained by Brannon and Terrace (1998) to order numerosities 
in ascending order (1-2-3-4) were correctly able to order the novel numerosities 5 through 9, it is 
interesting to note that another monkey trained to respond in descending order (4-3-2-1) did not 
exceed a chance level of accuracy on pairs of novel numerosities.  This puzzling result prompted 
a follow-up experiment in which the researchers trained one rhesus monkey to respond to 
exemplars in a 4-5-6 order and another to respond to exemplars in a 6-5-4 order.  Results 
revealed that the monkey trained on a 4-5-6 sequence was highly accurate when presented with 
novel pairs derived from the values 7 through 9, but performed below chance levels when 
presented with pairs derived from the values 1 through 3.  The opposite was true for the monkey 
trained on a 6-5-4 sequence (Brannon & Terrace, 2000).  These results suggest that the monkeys 
may not use an ordinal rule in the same way that humans would in a similar task.  Instead, they 
may respond to test pairs based on which value is closer to the first value on which they were 
trained.  This strategy still requires ordinal knowledge because the monkeys recognize which 
novel numerosities are closest to their initial training value, but it leaves open the question of 
whether or not monkeys can represent all of the values 1 through 9 on a continuous mental line.  
Ordinal numerical judgments with symbols 
Ordinal studies can also be conducted using symbols such as Arabic numerals instead of 
analog stimuli, but a different strategy is needed because novel symbols have no inherent 
meaning for the animals and therefore cannot be used to test the spontaneous transfer of an 
ordinal rule from one range of values to another.  Instead, researchers test the animal’s ability to 
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transfer an ordinal rule to novel combinations of trained symbols that cannot be ordered using 
transitive inference.   
In a study by Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991), two rhesus monkeys used a joystick to 
choose between pairs of the Arabic numerals 0 through 9 on a computer screen.  Each selection 
was rewarded with the corresponding number of pellets (i.e., one pellet for choosing the numeral 
1 and two pellets for choosing the numeral 2).  During training the monkeys learned to choose 
the larger of the two numerals to receive the larger reward.  The investigators withheld seven 
pairs during training and presented them later as novel probe trials.  One monkey responded to 
these novel pairs of symbols at levels significantly greater than chance within the first few 
presentations.  These probe pairings were carefully chosen by investigators so that they could not 
be solved by logical transitivity.  For instance, the monkeys learned during training that 8 
resulted in a larger reward than 7 and that 8 resulted in a larger reward than 6, but this 
information alone could not help them solve the probe pairing of 7 and 6.  The monkeys may 
have solved the probe pairings using knowledge of the exact difference between pairs of 
numerals.  In other words, during training they may have learned not only that 8 was greater than 
7 and 6, but that 8 was greater than 7 by one pellet and 8 was greater than 6 by two pellets.  A 
more parsimonious explanation is that the monkeys learned the absolute value of pellets 
associated with each numeral.  For instance, they learned that choosing the numeral 8 resulted in 
eight pellets and choosing the numeral 7 resulted in seven pellets. 
 It is clear from the probe trials that the monkeys acquired some form of knowledge of the 
relative values of the numerals.  In other words, they recognized that 8 > 7 and 7 > 6 and so forth 
for different pairs of numerals.  However, this is not the same as knowing that all of the numerals 
are ordered in magnitude along a continuum such that 8 > 7 > 6.  To investigate this question, 
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Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991) presented the two monkeys with random arrays of up to five 
numerals.  The monkeys were able to choose the numerals in descending numerical order, which 
indicates that the monkeys organized the numerals in a sequence according to their values. 
In a series of similar experiments, Olthof and colleagues (Olthof et al., 1997; Olthof & 
Roberts, 2000) presented squirrel monkeys and pigeons with choices between all possible pairs 
of the Arabic numerals 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9.  Each numeral was rewarded with the corresponding 
number of food pieces.  Both species learned to choose the larger numeral when presented with 
pair-wise comparisons and immediately chose the larger numeral when presented with novel 
pairs that could not be solved by transitive inference.  They also learned to choose the largest 
numeral from a set of four numerals.  In subsequent experiments, the animals were presented 
with stimuli that consisted of 1 to 3 numerals.  They chose the largest total sum when presented 
with pairs of stimuli containing 2 numerals versus 2 numerals, 1 numeral versus 2 numerals, and 
3 numerals versus 3 numerals, although performance was better for smaller ratios of total 
quantities.  These results could not be explained by selection of the stimulus with the largest 
single numeral or avoidance of the smallest single numeral.  This indicates that the animals 
summed the symbols that were located in close spatial proximity and that they had a fairly 
accurate representation of the individual quantities associated with each symbol. 
Despite the success of animals trained to associate numerals with differing numbers of 
food rewards in the studies by Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991) and Olthof and colleagues 
(Olthof et al., 1997; Olthof & Roberts, 2000), questions remained regarding the interpretation of 
those data.  First, presenting different numbers of food rewards based on differing numerals 
allowed for the possibility that the animals were responding on the basis of hedonic value.  In 
other words, choices with higher numerical values were also associated with a greater quantity of 
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food so responses may have been based on a judgment of how satiating a stimulus was instead of 
the numerical value of the stimulus. 
 There were also questions regarding the final experiment by Washburn and Rumbaugh 
(1991) in which 3, 4, or 5 numerals were presented at once on the screen.  The monkeys 
exceeded chance levels of performance on those trials, suggesting that the monkeys had 
established an ordinal sequence based on those numerals and their magnitude.  However, this 
final experiment occurred during the point at which the monkeys were most highly experienced 
in the task, and no control condition was offered to illustrate just how quickly the monkeys may 
have learned to respond to arrays of up to five completely novel stimuli.  These comparison data 
would illustrate whether performance with larger arrays of numerals was supported by an ordinal 
representation of the numeral stimuli acquired during the previous experiments (in other words, 
whether the animals had established a competency in ordering numerals on the basis of their 
magnitudes) or was simply the result of rapid learning of a new ordinal sequence. 
In a study by Beran et al. (2008), further aspects of ordinal learning with numerical 
stimuli were investigated in capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys.  Both species were 
presented with pairings of the Arabic numerals 0 through 9, but some animals were given 
differential rewards based on the numeral selected and some were rewarded with a single pellet 
for every correct response.  Both species learned to select the larger of the two numerals, and 
rhesus monkeys that were differentially rewarded performed above chance levels when presented 
with novel probe pairings.  This provides evidence that performance was not the result of 
hedonic value that accrued because of reward contingencies.  In a second experiment, the 
monkeys were first presented was arrays of 5 numerals (0-9) and then arrays of 5 letters.  Both 
species performed better with the numerals, which indicated that performance was not just the 
35 
result of rapid learning.  Instead, an ordinal sequence of all stimuli had been learned during the 
first experiment. 
Absolute numerical judgments with symbols 
Despite the impressive evidence that these studies provide for ordinal knowledge in 
nonhuman primates, it is difficult to determine whether the judgments are based on the absolute 
or relative numerosity of the stimuli.  As stated earlier, it is possible to judge that five elements 
are more than four elements without knowing the absolute number of either set of elements, 
which is also known as the cardinal value of the set.  Animals in the wild typically confront 
situations where relative knowledge is sufficient.  For example, it is important for an animal to 
know whether its allies outweigh its foes before engaging in a conflict, but it is not necessary to 
know the exact number of friends or foes.  This fact led numerical researcher Hank Davis (1993) 
to conclude that absolute numerosity is a “distinctly human invention” (p. 109).  
 Despite the lack of ecological necessity, there is some evidence that the monkeys in 
Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991) learned the quantitative values represented by Arabic 
numerals.  In a study of Stroop-like effects, six numeral-trained rhesus monkeys from the same 
laboratory learned to select the larger of two arrays of 1 to 9 letters (e.g., to select five As rather 
than four Cs; Washburn, 1994).  When the arrays of letters were replaced with arrays of 
numerals, it was more difficult for the monkeys to choose the array with the most stimuli when 
that array was composed of the smaller numeral (e.g., four 1s versus two 5s) than when it was 
composed of the larger numeral (e.g., four 5s versus two 3s).  These Stroop-like interference and 
facilitation effects suggest that these monkeys processed the absolute quantitative meanings of 
the numerical symbols automatically because of their prior training with these numerals, despite 
the fact that these meanings were irrelevant to the task. 
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In Experiment 1 of Chapter 2: What do Arabic numerals mean to macaques?, we 
further investigated the use of absolute versus ordinal representations by presenting six numeral-
trained rhesus monkeys with pairs of Arabic numerals and pairs of dot arrays ranging in value 
from 1 to 9.  Five of the monkeys received proportional rewards for every selection (e.g., picking 
the numeral 4 or an array of four dots netted four pellets) and the sixth monkey was rewarded 
with a proportional number of pellets for numerals, but probabilistic rewards for dot selections 
(e.g., correctly picking the larger array always netted one pellet).  The alternative reward 
contingency was designed to address the criticism that rewarding animals with a number of food 
items corresponding to the value of the stimulus confounds number and hedonic value (Brannon 
& Terrace, 2002). 
The monkeys were then given novel probe pairs involving one Arabic numeral choice 
and one dot array choice.  If the monkeys had originally learned a complex matrix of values 
using knowledge of the relative difference and degree of relative difference between pairs of 
numerals, then they should be incapable of comparing symbols with actual quantities.  
Conversely, if the monkeys acquired knowledge of the absolute quantity of pellets represented 
by each Arabic numeral, then they might be able to compare symbols with analog dot arrays.  
Results revealed that all of the monkeys were able to choose the largest value for probe 
trials involving one numeral and one dot array, even on the first exposure to these trials.  This 
finding allowed us to rule out a matrix of learned values and also hedonic value as the basis for 
responding.  The data therefore suggest that the monkeys had acquired knowledge about the 
absolute quantity of things represented by each Arabic numeral and could, even on probe trials, 
compare accurately this represented quantity to a visible array of dots.   
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An alternative possibility, however, is that performance reflected integration of two 
learned sequences instead of comparisons of quantity.  Research indicates that monkeys trained 
to order two lists of four arbitrary stimuli (e.g., A1B1C1D1 and A2B2C2D2) immediately 
respond correctly at a greater than chance level when presented with comparisons of two items 
from different lists (e.g., A1-C2 and B1-D2; D’Amato & Colombo, 1988; Terrace, Son, & 
Brannon, 2003).  It is possible that the monkeys in the Chapter 2 study perceived the numerals as 
one arbitrary list of stimuli and the dot quantities as another arbitrary list and ordered pairs of 
numerals and dots using only knowledge of their ordinal position.  
In Chapter 3: Ordinal-list integration for symbolic, arbitrary, and analog stimuli by 
rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) we assessed whether the animals in our laboratory were 
responding to numerals on the basis of their ordinal value or whether they had a representation of 
the absolute value associated with each numeral.  If Arabic numerals have ordinal value for the 
monkeys based on their previous numerical experience, they should learn to produce a list of 
Arabic numerals faster than they would learn to produce a list of unfamiliar arbitrary stimuli.  
Conversely, if past experiences using Arabic numerals have led to representations of those 
numerals that are linked to specific quantities (cardinal values), but not ordinal values, then the 
monkeys should show no advantage when learning to produce an ordinal list of numerals.  In 
addition, these quantity representations should not lead to facilitative effects during integration 
of the numeral list with lists of arbitrary stimuli that are only associated with ordinal information.  
In Experiment 1 of Chapter 3, monkeys learned to order serially a list of five numerals, a list of 
five colored squares, and a list of five arbitrary signs.  In Experiment 2, the monkeys received 
nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of items from different lists, testing the ability of the 
monkeys to use ordinal position information to integrate the lists.  
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In addition to our investigation of the use of ordinal versus cardinal numerical 
knowledge, we also investigated the integration of analog quantities into ordinal lists.  In 
Experiment 3 of Chapter 3, the monkeys received nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of analog 
quantities and items from the three learned lists.  Both of the monkeys involved in this study had 
previous experience viewing and responding to a variety of analog stimuli, so we hypothesized 
that the monkeys may spontaneously be able to integrate those types of stimuli into ordinal lists 
by converting the quantity information inherent in the analog sets into ordinal information.  
Together, the experiments in Chapter 3 provide us with a greater understanding of the nature of 
the monkeys’ concept of number and their understanding of the symbolic nature of Arabic 
numerals. 
The studies in Chapters 2 and 3 tested for absolute numerical knowledge using pairwise 
comparison tasks, but other paradigms exist as well.  To test for absolute numerical 
representations, several researchers have attempted to train animals to match numerical 
quantities with specific symbols.  For example, Ferster (1964) trained two chimpanzees to match 
the quantities 1 through 7 with binary numbers ranging from 001 to 111.  In the first phase of 
training, the chimpanzees were shown a number of polygons on a display panel, which varied in 
size, shape, and arrangement.  They were then required to select the matching binary code from 
two different options.  In the next phase of training, the animals were shown a number of 
polygons and were required to “write” the matching binary number by lighting up one to three 
bulbs, with a lit bulb signifying “1” and an unlit bulb signifying “0” within the binary code.   The 
animals learned this task, but it required hundreds of thousands of training trials. 
Matsuzawa (1985) performed a more recent study of numerical matching with a 
chimpanzee named Ai.  The chimpanzee was presented with groups of 3-dimensional objects, 
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such as pencils and keys, and a keyboard with symbols representing specific objects, colors, and 
numbers.  The goal of the task was to press the three keys that represented the identity, color, and 
number of items in the display.  She succeeded in learning numerical labels for arrays of 1 to 6 
items and correctly labeled 300 types of samples.  Although Ai could press the keys in any order, 
she usually selected the color first, the identity second, and the number last, which may indicate 
that she was least confident about the numerical labels.  In support of that theory, Matsuzawa 
noted that accuracy was lower for the numerical labels compared to the color and object identity 
labels and numerical labels were learned more slowly.  In subsequent studies Ai was trained to 
label sets of heterogeneous objects and sets of dots that varied in size, density, and pattern with 
the Arabic numerals 1 through 7 (Murofushi, 1997) and to use the numeral 0 to represent the 
absence of items (Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001). 
 Studies also show that several bird species are capable of matching symbols to specific 
numerosities.  For example, Xia et al. (2001) presented pigeons with exemplars of different 
numerosities, which were controlled for nonnumerical features.  Each exemplar was followed by 
an array of letters and each letter was designated to correspond to one of the numerosities.  With 
training, five pigeons learned to respond to the numerosities 1 through 4 at levels above chance, 
and two pigeons also learned to respond correctly to the numerosity 5.   
 In several studies, a grey parrot named Alex demonstrated the ability to respond to 
different quantities of items with a verbal numerical label (i.e., the word “three”) and to choose 
the matching quantity after hearing a verbal label (Pepperberg, 1994; Pepperberg & Gordon, 
2005).  For instance, when presented with a group of 4 corks he responded by verbalizing the 
word “four.”  When presented with a collection of heterogeneous objects including 5 keys and 
asked, “What five?” he was able correctly to answer “keys.”  These studies indicate that Alex 
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could produce and comprehend verbal labels for quantities up to 6 and that his accuracy was 
unaffected by the size of the quantity.  These data are interesting given the large number of 
animal numerical studies which show a decrease in accuracy as quantity increases. 
 In a subsequent study, the same parrot was able to combine two nonvisible sets of items 
and respond with the correct verbal label.  A trial began when an experimenter placed two sets of 
variously sized objects on a tray and covered them with cups.  The experimenter then briefly 
showed the parrot the items under each cup before covering them again.  The cups were lifted 
one at a time so the parrot never saw all the items at once.  The parrot was able to produce the 
correct verbal label for the total at levels greater than chance for the quantities 1 through 6 and 
his accuracy did not decrease as the total numbers of items increased.  These results indicate that 
the parrot was able to remember the quantity under each cup, combine the quantities through 
some process, and then produce a label for the total amount (Pepperberg, 2006) 
Absolute numerical judgments with analog quantities 
Other researchers investigate absolute numerical knowledge in animals using a paradigm 
that requires the subject to select a fixed analog quantity from an array of simultaneously 
presented options.  In one of the first known studies of absolute numerical ability in animals, a 
German scientist named Koehler (1950) trained a raven (Corvus corax) to choose a pot with 5 
dots on the lid from among a set of pot lids depicting different numbers of dots.  The raven could 
make this discrimination despite variations in the size and form of the dots.  In another of 
Koehler’s studies, a raven and a parrot were given a sample stimulus consisting of a lid bearing 1 
to 6 dots and were required to match that sample to another lid bearing the same number of dots.  
The size and pattern of the dots on the sample and comparison lids were made as dissimilar as 
possible to prevent the birds from using perceptual cues instead of numerical cues to perform the 
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task.  Davis and Memmott (1992) warned, however, that the performance of Koehler’s birds 
should be viewed with caution because his written accounts are lacking in experimental details.   
Hayes and Nissen (1971) performed a very similar experiment with a chimpanzee named 
Viki and demonstrated that she could match a stimulus card displaying a random pattern of dots 
with a response card displaying the same number of dots.  Performance was very good for dot 
patterns ranging in number from 1 to 3, but deteriorated as the number increased. 
 Other researchers found that rhesus monkeys (Hicks, 1956) and a raccoon (Procyon 
lotor; Davis, 1984) could choose a display of three items from displays consisting of 1 to 5 
items, even when extraneous cues such as area, density, spatial arrangement, and odor were 
controlled.  In addition, a recent laboratory study employing strict controls of nonnumerical 
factors demonstrated that monkeys were able to choose an exact numerical match for computer-
generated examples of the numerosities 1 through 9, although performance was modulated by the 
ratio between the correct numerical match and the distractor stimulus (Jordan & Brannon, 2006). 
 The fact that animals can perform tasks requiring them to choose a specific numerosity 
from an array of alternatives or match a specific numerosity to a symbol or verbal label indicates 
that they have a sense of cardinality.  That is, they have knowledge of the absolute value of the 
quantities.  However, the results of these studies do not provide evidence that these animals can 
order the quantities, or symbols representing the quantities, along a continuum.  In the study by 
Murofushi (1997), Ai learned to associate Arabic numerals with different quantities, but she may 
have represented Arabic numerals as separate and unrelated categories, just as we represent 
categories such as “tree” and “flower.”  There is some evidence that Ai failed to grasp the ordinal 
properties of the numerals.  Even after extensive experience with the task, each new numeral still 
required the same number of trials to reach criterion as the numeral before.  Ai did not recognize 
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that each new numeral represented the addition of one more item to the sample array, which 
would have allowed for immediate transfer to new numerals.  In this way, Ai is different from 
preschool children who immediately recognize that a new numeral is connected to a new 
quantity and that each new numeral in a series represents one more item than the one before 
(Carey, 2004).  Despite Ai’s inability to demonstrate ordinal knowledge in this particular task, 
numerous studies that do reveal ordinal knowledge in animals have already been discussed in 
this chapter (e.g., Brannon & Terrace, 1998, 2000; Emmerton et al., 1997; Judge et al., 2005; 
Kilian et al., 2003; Olthof et al., 1997; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991).  Collectively, these 
findings suggest that both ordinal and cardinal studies are necessary to develop a true picture of 
animal numerical abilities. 
Numerical discriminations of sequentially presented objects or events 
All of the studies described thus far have involved simultaneously presented stimuli, but 
another important aspect of numerical cognition is the ability to keep track of sequentially 
presented stimuli or events.  Adult humans have a concept of number that allows them to keep 
track of a sequential number of lightening flashes, or trips to the store, or notes of music, but 
whether animals share this ability is an interesting experimental question.  It is plain to see how 
the ability to compare two visible quantities of food or to weigh a number of attackers against a 
number of allies would be beneficial to animals in the wild, but the benefits of keeping track of 
sequentially encountered objects or events is less obvious.  Sequential studies are also different 
than simultaneous studies because different methods of control must be used to rule out 
nonnumerical factors.  Instead of controlling for stimulus features such as size and density, 
researchers must control for temporal factors such as total duration of presentation and rate of 
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presentation.  In recent years, researchers using a variety of paradigms and methods of control 
have provided a wealth of evidence for sequential numerical abilities in nonhuman animals.  
In a study by Beran (2001), two chimpanzees watched as pieces of candy were placed, 
one at a time, into two opaque cups.  The cups were lined with foam to reduce auditory feedback 
and temporal factors were controlled.  The chimpanzees succeeded in choosing the cup with the 
largest quantity when sets of 1 to 9 candies were used and the maximum difference did not 
exceed 4 candies.  They also succeeded when the quantities in each cup were presented as two 
smaller sets of 1 to 6 candies and even when they were presented as three smaller sets of 1 to 4 
candies.  These results provide evidence that chimpanzees can mentally combine and compare 
sequentially presented items, but the candies were uniform in size so it is unclear whether the 
animals were using number or amount of food.  Accuracy in all of these experiments was 
significantly correlated with the ratio and total number of the two quantities.  In the final 
experiment, 1 to 5 candies were placed into each cup and the experimenter then removed one of 
the candies from the cup on the left.  One of the chimpanzees was able to select the cup with the 
largest amount of candy on these trials, which indicates that he was representing the absolute 
difference between the two cups and not just keeping track of which cup had the larger amount.  
It is possible that he was representing the absolute magnitude of each quantity as well, but it is 
not clear from this procedure. 
In a variation of this study, chimpanzees watched as two sets of 1 to 10 marshmallows 
were sequentially placed into opaque cups.  After these sequential presentations, a visible set was 
made available as well and the chimpanzees were allowed to select any of the three choices.  The 
animals succeeded in selecting the greatest quantity, which indicates that they remembered the 
approximate magnitude of the largest nonvisible set and were able to compare that to the visible 
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set.  The chimpanzees also responded correctly when one marshmallow was removed from one 
of the two sequentially presented sets before selection, but not when more than one marshmallow 
was removed (Beran, 2004).  Similar studies have shown that orangutans are able to compare 
sequentially presented sets of food items and represent the absolute difference between them 
(Call, 2000) and that rhesus monkeys are able to choose the larger of two sequentially presented 
computer-generated sets of items, even when number does not covary with quantity (Beran, 
2007). 
Recent research has shown that capuchin monkeys, like chimpanzees and other species 
more closely related to humans, are also sensitive to the quantitative value of sequentially 
presented stimuli.  Evans, Beran, Harris, and Rice (2008) presented capuchin monkeys with one 
set of simultaneously visible food items and a second set of sequentially presented items that was 
never visible in its entirety.  Results revealed that the monkeys exhibited high accuracy in 
choosing the larger set, regardless of whether the correct set was the simultaneously visible or 
sequentially presented set.  However, the monkeys exhibited near-chance performance in a 
second experiment in which they were required to choose between two sequentially presented 
sets.  Further analysis of the results revealed that performance was related to trial duration, which 
suggests that their poor performance may have stemmed from a relatively limited attentional 
capacity.  
Lewis et al. (2005) used a search task to investigate the ability of lemurs (Eulemur 
mongoz) to keep track of sequentially presented quantities.  The animals watched as an 
experimenter placed grapes, one at a time, into an opaque bucket.  The lemurs were then allowed 
to retrieve the grapes from the bucket.  On half of the trials, grapes were placed into a false 
bottom in the bucket so that they were inaccessible to the animals.  The experimental question 
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was whether or not the lemurs would spend more time searching the bucket when grapes should 
have remained compared to when all the grapes were retrieved.  The lemurs searched longer on 
trials with hidden grapes when the numerosities differed by a 1:2 ratio, but not when they 
differed by a 2:3 ratio or a 3:4 ratio.  In a control condition, the lemurs watched as two half-
grapes were placed into the bucket and then continued to search after retrieving a whole grape.  
This indicates that they were representing the number of grapes and not just the total amount of 
grape. 
There are several other paradigms that researchers use to investigate number 
representations in sequential studies involving animals.  Davis and Bradford (1986) required rats 
to enter a particular tunnel (e.g., the third tunnel) in an array of six tunnels to obtain food.  
Spatial, olfactory, and visual cues were controlled to ensure that the rats were using the number 
of sequentially encountered tunnels as a cue to the correct tunnel.  The rats even performed well 
when they were presented with a novel configuration that required them to turn a corner in order 
to select the correct tunnel.  In an extension of this study, rats were able to perform above chance 
when the correct tunnel was the tenth among twelve or eighteen tunnels and when the size of the 
tunnels was varied to control for cumulative length (Suzuki & Kobayashi, 2000).  Other 
researchers used a similar procedure to show that 5-day-old chickens (Gallus gallus) could 
choose the correct food well from an array of identical food wells using numerical cues (Rugani, 
Regolin, & Vallortigara, 2007). 
Other investigators have used a forced-choice discrimination procedure to study 
sequential numerical knowledge.  Keen and Machado (1999) presented pigeons with two 
different flashing lights and the pigeons learned to choose the light that flashed the least number 
of times.  In another study, Roberts and Mitchell (1994) trained pigeons to discriminate between 
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two and eight flashes of light.  Davis and Albert (1986) conducted a sequential study using 
auditory stimuli.  In this study, rats were rewarded for lever pressing after hearing three noise 
bursts and not after hearing two or four noise bursts.  The rats learned to lever press more after 
three noise bursts than two or four, which indicates that responding was based on something 
more complicated than a “same” versus “many” discrimination.  
Numerical discriminations of sequential motor responses 
In other sequential paradigms, the numerical stimuli to be discriminated consist of the 
animal’s own responses.  Procedures requiring the subject to make a discrete number of motor 
responses are sometimes referred to as constructive enumeration tasks.  These tasks contrast with 
receptive enumeration tasks, in which the animal must enumerate externally presented sets of 
items or events before making a response (Beran & Rumbaugh, 2001; Xia et al., 2000).  In a 
paradigm developed by Mechner (1958), rats were required to make a certain number of 
responses in order to obtain a reward.  After 4, 8, 12, or 16 presses on lever A the rats could 
switch to lever B to obtain food.  Switching levers prematurely was an error and resulted in the 
trial starting over again.  In a subsequent study, Platt and Johnson (1971) required rats to signal 
when they had completed a certain number of lever presses by poking their nose into a food tray 
with a sensor.  In both of these studies the number of presses on the first lever was approximately 
normally distributed around a number slightly higher than the number of required presses.  This 
is a rational strategy given that abandoning the lever too early resulted in a penalty.  Even after 
training, results were imprecise and revealed scalar variance, which is a hallmark of the analog 
magnitude model.  This lever-pressing paradigm allowed the number of responses to covary with 
the time spent responding, but a later experiment by Mechner and Guevrekian (1962) 
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manipulated the rate of responding by changing the level of the rat’s food deprivation and found 
that this manipulation had no effect on the average number of presses or the distribution.  
In a unique study of sequential enumeration ability, Boysen and Berntson (1989) baited 
several sites around their laboratory with 1 to 3 oranges each.  A chimpanzee named Sheba 
learned to move from site to site and then choose the Arabic numeral that corresponded to the 
total number of oranges she had encountered.  In subsequent testing, the researchers replaced the 
oranges with cards depicting Arabic numerals ranging from 0 to 4 and her performance was not 
disrupted.  Sheba spontaneously summed the Arabic numerals at three different sites and chose 
the numeral that represented the total value.  It is possible that Sheba was summing the quantities 
represented by each individual numeral, but it is also possible that she was using a simpler 
strategy such as “counting all” or “counting on.”  In the counting all strategy, the subject 
enumerates all the items sequentially and maintains a running tally.  In the counting on strategy, 
the subject begins with the cardinal value of the first quantity and then adds onto it by 
enumerating the rest of the items sequentially.  Boysen (1993) referred to these two strategies as 
“pseudo-addition” because true addition involves combining a cardinal representation of one 
numerosity with the cardinal representation of another numerosity. 
Xia et al. (2000) investigated the use of symbols in a sequential task by presenting 
pigeons with a key that randomly displayed one of several possible symbols on each trial.  The 
symbols indicated how many pecks the pigeons were required to make to the key.  After 
completing a series of pecks, the pigeons signaled the completion of the trial by pecking a 
second key.  Six pigeons were able to match 1 to 5 pecks with the corresponding symbols and 
four were also able to match 6 pecks to the corresponding symbol.  Temporal variables were not 
controlled during this study, but subsequent analysis indicated that the animals were mainly 
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relying on number and not time.  As with most animal numerical studies, accuracy decreased as 
the number of required responses increased and the distribution of errors increased 
systematically with the number of responses.  This is a more flexible form of constructive 
enumeration than that demonstrated by the rats in Mechner’s (1958) paradigm because the rats 
were trained with each number successively.  The use of symbols as a cue to the number of 
required pecks allowed researchers to present the pigeons with randomly intermixed series 
requiring different numbers of pecks on every trial. 
In a series of constructive enumeration studies, two chimpanzees named Lana and Austin 
used a joystick to contact the number of boxes on a computer screen that equaled a randomly 
selected Arabic numeral (1-3 for Lana and 1-4 for Austin).  After they finished contacting boxes, 
they made contact with the numeral to signal the end of the trial.  No visual feedback was 
provided so the chimpanzees had to rely on their memory to determine whether they had 
removed the correct number of boxes.  They did not use any specific pattern of selection, which 
suggests that they knew that the number of items was the important factor and not the selection 
pattern (Beran et al., 1998; Rumbaugh et al., 1989; Rumbaugh & Washburn, 1993). 
In a more recent study using a similar procedure, Beran and Rumbaugh (2001) provided 
evidence that one chimpanzee could contact a number of dots equal to the Arabic numerals 1 
through 6 and a second chimpanzee could also respond correctly to the numeral 7.  There were a 
maximum of ten dots present on every trial and they were randomly positioned so that every trial 
had a unique pattern.  Analysis of trial duration data indicated that the chimpanzees were 
responding based on number and not temporal cues and analysis of accuracy indicated that 
performance decreased as the target number increased. 
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In another study involving successive actions, Capaldi and Miller (1988) presented rats 
with series of reinforced (R) and nonreinforced (N) runway trials.  The rats received multiple 
presentations of RRN and NRRN series and developed a pattern of running more slowly on the 
terminal N trials of each series than the other reinforced trials.  The researchers concluded that 
the rats were using the number of completed R trials to predict when the N trials would occur for 
each series.  Davis and Pérusse (1988) argued that the rats could have been using the rhythmic 
pattern of events, rather than the number of events, to predict when the N trial would occur.  To 
test this hypothesis, Burns et al. (1995) performed a similar runway experiment with rats in 
which they systematically varied the inter-trial intervals from 20 to 120 seconds, which would 
have disrupted any temporal rhythms.  The rats quickly developed a pattern of running slowly on 
the terminal N trials, which suggests that they were using number as a cue. 
Rats have also been trained to discriminate between different series of reinforced and 
nonreinforced trials using brightness and texture cues on the runway floor.  For  instance, Burns, 
Dunkman, and Detloff (1999) consistently presented rats with a rough and white floor during an 
XNY series (where the X and Y represented different food items) and a smooth and black floor 
during a ZNN series (where the Z represented a third type of food item).  Using this procedure, 
the researchers were able to compare performance between more than one series in the same 
group of rats.  For both series, the rats developed faster running for rewarded trials than for 
nonrewarded trials. 
Monkeys previously trained to make ordinal judgments using Arabic numerals provide a 
unique opportunity to study the use of numerical cues and spontaneous transfer between series. 
Arabic numerals, instead of the texture of runway floors, can be used as a cue to help the 
monkeys determine which type of series is being presented.  This in turn, could act as a cue to 
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help them predict when a nonreinforced trial will occur.  In Chapter 4: Macaques (Macaca 
mulatta) use of numerical cues in maze trials, we trained four Arabic numeral-experienced 
monkeys on an RRRN series.  The goal of the maze was an Arabic numeral 3, which 
corresponded to the number of reinforced maze trials in the series.  We then introduced probe 
series involving different numbers of reinforced trials.  Two of the monkeys were given probe 
series of the numerals 2 and 4, intermixed with the familiar 3 series, and the remaining two 
monkeys were given probe series of the numerals 2 through 8.  As was true during training, the 
Arabic numeral displayed in the maze corresponded to the number of reinforced trials that would 
occur before one nonreinforced trial.  We hypothesized that the monkeys would use the numerals 
to discriminate among different series of reinforced and nonreinforced trials and anticipate the 
nonreinforced trials.  We also hypothesized that the monkeys’ prior knowledge of Arabic 
numerals would allow for spontaneous transfer from one Arabic numeral to another during this 
sequential task.  
During training on the RRRN series, two of the four monkeys developed a “slow, fast, 
faster, slow” pattern, which suggested they were anticipating the final nonreinforced trial.  The 
other two monkeys performed gradually slower on each trial in a series, which made it 
impossible to ascertain whether or not they were predicting precisely when the final trial would 
occur.  During testing, the monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 and 4 showed some 
generalization to the new numerals and developed a pattern of performing more slowly on the 
nonreinforced trials than the reinforced trials, indicating the use of the changing target numeral 
cues to anticipate those final trials.  The monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 
through 8 did not use the changing numeral to predict precisely when the nonreinforced trial 
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would occur in each series, but they did incorporate the changing numerals into their strategy by 
performing faster overall on series with greater target numerals.   
This study provided evidence that number-trained rhesus monkeys could use Arabic 
numerals as a cue to facilitate performance on a task involving sequential responses.  However, 
the pattern established by two of the monkeys during training of performing gradually slower on 
each trial in a series, and the failure of the monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 
through 8 to generalize the pattern learned during training to new target numerals, highlighted 
the need for a task that specifically addressed the monkeys’ understanding of the number of trials 
in a series.  
In Experiment 2 of Chapter 2: What do Arabic numerals mean to macaques?, the 
monkeys were provided with two Arabic numeral cues in a computerized maze and each numeral 
was “baited” with the corresponding number of pellets.  Moving the cursor into contact with 
either numeral resulted in the delivery of a pellet, unless the monkey had already earned the 
corresponding number of pellets for that problem (e.g., the numeral 4 would only be reinforced 
four times in a problem).  We reasoned that a monkey could travel to the larger numeral the 
corresponding number of times and then behaviorally indicate that he knew he had exhausted the 
pellets at that location by traveling to the smaller numeral.  In contrast, if the monkeys know 
only the ordinal and not absolute values corresponding to the numerals, then they would have no 
basis for knowing when to stop responding to the larger of the two numerals.  This design 
allowed us to assess the monkeys’ understanding of the cardinal value of the numerals in a 
sequential task.   
In Chapter 5: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) select Arabic numerals or visual 
quantities corresponding to a number of sequentially completed maze trials, we further 
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investigated the symbolic nature of Arabic numerals in a sequential enumeration task.  We 
hypothesized that the monkeys in the Chapter 4 study did not use the target numbers in the way 
anticipated because there was little motivation for the monkeys to keep track of the absolute 
number of trials.  The reinforcement pattern remained the same regardless of the strategy used by 
the monkeys to perform the task.  During training, for instance, the monkeys always received 
three reinforced trials followed by one nonreinforced trial, regardless of how quickly they 
completed each maze trial.  In addition, the monkeys performed thousands of trials a day on this 
and other tasks, so a few nonreinforced trials were probably not very salient. 
In Chapter 5, four number-trained rhesus monkeys were trained to enumerate their 
sequential responses and reinforced only when they had made a correct response.  This should 
increase motivation to perform at high levels because of the time invested in each series.  After 
completing a series of computerized maze trials, the monkeys were given a same/different 
discrimination involving a numerical stimulus (an Arabic numeral or a dot array) and the letter D 
(for “different”).  The goal was to choose the numerical stimulus if it matched the number of 
just-completed maze trials, and to choose the D if it did not.  Previous studies have shown that 
nonhuman primates are capable of representing, combining, and comparing nonvisible, 
sequentially presented sets of items (e.g., Beran, 2001; Call, 2000; Hauser et al., 2000), but this 
study tested the ability of monkeys to enumerate their own responses and match the number of 
responses with the corresponding Arabic numeral or visual array. 
Numerical discriminations of sequentially presented auditory and tactile stimuli 
The stimuli used in numerical tasks are most often visual, but auditory stimuli also can be 
used in sequential tasks.  In a recent study, Hauser, Dehaene, Dehaene-Lambertz, and Patalano 
(2002) used a habituation-dishabituation paradigm to investigate auditory numerical 
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discrimination in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus).  In the habituation phase, some 
monkeys were presented with sequences of two speech syllables and others were presented with 
sequences of three speech syllables.  The syllables varied in overall duration, inter-syllable 
duration, and pitch.  In the test phase, all of the monkeys were presented with counterbalanced 
sequences of either two or three tones that also varied in overall duration, inter-tone duration, 
and pitch.  Results revealed that the monkeys looked reliably longer at test stimuli that differed 
in number from the stimuli with which they were trained.  These results indicate that monkeys 
can represent the numerical value of auditory stimuli and that their representations are abstract 
enough to accommodate differences in format.    
There is also evidence that animals can perform numerical discriminations based on 
successive tactile stimuli.  Davis, MacKenzie, and Morrison (1989) stroked the whiskers of a 
group of rats two, three, or four times in a row to indicate which arm of a Y-maze they should 
enter.  The rats learned to enter the correct maze arm, which indicated that they were able to 
transfer sequential tactile numerical information to the visual maze task. 
Spontaneous numerical operations in nonhuman animals and human infants 
Researchers often use a sequential presentation method to investigate spontaneous 
addition and subtraction abilities in animals and human infants.  In the expectancy-violation 
paradigm, which was originally developed for use with human infants, an untrained subject 
watches as items are successively placed behind an opaque screen.  Typically, each subject is 
tested in only one condition.  On some of the trials, items are covertly removed or added from 
behind the screen.  The screen is then raised to reveal all of the items and looking time is 
recorded.  According to this paradigm, unexpected outcomes should produce longer looking 
times in comparison to expected outcomes.  
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Hauser and Carey (2003) used the expectancy-violation paradigm to study 
representations of small numbers of objects in free-ranging rhesus monkeys.  The monkeys 
watched as experimenters placed eggplants, one at a time, behind a screen.  The screen was then 
raised to reveal a possible or impossible outcome.  The monkeys exhibited longer looking times 
for the impossible outcomes when presented with 1 + 1 = 2 or 3, 2 + 1 = 2 or 3, and 2 + 1 = 3 or 
4, but failed at 2 + 2 = 3 or 4, and problems consisting of more than two quantities of eggplants, 
such as 1 + 1 + 1 = 3.  To test the possibility that the monkeys were representing continuous 
variables such as volume, contour length, or visible surface area instead of the number of objects, 
the experimenters placed two small eggplants behind the screen and then raised the screen to 
reveal two small eggplants or one big eggplant that was roughly twice the size of a small 
eggplant.  The monkeys exhibited longer looking times for the impossible outcome of one big 
eggplant, which suggests that they were not relying solely on volume or surface area cues.  Uller, 
Hauser, and Carey (2001) provided additional evidence that monkeys do not rely on continuous 
perceptual variables in the expectancy-violation paradigm.  They found that cotton-top tamarins 
exhibited longer looking times for the outcome that was a numerical mismatch in a 1 small + 1 
small = 2 small objects or 1 big object problem, where the single large outcome matched the 
expected outcome in volume and surface area. 
In a similar study conducted by Flombaum et al. (2005), rhesus monkeys watched as 
lemons were placed behind a screen.  To rule out continuous variables as a possible cue, the 
amount of lemon was equated in the two conditions by using lemons that were larger or smaller 
in size than the lemons placed behind the screen.  The monkeys exhibited longer looking times 
for numerical violations than expected numerical outcomes.  None of the lemons that emerged 
from behind the screen were identical to the lemons placed behind the screen, which suggests 
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that the monkeys were using the number of items as a cue rather than the physical identity of the 
items.  Interestingly, the monkeys recognized that 4 + 4 = 8 rather than 4, but they showed no 
difference in looking time when they were shown 2 + 2 and tested with an outcome of 4 or 6.  
These results indicate that the monkeys were able to discriminate large sets of items, but only 
when the ratio between the observed and expected outcome was small.  Other animals, such as 
lemurs and dogs (Canis familiaris), also show numerical expectations when given simple tests, 
such as 1 + 1 = 2 or 3 (Santos, Barnes, & Mahajan, 2005; West & Young, 2002). 
In a study designed to assess spontaneous subtraction in nonhuman primates using a 
different paradigm, untrained rhesus monkeys were presented with a quantity of plums on one 
stage and a second quantity on another stage.  The experimenter subsequently occluded both 
stages and removed one or no plums from each stage.  The monkeys were then allowed to 
approach a stage and eat the plums behind the occluder.  The monkeys successfully chose the 
larger quantity of plums following the subtraction of one piece of food from two or three pieces 
of food.  Accuracy was high regardless of whether food was subtracted from one or both of the 
initial quantities (Sulkowski & Hauser, 2001). 
The results of these spontaneous numerical operation studies with animals closely mirror 
the results observed in human infants.  For example, Wynn (1992) conducted a study in which 5-
month-old infants watched an experimenter placed two Mickey Mouse dolls behind a screen.  
When the screen was removed, the infants exhibited longer looking times for the unexpected 
outcome of one doll or three dolls than they exhibited for the expected outcome of two dolls.  
Similar results were obtained for subtraction problems in which the experimenter placed two 
dolls behind a screen and then removed one doll.  The infants looked longer at the impossible 
outcome of two or zero dolls than the expected outcome of one doll.   
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There is conflicting evidence regarding the use of continuous variables by infants in these 
types of studies.  In a study by Feigenson, Carey, and Spelke (2002) 7-month-old infants 
watched as experimenters placed two small objects behind a screen.  The screen was then 
removed to reveal one big object (which had the expected surface area and volume, but an 
unexpected number) or two big objects (which had an unexpected surface area and volume, but 
the expected number).  The infants looked longer at the unexpected surface area and volume 
outcome, but not at the unexpected number outcome, which suggests that continuous variables 
were underlying their representations.  In contrast to this finding, Uller (1997) found that 8-
month-old infants exhibited longer looking times for the outcome that was a numerical mismatch 
in a 1 small + 1 small = 2 small or 1 big comparison, where the big object matched the expected 
outcome in volume and surface area. 
These expectancy-violation studies have been used as evidence that human infants and 
some nonhuman animal species have an innate understanding of simple arithmetic operations.  In 
contrast to this view, Simon (1997) suggested that the animals in these studies were not 
performing arithmetic, but instead were tracking each item placed behind the screen.  According 
to this view, the object tracking system assigns a unique index for each object placed behind the 
screen and when the screen is removed the indexes are placed in one-to-one correspondence with 
the revealed set.  Looking time is increased not because the subject recognizes the outcome as 
numerically incorrect, but because the subject detects a mismatch between the number of visible 
items and the number of indexes.  Subsequent findings suggest that these representations may 
not contain object identity or location information.  Simon, Hespos, and Rochat (1995) found 
that the expectations of infants were not violated when Elmo dolls were placed behind the screen 
and then secretly replaced with the correct number of Ernie dolls.  Koechlin, Dehaene, and 
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Mehler (1998) placed dolls on a revolving surface and showed that the expectations of infants 
were not violated due to a change in location of the objects.   
Numerical discriminations in human infants 
In addition to the expectancy-violation paradigm, several other paradigms have been used 
to study numerical capacities in infants and young children.  Wynn (1996) used a habituation-
dishabituation paradigm to study the ability of 6-month-old infants to discriminate different 
numbers of visual events.  The visual events were “puppet jumps” created by an experimenter 
moving a toy puppet up and down.  Half of the infants were habituated to two puppet jumps and 
the other half were habituated to three puppet jumps.  Then, both groups of infants were tested 
with series of two and three jumps.  The timing of the jumps was carefully controlled so that the 
duration was not a clue.  The infants looked longer at the novel number of jumps, which 
indicated that they could discriminate one series of jumps from the other.   
Other studies using the habituation-dishabituation paradigm have shown that infants in 
the first year of life can discriminate between sets of simultaneously presented objects on the 
basis of numerosity (Antell & Keating, 1983; Starkey & Cooper, 1980; Strauss & Curtis, 1981).  
In these studies, infants as young as 4-days-old discriminated 1 versus 2 objects and 2 versus 3 
objects, but failed at comparisons of 3 versus 4 and 3 versus 5 objects.  .   
Feigenson and Carey (2003, 2005) used search behavior as a measure of numerical 
ability.  Children 12 to 14 months old watched as an experimenter placed a number of objects 
(balls or crackers) into a box and were then allowed to retrieve the objects.  On some trials, 
experimenters secretly placed one or more of the objects into a hidden compartment at the 
bottom of the box so that they were inaccessible to the children.  The children searched 
significantly longer after retrieving 1 object from the box when they had seen 2 objects being 
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placed in the box compared to 1 object.  They also searched longer after retrieving 2 objects 
when they had observed 3 objects being placed in the box compared to 2 objects.  However, 
when infants viewed 4 objects being placed into the box they did not search longer after 
retrieving 2 objects than infants who had seen 2 objects being placed into the box.  The authors 
argued that the infants failed to represent arrays of more than 3 objects. 
Bijeljac-Babic, Bertoncini, and Mehler (1993) used sucking rhythm to study numerical 
abilities in young infants.  The infants were allowed to suck on a rubber nipple connected to a 
pressure gauge and computer.  Whenever the infant sucked on the nipple the computer delivered 
a nonsense word, such as “bafikoo,” through a loudspeaker.  The duration of the words and rate 
of speech were highly variable, but the number of syllables remained constant.  When the infant 
habituated to the number of syllables, the rate of sucking dropped and the computer switched to a 
different number of syllables.  Results revealed that a switch in the number of syllables was 
accompanied by renewed vigor in sucking behavior.  A control group in which novel words were 
introduced with no change in the number of syllables showed no reaction. 
Although these studies provide evidence that infants can discriminate between different 
number categories, they do not address whether or not infants understand the order of these 
categories.  Brannon (2002) addressed the issue of ordinal knowledge in a study with 11-month-
old infants.  At the start of the experiment, the infants were habituated to sequences of dot arrays 
on a computer screen that increased or decreased (e.g., 4-8-16 or 16-8-4).  Infants were then 
tested with new numerical values that alternated between increasing and decreasing sequences.  
The infants trained with increasing ordinal sequences looked longer at decreasing ordinal 
sequences and vice versa, which indicates that they understood the ordinal relations among the 
number of dots.  Infants who were 9 months old failed to discriminate between the increasing 
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and decreasing sequences.  Thus, ordinal knowledge may develop later than the ability to 
discriminate stimuli based on number. 
Cross-modal and cross-procedural transfer tests  
Another paradigm used to investigate nonverbal numerical ability involves transfer tests 
that require an animal or human infant to generalize numerical knowledge across modalities or 
procedures.  These tests provide evidence pertaining to the controversy of whether or not human 
infants and nonhuman animals represent number abstractly.  In other words, whether these 
nonverbal populations understand that sets of stimuli differing in perceptual features and 
modality, such as three visible squares, three tones, and three flashes of lightening share the 
cardinal value three.  Gelman and Gallistel (1978) recognized abstractness as one of the five 
principles of formal counting and Davis and Pérusse (1988) further argued that the ability to 
abstract number across different contexts and modalities is necessary for a true concept of 
number.  Evidence from functional imaging studies suggests that the posterior parietal may play 
a role in abstract number processing because this area is activated by numerical stimuli in 
humans and rhesus monkeys, regardless of modality (Nieder, Diester, & Tudusciuc, 2006). 
 Little research has been conducted to determine whether infants and animals have an 
abstract representation of number equal to that of adult humans.  This lack of evidence led 
Dehaene (1997) to conclude that the brains of animals and human babies are not as flexible as 
adult human brains and that those rigid brains, “work their minor arithmetical miracles only 
within quite limited contexts” (p. 5).  The research that has been conducted tends to focus on 
transfer of numerical knowledge across nonnumerical perceptual features such as size and color, 
across modalities such as auditory or visual, and across sequential and simultaneous presentation 
methods.    
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 In studies by Starkey and colleagues (Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 1983, 1990) infants 
were able to detect numerical correspondences between the visual and auditory modalities.   
Infants 6 to 9 months old were presented with visual displays containing two and three items 
while listening to two or three drumbeats.  Researchers found that when the infants were 
listening to three drumbeats they reliably looked at the visual display of three objects.  When 
hearing to two drumbeats they reliably looked at the display of two objects.  In similar studies, 
Jordan and colleagues (Jordan, Brannon, & Gallistel, 2006; Jordan, Brannon, Logothetis, & 
Ghazanfar, 2005) demonstrated that rhesus monkeys and 7-month-old infants preferred to look at 
video-clips containing a number of conspecifics equal to the number of vocalizations they heard.  
These studies suggest that rhesus monkeys and human infants possess an abstract concept of 
number that reaches across two sensory modalities.   
In another study, Fernandes and Church (1982) presented rats with sequences of white 
noise and rewarded them for pressing a lever on the right when they heard two noise bursts and a 
lever on the left when they heard four.  The rats learned to respond based on the number of noise 
bursts, even when temporal cues were controlled by varying the duration of each burst, as well as 
the total duration of the auditory sequences.  When the experimenters substituted light flashes for 
sounds, the rats immediately transferred their knowledge to the new task, which suggests that 
their representation of number was not tied to the auditory modality.   
 In a similar study, Church and Meck (1984) taught rats to press a lever on the left after 
viewing a sequence of two flashes or hearing a sequence of two white noise bursts, and a lever 
on the right after viewing a sequence of four flashes or hearing a sequence of four noise bursts.  
When the rats were then presented with a combination of two lights and two noise bursts they 
spontaneously integrated the number of visual and auditory stimuli and responded by pressing 
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the right lever.  This outcome indicates that the rats based their behavior on an abstract, amodal 
representation of number.   
Davis and Albert (1987) trained rats on a more complex task that required them to 
discriminate between two, three, or four bursts of noise.  When the experimenters substituted 
light flashes for the noise bursts they found no evidence of transfer.  These results, combined 
with the results of the Fernandes and Church (1982) study, suggest that abstract representations 
in rats may be confined to simple tasks requiring only a “few” and “many” judgment. 
The monkeys in our laboratory have had extensive experience with many types of 
numerical tasks, but it is unclear whether they possess an abstract numerical concept that allows 
transfer of numerical knowledge from one type of task to another.  The goal of Chapter 6: 
Numerical abstraction across presentation mode by rhesus monkeys was to investigate 
whether the monkeys in our laboratory could transfer learning in a sequential numerical task to a 
simultaneous numerical task.  During training, the monkeys learned to make one response after 
viewing a sequence of three circles flashed on a computer screen and another response after 
viewing a sequence of seven circles flashed on a computer screen.  The monkeys were then 
presented with nonreinforced probe trials consisting of groups of three or seven simultaneously 
visible circles.  The goal was to assess whether or not the monkeys would transfer the numerical 
knowledge gained in the sequential task to the simultaneous task by spontaneously providing a 
“three” response when presented with three simultaneously visible circles and a “seven” 
response when presented with seven simultaneously visible circles.  Evidence of transfer would 
suggest that the monkeys possess an abstract representation of number that is not tied to a 
specific mode of presentation. 
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In a second experiment, a variation of the standard transfer paradigm was employed to 
investigate abstract number concept in monkeys.  The same monkeys from the first experiment 
were used in this experiment so they all had experience making one response after viewing a 
sequence of seven circles and another response after viewing a sequence of three circles.  In this 
second experiment the monkeys were trained on a new task that involved groups of three or 
seven simultaneously visible circles.  For half of the monkeys, the correct response when 
presented with three simultaneously visible circles was the same as the correct response when 
presented with three sequential circles in the first part of the study.  Similarly, the correct 
response when presented with seven simultaneous circles was the same as the correct response 
when presented with seven sequential circles.  For the other half of the monkeys, the reward 
contingencies were reversed so that the correct response when presented with three 
simultaneously visible circles was the same as the correct response for seven sequential circles 
and the correct response for seven simultaneous circles was the same as the correct response for 
three sequential circles.  If the monkeys categorized sequentially and simultaneously presented 
stimuli together on the basis of number then it should take the group with reversed reward 
contingencies longer to learn this task than the group for which the reward contingencies stayed 
the same.  Thus, the results of this study help to answer the question of whether or not the 
monkeys in our laboratory, like humans, have an abstract concept of number that spans different 
contexts and methodologies.   
Overview of dissertation 
The subsequent chapters in this dissertation consist of a variety of control and transfer 
studies designed to illuminate what Arabic numerals symbolize to rhesus monkeys.  In Chapters 
2 and 3, the monkeys were required to compare and order Arabic numerals and were rewarded 
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with either proportional or probabilistic rewards.  These studies provided information on whether 
numerical discriminations are based on the numerousness attribute of the stimuli or 
nonnumerical attributes such as hedonic value and conditioned 2-choice discriminations.  They 
also provided information on whether numerals symbolize absolute or ordinal knowledge to the 
monkeys.  In chapters 4 and 5, the monkeys were required to enumerate their own sequential 
responses and associate that quantity with an Arabic numeral.  These studies provided data 
regarding the use of absolute versus ordinal knowledge by monkeys in sequential tasks.  Data 
from all of these studies were examined to determine if representations were approximate or 
inexact, which provided information on the underlying mental mechanisms.  The study in 
Chapter 6 was designed to investigate the generality of the monkeys’ symbolic number concept 
using transfer tests.  The ability to abstract number across presentation mode would indicate that 
numerals are truly symbolic and not simply functioning as part of a specific stimulus-response-
reward association.  Taken together, these studies shed light on the nature of the monkeys’ 
number concept and whether the animals’ understanding of Arabic numerals is symbolic in the 
same way that it is for humans. 
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Chapter 2: What do Arabic numerals mean to macaques?1 
 
Abstract 
In the past, rhesus macaques have demonstrated an ability to use Arabic numerals to facilitate 
performance in a variety of tasks.   However, it remained unclear whether they understood the 
absolute as well as the relative values of numerals.  In Experiment 1, numeral-trained macaques 
picked the largest stimuli when presented with pair-wise comparisons involving numerals and 
analog quantities.  In Experiment 2, macaques were provided with numeral cues indicating the 
number of times a behavior could be performed in one location for a reward.  Three of the four 
monkeys performed above chance, but they often erred by performing more behaviors than 
indicated.  The results of these studies indicate that the monkeys have knowledge of the 
approximate quantities represented by each numeral.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1 This chapter has been submitted for publication as: Harris, E. H., Gulledge, J. P., Beran, M. J., & Washburn, D. A. 
(2008). What do Arabic numerals mean to macaques? 
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  A range of nonhuman animals including dolphins (Mitchell, Tao, Sherman, & O’Regan, 
1985), pigeons (Olthof & Roberts, 2000; Xia, Emmerton, Siemann, & Delius, 2001), a parrot 
(Pepperberg, 1994, 2006), squirrel monkeys (Olthof, Iden, & Roberts, 1997), capuchin monkeys 
(Beran et al., 2008), rhesus monkeys (Beran, Beran, Harris, & Washburn, 2005; Washburn & 
Rumbaugh, 1991) and chimpanzees (Beran & Rumbaugh, 2001; Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001; 
Boysen & Berntson, 1989, 1995; Matsuzawa, 1985; Murofushi, 1997; Rumbaugh, Hopkins, 
Washburn, & Savage-Rumbaugh, 1989) have learned to make numerical judgments using 
arbitrary symbols that represent quantities.  The advantage to using arbitrary symbols, such as 
Arabic numerals, in numerical tasks rather than food items or analog stimuli is that the symbols 
provide no inherent non-numerical cues such as surface area, density, or complexity to indicate 
the relation between one quantity and another.   
 Over the last decade, the rhesus monkeys in our laboratory have participated in a variety 
of studies aimed at assessing their ability to perform numerical tasks using Arabic numerals.  
This research began when Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991) presented rhesus monkeys with pairs 
of the numerals 0 through 9 and reinforced them with a corresponding number of pellets for 
choosing either of the numerals.  The monkeys learned to choose the larger numeral, and they 
performed accurately even when presented with probe trials of unfamiliar pairings of numerals.  
None of the probe pairings could be solved on the basis of logical transitivity.  For instance, 
knowledge that 8 > 7 and 8 > 6 does not provide sufficient information to conclude that 7 > 6.  
When the animals were later presented with arrays of up to five numerals, they tended to select 
stimuli in the correct reverse ordinal sequence.  
 Across the years, dozens of additional monkeys were trained and tested at our laboratory 
or at the Ames Research Center (Moffett Field, CA) using our software and the protocols 
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originally described for the two animals by Washburn and Rumbaugh (1991).  For these animals, 
the relative numerousness judgment task with Arabic numerals, described above, was 
administered as one of many training tasks to prepare the animals for subsequent cognitive 
studies.  We have never reported the data from these training sessions, but the findings replicated 
the earlier results.  We currently have summary data for 66 of those monkeys.  After receiving 
training with randomly paired numerals (0 to 9, as described above and by Washburn & 
Rumbaugh, 1991), with proportional rewards for whichever numeral they selected, these animals 
averaged 84% accuracy on familiar (trained) pairings.  On the first presentation of novel test 
trials—pairings of numerals the animals had never seen before—the monkeys were correct on a 
total of 367 of the 462 probe trials (7 novel probes for each of the 66 animals).  This accuracy 
level (79%) is substantially and significantly in excess of what would be predicted by chance, 
and is in fact very near the monkeys’ levels of accuracy for familiar, over-trained pairings.  
 Despite these demonstrations of numerical ability, the following question remained: 
What exactly do these animals know about Arabic numerals?  In the Washburn and Rumbaugh 
(1991) study, for example, it is possible that the monkeys learned a complex matrix involving the 
relative difference and degree of difference between all possible pairs of numerals.  For example, 
knowledge that 8 is greater than 7 by one pellet (the smallest unit of difference) and greater than 
6 by two pellets (the second smallest unit of difference) would allow the monkeys to solve a 
novel pairing of 8 and 7 and also 7 and 6.  A different explanation is that the monkeys gained an 
understanding of the absolute quantity of pellets represented by each number.  Perhaps the most 
parsimonious explanation is that the animals associated each numeral with a different hedonic 
value based on how much food was presented for that numeral.  In others words, the largest 
numerals evoked the strongest positive hedonic states.  
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There is some evidence that monkeys may understand the quantitative values represented 
by Arabic numerals.  In a study of Stroop-like effects (Washburn, 1994), rhesus monkeys at our 
laboratory learned to select the larger of two arrays of 1 to 9 letters (e.g., to select five As rather 
than four Cs).  When the arrays of letters were replaced with arrays of numerals, incongruous 
numerals (e.g., four 1s versus two 5s) disrupted performance and congruous numerals (four 5s 
versus two 4s) did not.  In other words, it was more difficult for the monkeys to choose the array 
with the most stimuli when that array was composed of the smaller numeral than when it was 
composed of the larger numeral.  This effect suggests that these monkeys processed the 
quantitative meanings of the numerical symbols automatically because of their prior training 
with these numerals, despite the fact that these meanings were irrelevant to the task. 
 Experiment 1 of the current study further tests the hypothesis that number-trained 
monkeys understand the absolute as well as the relative values of numerals by presenting them 
with pair-wise comparisons involving numerals and analog quantities.  If the monkeys had 
originally learned a complex matrix of values using knowledge of the relative difference and 
degree of relative difference between pairs of numerals, then they should be incapable of 
comparing symbols with actual quantities.  Conversely, if the monkeys acquired knowledge of 
the absolute quantity of pellets represented by each Arabic numeral, then they might be able to 
compare symbols with analog dot arrays.  
Additionally, the study includes a test of whether it is number or hedonic value that 
determines the monkeys’ behavior.  Brannon and Terrace (1998) criticized the proportional 
reinforcement procedure previously used in some numerical studies (e.g., Washburn & 
Rumbaugh, 1991) because it confounds numerousness and hedonic value, making it possible that 
the monkeys were not responding to the stimuli based upon numerosity, but rather on the richer 
87 
reinforcement history provided by certain numerals that led to larger numbers of food pellets. 
That is, Brannon and Terrace (1998) suggested that the monkeys in our laboratory chose 7 
instead of 6, not because 7 is “more” than 6, but because 7 is “better” than 6.  We acknowledge 
this possibility, but note that monkeys could also perceive that 7 is better than 6 because 7 is 
more likely to be reinforced, as in studies like Brannon and Terrace (1998) that used probabilistic 
(rather than proportional) reinforcement in which the animal is rewarded only for selecting the 
correct number.  To address this criticism empirically, five monkeys in Experiment 1 received 
proportional rewards for every selection and a sixth monkey (Hank) was rewarded with a 
proportional number of pellets for numerals (e.g., picking the 4 netted four pellets) but 
probabilistic rewards for dot selections (e.g., correctly picking the bigger array always netted one 
pellet).   
Experiment 2 was designed to further assess the monkeys’ use of absolute numerical 
knowledge using a sequential task in which the monkeys were required to enumerate their own 
responses.  In a previous study we used a similar method to investigate the ability of four of our 
number-trained rhesus monkeys to use Arabic numeral cues to discriminate between different 
series of maze trials and anticipate the final trial in each series (Harris & Washburn, 2005).  The 
monkeys were trained on a computerized task consisting of three reinforced maze trials followed 
by one nonreinforced trial.  The goal of the maze was an Arabic numeral 3, which corresponded 
to the number of reinforced maze trials in the series.  Two of the four monkeys developed a 
“slow, fast, faster, slow” pattern, which suggested they were anticipating the final nonreinforced 
trial.  The other two monkeys performed gradually slower on each trial in a series, which made it 
impossible to ascertain whether or not they were predicting precisely when the final trial would 
occur.  
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During testing, two monkeys were given probe series of the numerals 2 and 4 intermixed 
with the familiar numeral 3 series and the remaining two monkeys were given probe series of the 
numerals 2 through 8.  As was true during training, the Arabic numeral displayed in the maze 
corresponded to the number of reinforced trials that would occur before one nonreinforced trial.  
The monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 and 4 showed some generalization to the 
new numerals and developed a pattern of performing more slowly on the nonreinforced trials 
than the reinforced trials, indicating the use of the changing target numeral cues to anticipate 
those final nonreinforced trials.  The monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 through 8 
did not use the changing numeral to predict precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur 
in each series, but they did incorporate the changing numerals into their strategy by performing 
faster overall on series with greater target numerals.   
The Harris and Washburn (2005) study provided evidence that number-trained rhesus 
monkeys could use Arabic numerals as a cue to facilitate performance on a task involving 
sequential responses, also known as a “constructive” enumeration task (Beran & Rumbaugh, 
2001; Xia, Siemann, & Delius, 2000).  However, the pattern established by two of the monkeys 
during training of performing gradually slower on each trial in a series, and the failure of the 
monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 through 8 to generalize the pattern learned 
during training to new target numerals highlighted the need for a task that specifically addressed 
the monkeys’ understanding of when a series is finished.  Thus, in Experiment 2, monkeys were 
provided with Arabic numeral cues indicating the number of times a behavior could be 
performed in one location for a reward.  After receiving all of the possible rewards from one 
location the monkeys could behaviorally indicate that the series was complete by moving on to a 
second location.  This design allowed us to assess their understanding of the cardinal value of the 
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numerals.  Together, these two experiments provided us with a greater understanding of what 
Arabic numerals mean to the macaques in our laboratory. 
Experiment 1: Do monkeys know, for example, that 4 > ● ● ● ? 
Method 
 Subjects.  Six male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were tested in this study.  The 
monkeys (age range 4 to 16 years) had previously been trained following the procedures 
described elsewhere (Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hopkins, 1989) 
to manipulate a joystick so as to control a computer-graphic cursor in response to stimuli 
displayed on a computer screen.  The animals were not deprived of food or water and had 
continuous access to the apparatus and computerized tasks so that they could work or rest ad 
libitum.  Each of the monkeys had been tested in numerous experiments prior to the present 
study, and each had previously learned to respond to Arabic numerals in accordance with the 
number of pellets associated with each (see Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991, for the details of this 
task and the procedure by which all of these monkeys learned to select the greater of any pair or 
array of Arabic numerals).  That is, each monkey could generally select the larger of any two 
Arabic numerals (0 to 9) to receive the corresponding number of pellets, and could generally 
select the array of letters or numerals with the most items (Washburn, 1994).  Importantly, none 
of the monkeys had received any training to link directly these two dimensions of numerousness 
(e.g., no training to label four items with the numeral 4, or to pick three stimuli when presented 
with the numeral 3, or to determine whether the numeral 2 is greater than or less than some 
number of dots). 
Apparatus.  An analog joystick was connected to a computer that displayed stimuli on a 
13-inch color monitor, presented auditory feedback through an external speaker/amplifier, and 
90 
delivered 97-mg fruit-flavored chow pellets (Noyes, Lancaster, NH) via a pellet dispenser 
(Gerbrands 5210) and relay interface (ERA01 and PIO12, Keithley).  The mounting and 
protection of this apparatus has been described in detail elsewhere (Rumbaugh et al., 1989; 
Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1992).  Each monkey worked at a dedicated computerized test system, 
and the monkey could reach through the mesh of his home cage to manipulate the joystick and to 
retrieve pellets. 
Task.  Each trial began with the cursor (a white “+”) randomly positioned on the screen 
and a small (1.25 cm diameter) circle presented midscreen.  Trials were initiated by manipulating 
the joystick so as to direct the cursor into the circle, whereupon the numerical stimuli were 
presented on either side of the cursor.  Three stimulus conditions were used in these experiments.  
Some trials were numeral:numeral trials, in which two different Arabic numerals (1 to 9) were 
selected at random and positioned randomly to the left and right of the cursor.  Other trials were 
dot:dot trials, in which two different arrays of 1 to 9 randomly positioned 2.5 cm diameter white 
dots were displayed, one array on each side of the cursor.  During training, each trial was 
randomly determined to be a numeral:numeral or a dot:dot trial.  During subsequent probe 
testing, some trials were numeral:dot trials in which a randomly selected Arabic numeral was 
presented on the screen with a randomly selected (but different) quantity of dots.  The position of 
the stimuli was randomized for all conditions (i.e., the numeral did not always appear on the left 
for numeral:dot trials).  The monkeys’ choices and response times were recorded for each trial. 
Training procedure, proportional reinforcement.  Five of the monkeys (Murph, Lou, 
Baker, Gale, and Willie) were trained to criterion with a version of the task that delivered a 
number of reinforcements proportional to the numeral or analog dot array that was selected.  
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That is, an animal received seven pellets for picking the numeral 7 or an array of seven dots, 
received three pellets for picking the numeral 3 or an array of three dots, and so forth.  
Training procedure, conditional reinforcement.  To assess the hedonic criticism outlined 
above, we decided to implement two control conditions in the training and testing of Hank.  
First, Hank was reinforced proportionally for the numeral:numeral trials (as had been done 
throughout his prior test history), but he was only reinforced with a single pellet for correct 
dot:dot responses, irrespective of the number of dots in the array.  Second, we withheld some of 
Hank’s dot:dot training trials, so that he never received an array in which five dots was the 
smaller quantity.  That is, every one of Hank’s choices of five dots was correct and reinforced 
during training. 
Probe test procedure.  After the monkeys reached a criterion of at least 76% accuracy on 
numeral:numeral trials and on dot:dot trials, the 72 possible novel numeral:dot trials were 
interspersed randomly within the next session.  Note that one could claim that more than 72 
novel numeral:dot trials exist, given that the position of the dots and the numeral were 
randomized each trial; however, the first exposure of each numeral with each quantity of dots 
(irrespective of position) was considered a probe trial for this study.  These trials were reinforced 
in the same way described above for the training conditions: proportional reinforcement for 
numerals, probabilistic reinforcement for Hank’s dot selections, and all selections of the smaller 
numeral or quantity of dots resulting only in a 1-second buzz and no food reward. 
Results 
Each monkey achieved the training criterion in fewer than 1,500 trials (about one day of 
testing).  Overall accuracy averaged 84% for numeral:numeral comparisons and 82% for dot:dot 
comparisons.  As was reported by Washburn (1994) and Brannon and Terrace (1998, 2000), 
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accuracy and response time varied as a function of the absolute difference between the quantities 
or numerals (e.g., 7:2 responses were faster and more accurate than 3:2 responses or three 
dot:two dot responses). 
 In the probe-test phase of the study, performance for each of the six monkeys was 
significantly better than chance (p < .05, binomial test), with the novel numeral:dot trials 
averaging 81.5% accuracy (see Table 2.1).  No reliable differences were observed in the probe-
trial tests between the numeral:numeral, dot:dot, and numeral:dot conditions.   
 Particular attention should be directed to Hank’s responses in this probe-test phase.  In 
the initial 36 novel numeral:dot trials, Hank showed a reliable numeral bias, and thus was correct 
on 100% of the trials in which the numeral was larger but only 6% of the trials in which the dot 
array was larger.  Following one additional day of testing on numeral:numeral, dot:dot, and these 
36 numeral:dot trials, he was tested on the final 36 novel probes.  Hank was correct on 89% of 
these novel probes, and accuracy on the other trial types remained high (93%).  It is also 
noteworthy that Hank was correct on 7 of the 8 (88%) novel trials in which an array of five dots 
was paired with a larger array or numeral. 
For all of the monkeys, most of the errors on the numeral-dot probe trials were made on 
trials in which the numerical distance (i.e., the difference between the numerical values of the 
numeral and dot array) of the two stimuli was very small.  Analysis of variance revealed a 
significant effect of numerical distance for the accuracy data, F (7, 28) = 10.02, p < .05.  A post-
hoc analysis utilizing a Tukey-test for Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) revealed that 
performance for the numerical distance of 1 was significantly different from performance for 
numerical distances of 2 and larger, performance for the distance of 2 was significantly different 
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from performance for the distances of 4, 5, and 8, and performance for the distance of 3 was 
significantly different from performance for the distances of 4 and 8. 
Discussion 
The monkeys accurately interdigitated Arabic numerals and random arrays of dots, even 
on the first exposure to these trials.  This indicates that the monkeys were not relying solely on a 
complex matrix of two-choice discriminations learned during the training phase.  Knowledge 
that the numeral 7 is the correct choice when presented with the numeral 6 and that an array of 
seven dots is the correct choice when presented with six dots is not sufficient information to 
compare the numeral 7 and six dots.   
Additionally, the data from Hank indicate that this ability is not based solely on the 
hedonic value of the numerals.  Although Hank initially favored all numerals, probably because 
of their substantial advantage in terms of reinforcement history, he did come to respond at levels 
significantly better than chance to first-trial presentations of stimulus pairs in which numerical 
value opposed hedonic value.  For example, Hank, like the other monkeys, responded that four 
dots is greater than the numeral 3, even though the numeral 3 was associated with a rich 
reinforcement history whereas arrays of four dots were only occasionally reinforced, and then 
with only a single pellet.  This point is further supported by the observation that Hank did not 
base his responses solely on “probability of reward” either.  Although arrays of five dots were 
always reinforced during training, Hank correctly selected larger arrays or Arabic numerals 
greater than 5 on 88% of the subsequent probe trials. 
Hank’s data are also interesting because they indicate that he was able to use the ordinal 
information inherent in the dot quantities to perform the numeral and dot comparisons.  Dot 
quantities are different from symbolic stimuli such as numerals because they have visible 
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properties that relate to their ordinal position in a sequence (i.e., the quantity three consists of 
fewer dots than the quantity four).  During training Hank was only reinforced with a single pellet 
for correct dot:dot responses and he never received an array in which five dots was the smaller 
quantity.  Thus, he did not have an opportunity to associate specific quantities of pellets with 
specific dot quantities or to learn the order of the dot quantities 5 through 9 using reinforcement 
history.  The fact that Hank was able to solve the novel trials in which an array of five dots was 
paired with a larger array or numeral indicates that he was responding to the inherent ordinal 
value present in the analog dot displays.  These data match those from another study with rhesus 
monkeys in which those animals also spontaneously responded to analog dot displays in a 
comparison task on the basis of their ordinal relations (Harris, Beran, & Washburn, 2007). 
Based on the combined data from all of the monkeys we are able to rule out a matrix of 
learned values and also hedonic value as the basis for responding to the novel numeral:dot 
comparisons.  The data therefore suggest that the monkeys had acquired knowledge about the 
absolute quantity of things represented by each Arabic numeral and could, even on probe trials, 
compare accurately this represented quantity to a visible array of dots.   
Another possibility that must be noted, however, is that performance reflected integration 
of two learned sequences instead of comparisons of quantity.  Research indicates that monkeys 
trained to order two lists of four arbitrary stimuli (e.g., A1B1C1D1 and A2B2C2D2) 
immediately respond correctly at a greater than chance level when presented with comparisons 
of two items from different lists (e.g., A1-C2 or B1-D2; D’Amato & Colombo, 1988; Terrace, 
Son, & Brannon, 2003).  It is possible that the monkeys in the current study perceived the 
numerals as one arbitrary list of stimuli and the dot quantities as another arbitrary list and 
ordered pairs of numerals and dots using only knowledge of their ordinal position.  It is unlikely, 
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however, that the differentially reinforced monkeys completely disregarded quantity information 
during the novel probe comparisons given that quantity information was readily available during 
training.  We know that Hank did not represent the dot arrays as arbitrary stimuli in a list with no 
inherent order because he was able to solve novel numeral:dot probe trials, despite the fact that 
some dot pairs were withheld during training so he had no opportunity to learn the complete 
order of dot quantities by trial-and-error.  
In fact, the use of pair-wise comparisons leaves open the question of whether or not any 
of the monkeys learned a complete ordered list of numerals or dot quantities.  Knowing that 8 > 
7 and 7 > 6 is not the same as knowing that 8 > 7 > 6.  Subsequent studies have produced mixed 
findings pertaining to the formation of an ordered list based on pair-wise comparison training.  
When two of the monkeys in the current study were subsequently trained to order lists of Arabic 
numerals and arbitrary colors they showed no advantage with the numerals, which suggests that 
they had no previous representation of Arabic numerals as an ordered list (Harris et al., 2007).  In 
another study, however, capuchin and rhesus monkeys from our laboratory were presented with 
random pairings of the Arabic numerals 0 through 9 and learned to choose the larger numeral 
when rewarded with one pellet for each correct choice.  The monkeys were subsequently 
presented with arrays of 5 familiar numerals and arrays of 5 novel letters and both species 
performed better with the numerals.  This indicates that they had learned a sequence of numerals 
during the pairwise comparison training despite the lack of quantity information (Beran et al., 
2008).  Regardless of the exact nature of the knowledge used in the current task, the monkeys 
were able to compare novel numerals and dot quantities based only on information acquired 
during randomly presented pairwise comparisons.   
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Overall, the data from this experiment provide insight regarding what the monkeys know 
about the numeric symbols with which they have experience.  It appears that the numeral 4 does 
not simply mean “greater than 3 and less than 5” or “better than 3 and not as good as 5,” but 
rather it represents a quantity that can be compared directly and accurately to visible arrays of 
analog stimuli.  However, it is important to note that performance suffered when the numerical 
distance between the numeral and dot quantity was small, which suggests that any quantity 
information was approximate rather than exact.   
Experiment 2: Do monkeys know, for example, that 4 means four actions? 
The monkeys in the sequential study by Harris and Washburn (2005) that was discussed 
in the introduction were clearly using the numeral values to alter their behavior on a sequence of 
maze trials.  They solved nonreinforced trials more slowly than reinforced trials.  They could 
have produced this effect in the way suggested by the authors, by solving the maze slowly in 
anticipation of a lack of reward when the number of reinforced trials performed matched the 
value of the target numeral.  However, they could also have accomplished this by performing 
more slowly on each successive trial (without keeping track of the number of reinforced trials or 
even knowing the cardinal value of the target number) and resetting back to rapid responding 
after the nonreinforced trial.  Indeed, two monkeys appeared to do this.  It is important to note 
that even if this was the strategy, the monkeys were still using the numeral values to adjust 
performance speeds differentially, so that the slope of successive slowing was steeper when the 
target number was 3 than when it was 5. 
An alternative procedure is required to allow a monkey to solve a maze N times and then 
behaviorally indicate, “I’m done.” We reasoned that by placing two target numerals in the maze, 
the monkeys could travel to the larger number the corresponding number of times and then 
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indicate that he knew he had exhausted the pellets at this location by traveling to the smaller 
number.  In contrast, if the monkeys know only ordinal and not absolute values corresponding to 
the numerals, then the animals have no basis for knowing when to stop responding to the larger 
of two numerals and to move instead to the smaller stimulus. 
Method 
 Subjects.  Four rhesus monkeys were available to be tested in this experiment.  The 
animals (Hank, Gale, Willie, and Murph) had been trained previously to select between visual 
arrays or Arabic numerals and had participated in some of the experiments discussed above.  All 
were familiar with moving a cursor through a two-dimensional maze (Harris & Washburn, 2005; 
Harris, Washburn, Beran, & Sevcik, 2007), although none had seen the task with two Arabic-
numeral targets prior to this study. 
Task.  Each trial began with a white plus-sign cursor (“+”, measuring 1.25 cm  1.25 cm) 
presented midscreen against a black background.  White rectangles were displayed on the screen 
to form a basic two-dimensional H-maze (see Figure 2.1).  Two randomly selected Arabic 
numerals were presented in two terminus points of the maze, equidistant from the cursor.  For 
each trial within a problem, these numeral positions remained constant.  Each numeral was 
“baited” with the corresponding number of pellets.  Moving the cursor into contact with either 
numeral resulted in the delivery of a pellet, unless the monkey had already earned the 
corresponding number of pellets for that problem (e.g., a 4 would only be reinforced four times 
in a problem).  Additional responses to a numeral were scored as errors.  When the monkeys 
made an error they received a negative buzzing sound and the cursor reset to the center of the 
screen in preparation for the next trial.  The monkey could make as many errors as needed to 
obtain all the pellets for each problem.  The problem ended automatically when all of the pellets 
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that could be obtained had been earned.  A new problem began immediately after the previous 
problem ended.  New numerals and random positions for the numerals were generated for each 
new problem.   
Procedure.  Gale and Hank were trained for 200 problems in which the target numerals 
were always 2 and 3.  Between problems, the location of the numerals was changed randomly.  
For each of these 200 problems, an ideal solution was to move the cursor through the maze to the 
3 on three (and only three) trials and to the 2 on two (and only two) trials.  Note that nothing 
constrained the animals to select the numerals in this order (i.e., touching the 2 twice and then 
the 3 thrice would also have been errorless performance, as would other combinations of 
responses that did not involve moving to a numeral more times than its value).  After these 200 
problems, another numeral (1 to 6) was introduced every 50 problems.  For example, the Arabic 
numerals on Gale’s problems 201-250 were 2, 3, or 5 and for Hank they were 2, 3, and 4.   
An identical procedure was used for Willie and Murph, except that their first 200 training 
problems used 2 and 4 as targets.  As above, an additional numeral was selected at random every 
50 problems to be included in the stimulus pool. 
Results 
 All four monkeys learned to complete problems during the initial training period, and 
three of the four animals generalized to new numerals when they were added to the sequence. 
Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of problems completed without error (i.e., without visiting a 
numeral more times than its value), relative to chance.  Chance was computed separately for 
each monkey because each monkey received different number pairings.  Gale, Willie, and Murph 
performed significantly better than chance across target-numeral pairings (p < .05, binomial test). 
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 Hank showed a different pattern. During the initial training problems, he developed the 
strategy of alternating between the target numerals, starting with the larger numeral. That is, he 
learned that he could touch the 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, in sequence to end each trial without error.  Of 
course, this was a perfectly acceptable strategy, but one that would not work when most other 
combinations of numerals were used as targets.  Consequently, Hank’s performance was 
statistically at chance levels on the test trials. 
 Examining the data for the other three animals, trials without error were seen at levels in 
excess of chance across target numerals and target-number ratios.  Figure 2.3 depicts average 
performance across target numerals and Figure 2.4 depicts average performance across target-
number ratios.  Note that performance was essentially stable across ratios—consistently above 
and showing a different distribution than chance levels (as determined by Monte Carlo 
simulation).  Performance was significantly better than chance (p < .01) at every ratio except 
0.67 and 0.83 (each p > .10).  Observed behavior was better simulated by an algorithm that 
selected numerals in proportion to their relative magnitudes (i.e., to be twice as likely to select 4 
rather than 2 when they were paired together, versus having a .50 chance of selecting each 
numeral).  However, even this simulation failed to capture the level of errorless trials that was 
observed with target:target ratios of 0.6 and greater.  The monkeys performed significantly better 
than the relative amount simulation for the target pairings 5:3, 4:3, and 5:4 (p < .05).  The 
monkeys’ performance on these problems required knowledge beyond the relative magnitudes of 
the numerals. 
 To determine how the monkeys solved these problems we examined the pattern of 
responding and found several patterns that were routinely used by the monkeys in this task.  
Some of the problems were solved with a pattern we labeled as the “numeral pattern.”  This 
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pattern involved clearing out the bigger numeral first before moving to the smaller numeral.  For 
example, if the problem contained a numeral 2 and a numeral 3 the monkeys would contact the 3 
on three consecutive trials before contacting the 2 on the last two trials.   
 Other problems were solved with a pattern we labeled as the “pellet pattern.”  This 
pattern involved contacting the numeral with the greatest number of remaining pellets on every 
trial in a problem.  For example, when presented with a 2 and a 4, the monkey might touch 4, 4, 
4, 2, 2, 4, in that order.  After contacting the 4 on three trials the numeral 2 would have the most 
remaining pellets (one pellet for the numeral 4 and two for the numeral 2) so the monkeys might 
switch to the numeral 2.  After contacting the numeral 2 twice, the numeral 4 would have the 
most remaining pellets (one pellet for the numeral 4 and zero for the numeral 2) so the monkeys 
might switch back to the 4 to finish the problem.  It must be noted, however, that the same 
pattern for the numerals 2 and 4 could be obtained using a slightly different rationale.  The 
monkeys could attempt to clear out the numeral 4 first, but move prematurely to the 2.  If they 
knew they had exhausted the pellets at the 2 and the problem did not end, they could then move 
back to the 4 and retrieve the last pellet.  This would produce the same pattern as choosing the 
numeral with the largest number of pellets on every trial.  This rationale, however, would not 
produce the same pattern as the “pellet pattern” for other pairings such as 4 and 3.   
The “alternating pattern” was scored as a special case of the pellet pattern.  In the 
alternating pattern, the monkeys started with the larger numeral and alternated between the two 
numerals on each response until the pellets had been exhausted.  So if they were presented with a 
3 and a 2 they would touch 3, 2, 3, 2, 3, in that order.  Note that this response pattern would 
never produce an errorless trial when the target numerals differed by more than one (e.g., 5 and 
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3).  Problems in which the smaller number was cleared first (e.g., 1, 2, 2) or there was no 
predictable pattern were labeled as the “other pattern.” 
We determined the proportion of errorless trials as a function of response pattern for 
Gale, Willie, and Murph.  The proportion was approximately 5% for the numeral pattern, 20% 
for the pellet pattern, 20% for the alternating pattern, and 55% for the other pattern.  We then 
computed how often the monkeys’ behavior would conform to these patterns by chance, given 
the numeral pairings that were used in the study.  We used a computer simulation to perform this 
calculation. 
Simulations were conducted by creating a computer program that responded to the same 
kinds of problems the monkeys saw.  That is, we simulated the choices between numerals, not 
the maze-running itself.  The simulation chose randomly between the two numerals available in 
the problem.  Responding continued in this way until the trial was completed (i.e., until each 
numeral had been selected the corresponding number of times).  Errors were calculated for the 
computer in the same way they were operationalized for the monkeys (e.g., choosing the 4 more 
than four times in a problem).  The computer was tested with blocks of problems, as was done 
with the monkeys, but for purposes of generating the normal distribution, at least 10,000 blocks 
of trials were simulated for each possible pairing of numerals (1 to 6).  One million trials were 
simulated in total.  
After each block of problems, the proportion of trials completed without error was 
calculated, producing a sampling distribution of errorless trials that could be expected by chance 
alone.  Each simulated errorless trial was also scored according to whether it matched the pellet 
pattern described above.  In this way, we obtained statistical estimates of the likelihood by 
chance alone of selecting the numeral associated with the larger number of pellets on every trial 
102 
(response) of a problem.  Of course, the probability of this pattern of responses varied as a 
function of the numeral pairing.  For 2:1 problems, 2/3 of the problems fit this pattern (i.e., only 
by selecting the 1 on the first response could one complete a trial without error and without 
following the pellet pattern).  By comparison, only 7% of the errorless 6:5 trials fit this pattern 
by chance alone.  Overall, only 20% of the trials that were completed without error by the 
computer simulation matched the pellet pattern.  
In the monkeys’ responses, 40% of the errorless trials involved touching the numeral on 
each trial that had the same or greater number of pellets remaining, including those trials in 
which the animals alternated between the numerals and thereby selected the numeral with the 
larger number of remaining pellets (i.e., the pellet pattern plus its variation, the alternating 
pattern).  The 40% of errorless trials that actually fell into those two related categories 
significantly exceeded the chance level determined by the computer simulation (p < .05).  This 
suggests that the monkeys were purposefully using this pattern to facilitate performance, and not 
just behaving at random with some of their behavior conforming to the pellet and alternating 
strategies by chance.   
No other strategy was observed at levels in excess of chance.  Analysis revealed that 8% 
of the simulated trials fit the “numeral pattern” (e.g., 5,5,5,5,5,2,2), which is a number 
statistically identical to the 5% the monkeys produced (p > .10).  Errorless responses that fit the 
“alternating pattern” (e.g., 2,1,2) alone were even less probable by chance (3%), but the monkeys 
did not produce this subset of the “pellet pattern” at levels significantly in excess of chance (p = 
.06).  Recall that the “alternating” variant of the pellet pattern could only produce errorless 
performance on five numeral pairings (1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 4:5, and 5:6). 
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Discussion 
Three of the four animals performed better than chance, and better than would be 
expected if they knew only the relative magnitudes of the numerals.  The pattern of responding 
indicated that the animals learned strategies to simplify the task, such as clear the larger numeral 
first and choose the numeral with the greatest amount of remaining pellets.  Correct execution of 
these strategies required knowledge beyond ordinality (which numeral is bigger) or even ratio 
(the relative magnitude of the difference in proportions).  For instance, the pellet strategy 
required the monkeys to know the absolute number of pellets remaining for each numeral. 
Despite these performance strategies, errorless problems were still the minority.  On most 
trials, the monkeys touched a target more times than was represented by the numeral.  Of course, 
the memory demands of this task were substantial, requiring a monkey not only to keep track of 
how many times he had touched a specific target, but potentially also to remember how many 
times he had touched the other target, and in any case to reset these representations for each new 
problem.  Under these demands it seems unreasonable to expect errorless performance on the 
vast majority of trials; still, the present data do not compel a conclusion that the monkeys were 
enumerating responses toward some exact and absolute quantity (e.g., move to the 3 exactly 
three times).  Instead, the results indicate that the monkeys had an understanding of the 
approximate values represented by the numerals. 
General Discussion 
 Over the past two decades, researchers have provided clear evidence that nonhuman 
primates can use Arabic numerals to perform a variety of tasks (e.g., Beran & Rumbaugh, 2001; 
Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001; Boysen & Berntson, 1989; 1995; Matsuzawa, 1985; Murofushi, 1997; 
Olthof et al., 1997; Rumbaugh et al., 1989; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991).  Despite these 
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impressive displays of numerical competence, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what numerals 
represent to these animals.  When adult humans look at the Arabic numeral 4 they understand 
several things about that numeral.  They understand that the numeral 4 is larger than the numeral 
3 and smaller than the numeral 5 and that it symbolizes the quantity four.  They also understand 
that the numeral 4 is an even number that can be divided by the numeral 2 with no remainder.  
Obviously we do not expect the monkeys to understand the concept of even numbers or the 
operation of division, but it is possible that they understand the order of numerals (their ordinal 
value) and that the numerals represent specific quantities (their cardinal value).  It is also 
possible that the monkeys do not understand the order of the numerals or the quantities 
associated with them, but instead respond to the numerals based on a complex matrix of 
memorized response patterns (e.g., pick the numeral 7 when presented with 6, not when 
presented with 8) or their hedonic value.  The results of the two current studies provided us with 
a clearer picture of what Arabic numerals mean to the rhesus macaques in our laboratory.   
 In Experiment 1, the monkeys accurately compared Arabic numerals and analog dot 
arrays, even on the first exposure to these trials.  This indicates that the monkeys were not 
relying on a complex matrix of learned discriminations.  Additionally, the data from Hank 
suggest that the monkeys were not solving the comparisons based on the hedonic value of the 
numerals.  Although Hank was reinforced proportionally for numerals and not dot displays, his 
responses to the last half of the novel numeral:dot probes were similar to the responses of the 
other monkeys, even when numerical value opposed hedonic value.  For example, Hank was able 
to respond correctly to a comparison of four dots and the numeral 3, despite the fact that the 
numeral 3 had a much richer reinforcement history.  The results also indicated that Hank did not 
base his responses on the probability of reward.  He responded correctly on the majority of trials 
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in which an array of five dots was paired with a larger array or numeral, even though he had 
always been reinforced for choosing arrays of five dots during training.  The fact that the 
monkeys were not responding to numerical pairs based on a complex matrix of memorized 
responses or hedonic values suggests that these monkeys understood that the Arabic numerals 
represented absolute values that could be ordered and compared on a relative basis.     
Although the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the monkeys were using quantity 
information to make comparisons between numerals and dot quantities, the quantity information 
appears to be approximate rather than exact.  Performance suffered when the numerical distance 
between the numeral and dot quantity was small, which is a hallmark of the analog magnitude 
model of numerical ability (e.g., Brannon & Roitman, 2003; Gibbon, 1977; Meck & Church, 
1983).  According to this model, numerical performance is based on a continuous representation 
of magnitude rather a representation of the exact number of items in a set.  Memory for the 
magnitudes associated with each numeral is imperfect so it is more difficult to compare numerals 
that are close in distance than numerals that are far apart (Dehaene, 1992, 2003; Gallistel & 
Gelman, 1992, 2000; Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999).  This model has been used by a 
number of researchers to explain animal numerical behavior in studies involving analog stimuli 
(e.g., Beran, 2001, 2004; Beran & Rumbaugh, 2001; Nieder & Miller, 2004) 
The results of Experiment 2 provide additional information on the representations 
underlying the monkeys’ use of Arabic numerals.  Three of the four animals performed better 
than chance in a task requiring them to make a number of responses equaling an Arabic numeral.  
However, on most trials, the monkeys touched a target more times than was represented by the 
numeral.  These data, like the data from Experiment 1, suggest that the monkeys had some 
understanding of the quantity symbolized by the numerals, but were not representing that 
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quantity precisely.  In other words, the monkeys were not enumerating exactly three responses to 
the numeral 3, but were instead responding in a more approximate manner.  Overall, these two 
studies provide evidence that the rhesus macaques in our laboratory understand the relative 
values of Arabic numerals and can use this knowledge to compare two numerals.  These 
monkeys also understand that Arabic numerals represent approximate quantity information and 
can use that information to compare numerals to analog stimuli and to perform a task requiring 
the enumeration of sequential responses.   
Although these numerical abilities are impressive, it is clear that the monkeys do not have 
a human-like understanding of numerals.  Humans use number words and symbols to move 
beyond the realm of approximation and communicate the precise numerical values required for 
formal mathematics.  The monkeys in this study understood the order of the numerals and could 
use them to facilitate responding in tasks requiring knowledge of quantity information.  In 
contrast to humans, however, they behaved as if the representations underlying the Arabic 
numerals were fuzzy approximations of true set size rather than precise quantities.  Therefore, 
what seems to distinguish the symbolic numerical competence of monkeys from that of humans 
is the representation of exact set sizes across a large range of quantities.  Only humans need the 
exactness of representing numbers such as 9, 13, 142, or even 4 for that matter.  Monkeys may 
need to judge between small sets so that they can make important choices between things like 
four pieces of food and three pieces, or two predators versus three, but even these judgments do 
not require exact numerical knowledge, just an ability to distinguish relative numerousness.   
Outside of laboratory tasks like the ones in this study, monkeys probably never need to know 
that there are exactly six predators, or to distinguish 16 pieces of fruit from 18, for example.  In 
those cases, the approximate representation of those numbers provides all of the information 
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necessary to aid decision making that increases survival odds.  The present findings indicate that, 
although nonhuman primates do not need to know absolute numerousness in the wild, they can 
learn symbols that represent such numerousness and use these symbols in a variety of different 
contexts. 
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Table 2.1 
Overall Accuracy Levels across Trial Type for Experiment 1 
Trial Type Mean % Correct Number of Trials Std. Deviation 
Numeral-Numeral 
(Training) 
84.5* 2399 11.82 
Dot-Dot 
(Training) 
89.3* 2385 4.72 
Numeral-Dot Probes 
(Testing) 
81.5* 360 2.52 
 
* Performance is significantly better than chance, p < .01  
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Figure 2.1. Example of the type of display used in Experiment 1 (the arrows and annotations 
within the arrows did not appear on the monkeys’ screens). 
+ 
2 
3 
This numeral could be 
touched three times in a 
problem.  Each would be  
rewarded.  Additional touches 
would not be rewarded. 
This numeral could be 
touched twice in a problem.   
The problem ended when the 2 
was touched twice and the 3 
was touched thrice. 
116 
 
 
 
 
 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
Gale Hank Willie Murph
W
or
se
 th
an
 C
ha
nc
e 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 B
et
te
r t
ha
n 
C
ha
nc
e *
* *
 
* Performance is significantly better than chance, p < .05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Percent of problems completed without error relative to chance in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 2.3. Percent of problems completed without error that included a given target numeral for 
Gale, Willie, and Murph in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 2.4. Percent of problems completed without error by ratio (small/large target numerals) 
for Gale, Willie, and Murph in Experiment 2 compared to computer simulations of chance 
performance and a strategy based on relative amount. 
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Chapter 3: Ordinal-list integration for symbolic, arbitrary, and analog stimuli by rhesus 
macaques (Macaca mulatta)2 
 
Abstract 
Two numeral-trained monkeys learned to produce 3 5-item lists of Arabic numerals, colors, and 
arbitrary signs in the correct sequence.  The monkeys then responded at above-chance levels 
when the authors tested them with nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of items from different 
lists, indicating their use of ordinal-position information.  The authors also tested the monkeys 
with nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of an analog quantity and an item from 1 of the 3 
learned lists.  Although the monkeys were not trained to serially order analog quantities, 1 
monkey correctly integrated the analog quantities with the lists of numerals, colors, and signs. 
The consistent use of an ordinal rule, despite different types of training and varying degrees of 
experience with the 4 types of stimuli, suggested that the monkey had a robust concept of 
ordinality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
2 This chapter was previously published as: Harris, E.H., Beran, M.J., & Washburn, D.A. (2007). Ordinal-list 
integration for symbolic, arbitrary, and analog stimuli by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). The Journal of 
General Psychology, 134, 183-197. 
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Nonhuman primates can learn to produce serial lists of four, five, and even seven 
arbitrary stimuli (e.g., D’Amato & Colombo, 1988, 1989; Swartz, Chen, & Terrace, 1991, 2000; 
Terrace, Son, & Brannon, 2003; Treichler, Raghanti, & Van Tilburg, 2003).  In addition to 
producing such lists, animals also can retain knowledge of several lists at once in long-term 
memory.  This ability allows researchers to investigate the type of knowledge that animals 
acquire when learning serial lists and the organization that occurs for list items that are presented 
in different ways (e.g., Treichler & Van Tilburg, 1999, 2002).  For example, researchers such as 
Treichler et al. investigated whether animals infer an integrated serial relationship among items.  
In the present article, we investigated the question of whether animals encode the ordinal 
relations between items in the lists. 
Early theories of human memory proposed that humans learn a serial list by focusing on 
associations between adjacent or even remote items in the list.  In other words, items are stored 
as pairs in memory so that each item is associated with another item (Ebbinghaus, 1964; Young, 
1961).  However, another possibility is that, when mastering a list, humans and animals learn 
item-position associations.  For example, they learn an association between Item 1 and the first 
ordinal position and between Item 2 and the second ordinal position (e.g., Burns, Dunkman, & 
Detloff, 1999; Ebenholtz, 1963).  Chen, Swartz, and Terrace (1997) reported that rhesus 
monkeys learned four lists containing four arbitrary items each.  The monkeys then learned four 
4-item lists that were derived from individual items in the original lists.  On two of the new lists, 
each item’s original ordinal position was maintained and, on the other two new lists, the ordinal 
position of each item was changed.  The lists that maintained the ordinal positions were much 
easier for the monkeys to learn, indicating that the monkeys retained information about the 
ordinal positions of individual items in each list.  Other researchers have used comparisons of 
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two items from different lists to provide evidence that monkeys learn the ordinal positions of 
each item.  For example, monkeys that were trained on a series, A1B1C1D1, and a second series, 
A2B2C2D2, immediately responded correctly at a greater-than-chance level when researchers 
presented them with comparisons such as A1-C2 and B1-D2 (Terrace et al., 2003).  Therefore, 
learning about the ordinal relations of stimuli seemingly emerges for free in the sense that 
reinforcement contingencies are not tied to ordinal information about list items during training 
phases.  Given that these relations emerged in a number of situations, in the current study we 
assess the role of previous experience with various types of stimuli on ordinal-list integration. 
In the aforementioned studies, the items typically have been arbitrary stimuli, such as 
photographs, with no meaningful relevance to animals outside of the constraints of the task.  For 
many years, we have presented rhesus monkeys with a variety of stimulus types, some of which 
have come to operate at or near symbolic levels.  For example, monkeys learned to select the 
larger of two Arabic numerals, and after extensive training with specified pairs, they selected the 
larger member of a never-before-seen pairing.  The monkeys also selected sets of three, four, and 
even five numerals in descending order (Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991).  The monkeys received 
a number of food pellets proportional to the numeral or array that they selected (e.g., five pellets 
for picking the numeral “5” or five dots).  Thus, they were always rewarded regardless of their 
selection.  In an extension of Washburn and Rumbaugh’s study, Gulledge (1999) demonstrated 
that monkeys learned to choose the larger of two Arabic numerals or the larger of two arrays of 
circular dots, and when later presented with a numeral and a dot array, they selected the larger 
stimulus, even when only correct responses were rewarded.  However, in each of those studies, 
whether the animals responded to numerals on the basis of their ordinal or cardinal value was 
unknown.  If the numerals had ordinal values for the monkeys, each numeral would be linked to 
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all others in a serial list.  If the numerals operated with cardinal values, it would be the result of 
linking each numeral to a specific number of food items.   
In the present study, we tested the ability of 2 rhesus monkeys to integrate lists of Arabic 
numerals, colored squares, arbitrary signs, and analog quantities.  Our monkeys had prior testing 
experience in using Arabic numeral stimuli and analog quantities, for which numerals may have 
obtained cardinal or ordinal values.  Both monkeys also participated in a recent study in which 
researchers presented them with a series of one to nine computerized maze trials (Harris, 
Washburn, Beran, & Sevcik, in press).  Upon completion of all of the maze trials in a series, the 
researchers gave the monkeys a same-or-different discrimination involving a numerical stimulus 
(either an Arabic numeral or a dot quantity) and the letter “D” (for different).  Harris et al. 
rewarded the monkeys for choosing the numerical stimulus if it corresponded to the number of 
maze trials in the previously completed series.  If the numerical stimulus did not match the 
number of maze trials, they rewarded the monkeys for choosing the “D.”  In addition to these 
studies with Arabic numerals, the monkeys also had previous experiences with analog quantities.  
Both monkeys had participated in a study in which they assessed the number of circular dots on a 
screen as being either larger or smaller than a learned central value (Beran, Smith, Redford, & 
Washburn, 2006).  Thus, Arabic numerals and analog quantities in the form of circular dots were 
very familiar stimuli for these monkeys, and this familiarity allowed us to examine spontaneous 
list integration for meaningful and nonmeaningful stimuli. 
Our first experimental question pertained to exactly what numerals meant to the monkeys 
in terms of how they were represented.  If Arabic numerals have ordinal value, the monkeys 
should learn to produce a list of Arabic numerals faster than they would learn to produce a list of 
unfamiliar arbitrary stimuli because of both their prior experience with the numerals and their 
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prior knowledge of the ordinal relations between numerals.  Conversely, if past experiences 
using Arabic numerals have led to representations of those numerals that are linked to specific 
quantities (cardinal value), the monkeys should show no advantage when learning to produce an 
ordinal list of Arabic numerals because cardinal, and not ordinal, relations were the basis of their 
earlier judgments (the number of food items received for picking numerals led to a representation 
of numerals in terms of cardinal value).  In addition, these quantity representations should not 
lead to facilitative effects during integration of the numeral list with lists of arbitrary signs and 
colors that are only associated with ordinal information.  In Experiment 1, monkeys learned to 
serially order a list of five numerals, a list of five colored squares, and a list of five arbitrary 
signs.  In Experiment 2, the monkeys received nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of items from 
different lists, testing the ability of the monkeys to use ordinal position information to integrate 
the lists. 
Our second experimental question pertained to the integration of analog quantities into 
ordinal lists.  Given that these 2 monkeys had previous experience in viewing and responding to 
a variety of analog stimuli, we investigated whether those types of stimuli could be 
spontaneously integrated into ordinal lists on the basis of converting the quantity information 
that was inherent in the analog sets into ordinal information.  It was critical that the animals had 
previous experience with analog sets so that, when the time came to compare a quantity with an 
item from one of the trained lists, the animals would be familiar with many different analog 
quantities.  In Experiment 3, the monkeys received nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of 
analog quantities and items from the three learned lists.  We did not train the monkeys to select 
analog quantities in descending order.  We relied on their previous experiences with these types 
of stimuli to provide them with the necessary information to spontaneously encode the ordinal 
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relations between such stimuli within this new type of task.  Although the monkeys had some 
prior experience in comparing numerals and analog quantities (Gulledge, 1999), they had no 
experience in comparing colors and analog quantities, comparing signs and analog quantities, or 
serially ordering lists of analog quantities.  Unlike the Gulledge study, in which the monkeys 
were rewarded every time they selected a numeral or analog quantity, in the current study we 
provided them with no reward regardless of their selections.  In addition, the analog quantities 
that Gulledge used were uniform circles that did not vary in size.  The analog quantities that we 
used were various polygons ranging in size from 1 to 3 cm that we presented in varying 
configurations on the screen.  Thus, to respond correctly to the pairwise comparisons in 
Experiment 3, the monkeys would have to apply ordinal information about analog quantities that 
they obtained from a very different context or use the ordinal information that might 
spontaneously emerge from extensive experience in viewing and responding to these types of 
stimuli. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Subjects.  Subjects were 2 male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; called Lou and 
Murph) aged 11 years.  The monkeys were housed individually at the Language Research Center 
of Georgia State University according to federal animal-housing standards and were not food or 
water deprived. 
Both monkeys had previously been trained to manipulate a joystick and respond to 
stimuli on a computer screen.  For example, in prior tasks investigating numerical ability, both 
monkeys learned to select the larger of two Arabic numerals (range = 0-9), the larger of two 
analog dot arrays (range = 1-9), and the larger stimulus when researchers presented them with an 
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Arabic numeral and dot array (range = 1-9; Gulledge, 1999; Washburn, 1994).  Although some 
monkeys in our laboratory have ordered more than two simultaneously visible Arabic numerals 
(Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991), the monkeys involved in the present study had no experience in 
learning lists or ordering stimuli and were not in visual contact with monkeys performing that 
type of task. 
Apparatus.  We tested the monkeys in their home cages using the LRC Computerized 
Test System (see Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hopkins, 1989, for a 
description), which consists of a joystick that is attached to a computer and color monitor.  The 
monkeys moved the joystick to control the movement of the cursor on the screen.  The computer 
program, which was written in Visual Basic, recorded the type and number of stimuli that we 
presented on each trial and the responses that the monkeys made.   
Design and Procedure: Phase 1.  The procedure that we used was similar to those of 
previous studies of ordinal knowledge and serial learning in monkeys (e.g., D’Amato & 
Colombo, 1988; Swartz et al., 1991).  At the beginning of each trial, a cursor appeared in the 
middle of the screen, and the monkey was required to move the cursor and make contact with 
stimuli positioned randomly around the perimeter of the screen in one of eight possible locations.  
To prevent the animal from relying on a fixed motor response pattern, the positions of the items 
varied randomly from trial to trial.  After contact with a stimulus, a green border surrounded the 
stimulus for 300 ms, indicating to the animal that its response had been recorded.   
Initially, the monkeys received only the first and second items in a list.  We added the 
next item in the list when a monkey correctly completed 39 of the 60 most recent trials (65% 
accuracy).  The program terminated trials and scored them as incorrect if the monkey skipped an 
item or made contact with an item that came earlier in the sequence (termed forward and 
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backward errors by Terrace et al., 2003).  We categorized repeated responses to the same 
stimulus, which occurred on less than 3% of the trials, as backward errors and terminated the 
trial.  Correct trials were rewarded with a melodic sequence of tones and the automatic delivery 
of a 94-mg fruit-flavored Noyes pellet.  Incorrect trials resulted in a negative buzzing tone and a 
10 s time-out during which the screen remained black.   
We trained the monkeys on three lists: a list consisting of the Arabic numerals “5” 
through “1” (in descending order), a list consisting of five uniquely colored squares, and a list 
consisting of five arbitrary symbols (“$,” “%,” “@,” “#,” and “*”).  During testing, the 
background was white, and the numerals and signs were black.  All stimuli were approximately 5 
cm  5 cm. 
After the monkeys reached criterion with the first five-item list, they began training with 
the first two items on the next list.  Lou was trained first on the list of numbers, then on the list of 
colors, and finally on the list of signs.  Murph was trained on the list of colors, then numbers, and 
finally signs.   
Design and Procedure: Phase 2.  After reaching criterion with all three of the five item 
lists, we gave the monkeys a version of the task in which five items were present on each trial, 
but the type of items (numerals, colors, or signs) varied from trial to trial.  The monkeys might 
be required to order five colors on one trial and five signs on the next trial.  The monkeys 
performed this version of the task in 500-trial sessions until they had achieved 65% accuracy for 
all three types of stimuli during a session.  This phase ensured that the monkeys were still at 
criterion for all three lists before Experiment 2. 
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Results and Discussion 
Both monkeys learned to produce the three 5-item lists in approximately 25 4-hr sessions.  
After they had learned all three lists, both monkeys required seven sessions of 500 trials to 
perform at criterion when the stimulus type varied from trial to trial.  The monkeys could attain 
criterion (39 out of the 60 most recent trials) by responding correctly to 39 consecutive trials.  
Therefore, 39 trials was the minimum number of trials that we required of the monkeys to satisfy 
criterion for each training phase with each ordinal list.  Table 3.1 shows the actual numbers of 
trials to criterion that the monkeys required on each phase of training.  After the initial two-item 
phase, the monkeys could have performed the task successfully by executing the known 
sequence and then responding to the new item.  However, they did not appear to be using this 
list-learning strategy because the number of trials to criterion typically increased as the length of 
the list increased. 
There was no facilitation of list learning when Arabic numerals were the stimuli.  One 
monkey, Murph, showed the greatest difficulty at all set sizes in learning to select Arabic 
numerals in descending order.  Lou had the greatest difficulty with Arabic numerals for two of 
the set sizes.  We had predicted that, if Arabic numerals already had ordinal value for the 
monkeys (given their previous experiences), learning should occur rapidly.  This was especially 
true because the descending selection order was exactly the same requirement as the optimal 
responding strategy in their previous number comparison task (Gulledge, 1999).  The fact that 
they did not show better performance, but instead performed poorly with numerals, suggests that 
those stimuli had not accrued ordinal value during previous exposure. 
Because the monkeys used to be able to select the larger of two numerals, one might 
expect performance to have been higher than what resulted in Experiment 1.  However, the most 
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recent experience these monkeys had with numerals was a task in which simply selecting the 
larger of the two numerals was not an optimal response strategy.  Rather, they had to match the 
number of runs through a maze to the corresponding numeral.  Therefore, prior to this training, it 
did not appear that Arabic numerals carried with them an ordinal value for the monkeys.  
Although we could not yet state that numerals had cardinal value for the monkeys, we assessed 
this question in Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 
We designed Experiment 2 to determine whether the monkeys learned the ordinal 
positions of the items in the trained lists of colors, numerals, and signs.  Although we continued 
to present the monkeys with trials like those at the end of Experiment 1, we also introduced 
nonrewarded probe trials in which we presented two items from different lists and different 
ordinal positions within the learned lists.  If the monkeys had learned the ordinal locations of the 
various stimuli in the learned lists, they should have selected the correct stimuli at levels above 
those of chance.  Such results would replicate earlier studies that showed ordinal learning by 
nonhuman animals (e.g., Swartz et al., 2000; Terrace et al., 2003; Treichler et al., 2003) and 
provide the foundation for Experiment 3, in which we would examine spontaneous ordinal-list 
integration for unlearned analog stimuli. 
Method 
Subjects and Apparatus.  In Experiment 2, we used the same subjects and apparatus from 
Experiment 1. 
Design and Procedure.  Experiment 2 consisted of sequencing trials that were identical to 
those in Phase 2 of Experiment 1 and pair-wise comparison trials.  The pair-wise comparison 
trials, which occurred on every 5th trial, consisted of randomly chosen items from two different 
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lists that occupied different ordinal positions.  For example, a comparison trial might consist of a 
black square (the first item in the color list) and the “@” sign (the third item in the sign list).  The 
two items were side by side on the screen, and the computer program randomly assigned one 
item to the left side and one to the right.  After subjects selected one of the items, the comparison 
trial ended, and the computer presented a new five-item sequence trial.  We provided no positive 
or negative feedback for the comparison trials, although feedback in the form of tones, pellets, 
and time-outs continued to be provided for the sequencing trials.  The monkeys performed this 
task twice a week for 4-hr sessions until they had completed 500 comparison trials. 
Results and Discussion 
We grouped together comparisons involving a color and a numeral, comparisons 
involving a numeral and a sign, and comparisons involving a color and a sign.  We considered a 
trial correct if the monkey selected the stimulus with the lower ordinal position.  For example, if 
the trial involved a black square (the first item in the color list) and the numeral “4” (the second 
item in the numeral list), the correct response would be the black square.  For all comparison 
types (colors and numerals, colors and signs, numerals and signs), performance was significantly 
above chance levels (p < .05), according to a sign test that compared performance with a 50% 
chance level of performance (Figure 3.1).   
As in other serial learning studies (e.g., Terrace et al., 2003), we found a distance effect 
for the comparison trials in which comparisons between items from more disparate ordinal 
positions on different lists were easier for the monkeys.  Accuracy increased as the ordinal 
distance between the two probe stimuli increased.  Even with a small range of distances, 
correlations between distance and accuracy were very high for both monkeys - Murph: r(2) = 
.84, p = .08; Lou: r(2) = .93, p < .05.   
130 
The accuracy for the monkeys on the pair-wise comparison trials indicates that they were 
responding on the basis of the ordinal position of the items on these three learned lists.  The fact 
that accuracy increased as the ordinal distance between the two stimuli increased indicates that 
this ordinal knowledge is probably inexact (i.e., the monkeys know that the numeral “4” is near 
the beginning of the number list, but they may not know that it occupies the second ordinal 
position). 
Experiment 3 
Typically, list items in these types of experiments are arbitrary, single stimuli that inhabit 
ordinal locations in a sequence.  Of course, the subject must learn the ordinal value of a stimulus 
because nothing inherent in the stimulus itself or in its relation to another stimulus denotes its 
ordinal position in the list.  However, other stimuli do provide inherent ordinal information when 
compared with each other, if nonhuman animals have an understanding and a responsiveness to 
numerical properties of a stimulus set.  When analog quantities are shown, nonhuman animals 
respond to their ordinal relations on the basis of ascending or descending numerosity, and not 
specific stimulus properties such as color, arrangement, or size (e.g., Brannon & Terrace, 2000; 
Emmerton, Lohmann, & Niemann, 1997; Judge, Evans, & Vyas, 2005; Smith, Piel, & Candland, 
2003; Thomas & Chase, 1980).  The question that we addressed in Experiment 3 was whether 
monkeys encode such analog quantities in terms of their ordinal position as determined by their 
numerosity when they are presented in comparison with unitary stimuli from learned ordinal 
lists.  If so, monkeys should select the analog stimulus set when its numerosity exceeds the 
learned ordinal position of the unitary comparison stimulus, whereas they should select the 
unitary stimulus set when its learned ordinal position exceeds that of the analog quantity.   
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It is important to note that the monkeys’ previous experience with analog stimuli (e.g., 
Gulledge, 1999) was critical to our ability to ask this question.  Because these 2 monkeys had 
compared two sets of dots and compared a set of dots with a numeral, they had ample 
opportunity to learn about the relation between differing numbers of analog stimuli.  They 
ultimately responded appropriately in selecting the correct stimulus with those comparisons.  
However, we do not know whether the monkeys were encoding the number of items in the 
analog set and comparing that with the representation of the cardinal value of the Arabic numeral 
member of the pair.  They might simply have learned which analog set sizes were correct choices 
in combination with some numbers but incorrect choices in combination with others.  If that 
were true, the monkeys would not be able correctly to select the larger of an analog set of stimuli 
and either a color or sign from those newly learned lists.  However, if the monkeys previously 
learned about the ordinal positions of analog stimuli from their cardinal values (i.e., their actual 
quantitative properties), they should be able to choose correctly no matter which list we paired 
with an analog quantity. 
Method 
Subjects and Apparatus.  In Experiment 3, we used the same subjects and apparatus from 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
Design and Procedure.  The analog quantities were groups of up to five black polygons 
(squares, rectangles, circles, ovals, parallelograms) with heights and widths ranging from 
approximately 1 cm to 3 cm.  The computer randomly selected the polygons and placed each 
within one of 81 locations in a 9 9 matrix.  The positions of the polygons changed from trial to 
trial. These stimuli were completely novel and did not resemble the analog stimuli that Gulledge 
(1999) previously presented to the monkeys in a pair-wise comparison task.   
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Because we were interested in whether analog quantities spontaneously would accrue 
ordinal value within the constraints of our task, we offered the monkeys no opportunity to 
respond to those stimuli prior to the nonrewarded probe trials.  In contrast to numerals, colors, 
and signs, the monkeys never learned to select analog sets in descending order and were never 
exposed to these analog sets before the first probe trial.  Baseline trials only involved five colors, 
numerals, or signs being presented on the screen, never analog quantities.   
The computer program presented pair-wise comparison trials on every 5th trial as during 
Experiment 2.  In between pair-wise comparison trials, the monkeys received the same 
sequencing trials as in Experiment 2 (with colors, numerals, or signs, but never analog 
quantities).  There were six possible pair-wise comparisons: a numeral and a color, a numeral 
and a sign, a color and a sign, an analog quantity and a numeral, an analog quantity and a color, 
and an analog quantity and a sign.  The computer program randomly chose pair-wise comparison 
stimuli from two different lists, with the constraint that they had to be in two different ordinal 
positions, and placed them on opposite sides of the screen.  We provided no positive or negative 
feedback for any responses during the probe trials.  The monkeys performed this task twice a 
week for 4-hr sessions until they had completed 500 pair-wise comparison trials. 
Results and Discussion 
We considered a trial correct if the monkey selected the stimulus with the lower ordinal 
position.  For example, if the trial involved a black square (the first item in the color list) and 
four items in an analog set (the second ordinal position in the analog list), the correct response 
would be the black square.  We analyzed the pair-wise comparison trials the same way as in 
Experiment 2.  For all six comparisons (including those with analog quantities), Murph’s 
performance was significantly above chance (p < .05) according to a sign test.  However, Lou 
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exceeded chance (p < .05) only for comparisons between colors and analog quantities (Figure 
3.2). 
As in Experiment 2, accuracy increased as the ordinal distance between the two 
comparison stimuli increased (Murph: r(2) = .91, p < .05; Lou: r(2) = .93, p < .05).  An 
important aspect of this distance effect is that it allowed us to take a closer look at the 
performance of Murph on probe trials with analog quantities.  Although Murph’s performance 
was statistically better than chance in comparing analog quantities with items from the other 
trained lists, one could argue that such performance could emerge not on the basis of his 
incorporating ordinal information inherent in the analog quantities, but on the basis of previous 
experience in selecting larger sets of analog quantities over smaller sets of analog quantities.  In 
such a case, Murph should have shown a bias in selecting larger analog sets as compared with 
smaller analog sets, independent of the comparison stimulus.  Given that the monkeys’ selection 
of larger analog sets, as compared with smaller analog sets, also indicated competence in using 
ordinal information in these probe trials, we could not simply report the frequencies of selecting 
different analog quantities.  However, we could look at shifts in the likelihood of selecting the 
most extreme analog quantities as a function of the difference between those analog quantities 
and the comparison stimuli.  When the computer program presented a single polygon with list 
items from Ordinal Position 4 (the second-to-last position), subjects selected the single polygon 
on 87% of the trials.  Subjects selected single analog quantities approximately 50% of the time 
when they were presented with list items from Ordinal Position 3.  If Murph learned through 
previous experience only that single polygons were not good stimuli to select, he should have 
shown little or no responding to those stimuli, and he certainly would not have shown 
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preferential responding to single polygons when the comparison stimulus was from a close 
ordinal position. 
In addition, although performance was very high whenever the computer program 
presented five polygons, the occasional incorrect selection of a trained list stimulus instead of the 
five polygons always occurred when that comparison stimulus was from Ordinal Position 2 in its 
trained list (providing a distance of only one ordinal position).  When we looked only at 
comparisons of analog quantities to learned list stimuli, Murph still exhibited a very high 
correlation between performance and the ordinal distance between stimuli being compared, r(2) 
= .97, p < .05. 
General Discussion 
As we predicted, both monkeys learned to produce three 5-item lists at greater-than-
chance levels.  During the initial presentation of each list, only two items were present, and we 
added a new item each time the monkeys reached an accuracy criterion.  This successive method 
has been effective in training other rhesus monkeys to produce ordinal lists (e.g., D’Amato & 
Colombo, 1998; Swartz et al., 1991), and we have successfully replicated those reports.   
Previously, we have trained rhesus monkeys to select the larger of two Arabic numerals 
or the larger member of a pair containing a numeral and a dot quantity.  Although the monkeys 
could have learned something about the approximate (or exact) number of items associated with 
those numerals, they might also have simply learned a number of ordinal pairings independent of 
numerosity.  If the latter were true, and if the subjects learned the ordinal values of the numerals, 
we would have expected the monkeys to reach training criterion more quickly with numerals 
than with either of the two novel stimulus sets.  However, this was not the case, suggesting that 
either (a) ordinal knowledge did not inhere in the representations formed during the presentation 
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of Arabic numerals in previous studies or (b) if it did, such learning was lost as a result of 
subsequent studies in which numerals took on cardinal values (e.g., Harris et al., in press).  After 
ordinal training in the present study, the monkeys performed significantly above chance for all 
types of pair-wise comparisons with items from different lists.  Such results indicate that the 
monkeys were responding on the basis of the newly learned ordinal positions of the items.   
Perhaps the more exciting finding is that, in addition to successfully comparing numerals, 
colors, and signs that were trained as serial lists, one monkey was able to make ordinal 
comparisons using analog quantities.  Murph performed above chance levels for all comparison 
types, including those that involved analog quantities.  As we previously mentioned, both 
monkeys had prior experience comparing analog dot quantities with Arabic numerals (Gulledge, 
1999), but they had received no serial training involving lists of quantities.  However, when we 
presented analog quantities within the context of making ordinal judgments, one monkey 
spontaneously used the magnitude of the polygon set to determine its ordinal position relative to 
the learned-list stimuli.  Although the monkeys had prior experience performing pair-wise 
comparisons with analog dot quantities and Arabic numerals (Gulledge), the analog quantities in 
that experiment were uniform dots and the monkeys were rewarded regardless of selection.  In 
contrast, the analog quantities in the present experiment were polygons that varied in size, and 
we gave no reward on pair-wise comparison trials.  Therefore, applying ordinal information from 
Gulledge’s previous study to the current task indicates impressive generalization abilities.  In 
addition, Murph integrated the analog sets into lists of colors and signs, stimuli that were never 
previously paired together.  Thus, for Murph, analog stimuli took on both cardinal and ordinal 
values within specified tasks.   
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Although researchers have demonstrated that monkeys can respond to analog quantities 
on the basis of ascending or descending numerosity (Brannon & Terrace, 2000; Emmerton et al., 
1997; Judge et al., 2005; Smith et al., 2003; Thomas & Chase, 1980), the present study is the first 
evidence that a monkey will respond on the basis of ordinal position on nonrewarded trials in 
which an analog quantity is presented in comparison with a unitary stimulus from a learned 
ordinal list.  Unfortunately, only one of the two monkeys performed at a high level in 
Experiment 3.  Although Lou exceeded the chance levels for the first set of probe trials 
(Experiment 2), his performance was lower than that of Murph, and he did not sustain above-
chance performance during the second set of probe trials, including those with the analog stimuli 
(Experiment 3).  This individual difference is important in illustrating the fragile nature of these 
representations.  However, it is notable that the one comparison in which Lou performed above 
chance involved colored squares that he was trained to order sequentially and analog quantities 
that he was never trained to order sequentially, suggesting that he was able to apply an ordinal 
rule with analog stimuli, despite the different types of training with colors and analog quantities. 
Conclusion 
Both monkeys showed evidence of ordinal knowledge when we tested them with 
arbitrary stimuli and familiar Arabic numerals that they had learned to sequence and that had 
previously been associated with quantity information.  One monkey also incorporated ordinal 
information that was inherent in analog dot quantities.  The monkeys’ ability to respond to the 
ordinal information of these different stimuli suggests that they spontaneously attended to ordinal 
position.  These data, combined with the data of other studies (e.g., Brannon & Terrace, 2000; 
Chen et al., 1997; Terrace et al., 2003), provide a glimpse of what is perhaps a broad concept of 
ordinal position in rhesus monkeys that is readily gleaned from various properties of stimulus 
137 
sets.  If this concept is true, future researchers could design studies to examine monkeys’ 
immediate incorporation of such ordinal information in cross-list comparisons of different 
stimulus properties, such as lists of larger and smaller stimuli compared with lists of brighter and 
dimmer stimuli. 
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Table 3.1 
The Number of Trials to Criterion for Each Phase of Training  
Lou 2 Stimuli 3 Stimuli 4 Stimuli 5 Stimuli 
     
List 1 - Numbers 85 516 1,306 1,649 
List 2 - Colors 47 2,025 2,166 123 
List 3 - Signs 66 60 171 464 
     
Murph 2 Stimuli 3 Stimuli 4 Stimuli 5 Stimuli 
     
List 1 - Colors 48 55 172 1,918 
List 2 - Numbers 394 1,626 2,495 3,998 
List 3 - Signs 54 72 420 1,269 
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Figure 3.1. Performance on the three types of probe trials from the trained lists. Bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals for proportions. Dotted line denotes chance. 
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Figure 3.2. Performance on the six types of probe trials from the trained lists and the analog dot 
quantities. Bars indicate 95% confidence intervals for proportions. Dotted line denotes chance. 
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Chapter 4: Macaques’ (Macaca mulatta) use of numerical cues in maze trials3 
 
Abstract 
We tested the ability of number-trained rhesus monkeys to use Arabic numeral cues to 
discriminate between different series of maze trials and anticipate the final trial in each series.  
The monkeys’ prior experience with numerals also allowed us to investigate spontaneous transfer 
between series.  A total of four monkeys were tested in two experiments.  In both experiments, 
the monkeys were trained on a computerized task consisting of three reinforced maze trials 
followed by one nonreinforced trial.  The goal of the maze was an Arabic numeral 3, which 
corresponded to the number of reinforced maze trials in the series.  In experiment 1 (n=2), the 
monkeys were given probe trials of the numerals 2 and 4 and in experiment 2 (n=2), they were 
given probe trials of the numerals 2–8.  The monkeys receiving the probe trials 2 and 4 showed 
some generalization to the new numerals and developed a pattern of performing more slowly on 
the nonreinforced trial than the reinforced trial before it for most series, indicating the use of the 
changing numeral cues to anticipate the nonreinforced trial.  The monkeys receiving probe trials 
of the numerals 2–8 did not predict precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur in each 
series, but they did incorporate the changing numerals into their strategy for performing the task.  
This study provides the first evidence that number-trained monkeys can use Arabic numerals to 
perform a task involving sequential presentations. 
 
 
                                               
3 This chapter was previously published as: Harris, E.H., & Washburn, D.A. (2005). Macaques’ (Macaca mulatta) 
use of numerical cues in maze trials. Animal Cognition, 8, 190-199. 
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Many species of animals including pigeons, rats, raccoons, salamanders, monkeys, and 
chimpanzees have exhibited some form of numerical knowledge either spontaneously or with 
training (e.g., Beran and Rumbaugh 2001; Boysen and Berntson 1989; Brannon and Terrace 
1998; Capaldi and Miller 1988; Emmerton 1998; Hauser et al. 2000; Matsuzawa 1985; Uller et 
al. 2003).  Most numerical studies with animals have focused on counting behavior (e.g., Davis 
and Bradford 1986; Beran and Rumbaugh 2001) or relative numerousness judgments.  Relative 
numerousness judgments have typically involved the comparison between visible quantities 
(e.g., Brannon and Terrace 1998, 2000; Rumbaugh et al. 1987; Thomas et al. 1980; Uller et al. 
2003) or visible symbols that represent quantities (e.g., Olthof et al. 1997; Washburn and 
Rumbaugh 1991).  
In a few studies, however, animals have been required to respond to the numerousness of 
stimuli or sequences that were not simultaneously visible.  Rhesus monkeys (Hauser et al. 2000), 
chimpanzees (Beran 2001), and orangutans (Call 2000) have shown the ability to watch food 
items placed sequentially into opaque containers, and subsequently to select the container with 
the most items.  Cotton-top tamarins have been shown to discriminate between the number of 
syllables in two sequences of speech, even while continuous variables such as sequence duration, 
item duration, inter-stimulus interval, and overall energy were controlled (Hauser et al. 2003). 
However, the capacity to respond to nonvisible numerousness is not limited to primates.  
Capaldi and Miller (1988) used the sequential presentation of events to investigate the ability of 
rats to count reinforced maze trials.  They presented rats with either three or four maze trials.  
The three-trial series consisted of two reinforced trials followed by a nonreinforced trial (RRN) 
and the four-trial series consisted of one nonreinforced trial followed by two reinforced trials and 
a nonreinforced trial (NRRN).  Results indicated that in both series the rats ran more slowly on 
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the terminal N trial than any other trial, even when confounding temporal and odor cues were 
controlled.  Capaldi and Miller concluded that the rats were counting the reinforced trials and 
using that numerical cue to predict when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  
These findings have been replicated and extended numerous times (e.g., Burns and 
Criddle 2001; Burns et al. 2004; Capaldi and Miller 2004).  In one of these subsequent studies, 
Burns et al. (1995) systematically varied the inter-trial intervals in a series of runway trials from 
20 to 120 s and obtained results similar to those of Capaldi and Miller (1988).  Due to the large 
variation in inter-trial intervals, Burns and colleagues concluded that the slower running times 
observed on the terminal N trials could not be explained by rhythmic cues, as had been suggested 
by Davis and Pérusse (1988).  The use of rhythmic cues is an extension of simultaneous 
subitizing (Mandler and Shebo 1982; Piazza et al. 2002) that applies to sequentially presented 
items or events.  
Rats have also been trained to discriminate between different series of reinforced and 
nonreinforced trials using brightness and texture cues on the runway floor.  For instance, Burns 
et al. (1999) consistently presented rats with a rough and white floor during an XNY series 
(where the X and Y represented different food items) and a smooth and black floor during a 
ZNN series (where the Z represented a third type of food item).  Using this procedure, the 
researchers were able to compare performance between more than one series in the same group 
of rats.  For both series, the rats developed faster running for rewarded trials than for 
nonrewarded trials.  
Monkeys previously trained to make ordinal judgments using Arabic numerals provide a 
unique opportunity to study the use of numerical cues and spontaneous transfer between series.  
Arabic numerals, instead of the texture of runway floors, can be used as a cue to help the 
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monkeys determine which type of series is being presented.  This in turn, could act as a cue to 
help them predict when a nonreinforced trial will occur.  Because the monkeys should not 
require additional training on what the Arabic numerals mean, they might then show flexibility 
in anticipating the identity of nonreinforced trials that occur at various places in a maze 
sequence.  
The monkeys involved in the current study previously learned to select the larger of two 
Arabic numerals (0-9) to receive the corresponding number of food pellets (Washburn and 
Rumbaugh 1991).  They also learned to select the larger of two analog quantities, such as arrays 
of letters (Washburn 1994), and have demonstrated the ability to choose the larger stimulus at a 
greater than chance level when presented with one analog quantity (such as dots) and one Arabic 
numeral (Gulledge 1999).  Based on the monkeys’ success in previous numerical tasks involving 
the simultaneous presentation of analog quantities and numerals we hypothesized that the 
monkeys would use Arabic numerals to perform a task involving the sequential presentation of 
maze trials.  More specifically, we hypothesized that the monkeys would use the numerals to 
discriminate among different series of reinforced and nonreinforced computerized maze trials 
and anticipate the nonreinforced trials.  We also hypothesized that the monkeys’ prior knowledge 
of Arabic numerals would allow for spontaneous transfer from one Arabic numeral to another 
during this sequential task.  To test these hypotheses, we trained all of the monkeys on an RRRN 
series and then introduced probe series involving different numbers of reinforced trials. 
Experiment 1 
In experiment 1, two rhesus monkeys were trained on a computerized maze series 
consisting of three reinforced trials followed by one nonreinforced trial (an RRRN series).  The 
numeral 3 was used as the goal of the maze and acted as a cue to the number of reinforced trials 
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that would occur before the nonreinforced trial.  After the monkeys had developed a pattern of 
performing more slowly on the nonreinforced trial in each series compared to the reinforced trial 
before it, they were introduced to probe trials consisting of the numerals 2 and 4 (an RRN and 
RRRRN series).  The goal was to assess the ability of the monkeys to use the changing target 
numeral to predict when the nonreinforced trial would occur. 
Method 
Subjects.  Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in this study.  The 
monkeys, Murph and Lou, were both 10 years old and had participated in several previous 
studies that required them to make ordinal judgments using Arabic numerals (following the 
methods described by Washburn and Rumbaugh 1991).  They also had participated in numerous 
computerized joystick tasks related to various other areas of cognitive research (e.g., Smith et al. 
2003; Washburn and Gulledge 2002; Washburn and Rumbaugh 1997).  The monkeys were 
individually housed according to federal animal housing standards and were not food or water 
deprived during this study. 
Apparatus.  The monkeys were tested in their home cages using the LRC Computerized 
Test System (see Rumbaugh et al.1989, for a description) consisting of a joystick attached to a 
Compaq computer and 17-inch color monitor.  The monkeys moved the joystick to control the 
movement of a cursor on the screen.  The computer program recorded the stimuli that were 
presented along with the amount of elapsed time before the monkey initiated the start of the trial 
and the amount of time required to complete the trial.  Pellets were dispensed automatically upon 
completion of reinforced trials. 
Task.  The computerized display consisted of a black H-shaped maze, approximately 21 
cm 29 cm, on a white background (see Figure 4.1).  A computer-generated white Arabic 
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numeral, approximately 2.5 cm 1.8 cm appeared in the upper left hand corner of the maze.  The 
monkeys moved the joystick to begin the trial and to begin measurement of response time.  At 
the beginning of each trial the cursor appeared in the lower right hand corner of the maze and the 
monkeys were required to move the cursor through the maze and make contact with the Arabic 
numeral in order to complete the trial successfully.  
Training procedure.  The monkeys were trained using only the Arabic numeral 3 in the 
display.  The numeral 3 corresponded to a series consisting of three reinforced trials followed by 
one nonreinforced trial (RRRN).  The inter-trial interval was 5 s, during which the screen 
remained black.  Upon successful completion of the reinforced trials there was sound feedback 
and the automatic delivery of a 97-mg fruit-flavored Noyes pellet.  No feedback was given for 
completion of the nonreinforced trials and the screen remained black for 15 s before a new series 
began.  
After several sessions of training the data were analyzed to determine whether the 
monkeys should be moved to test phase or should continue training using only the Arabic 
numeral 3.  Monkeys were considered ready for the test phase if they showed significantly 
slower response times on the fourth (nonreinforced) trials compared to the third (reinforced) 
trials.  Lou received 1,000 training trials (250 series) and Murph received 1,300 training trials 
(325 series) over the course of two sessions before they were moved to the test phase of the 
experiment.  
 Testing procedure.  During testing, probe trials consisting of the Arabic numerals 2 and 4 
were randomly interspersed with the familiar Arabic numeral 3.  As was true during training, the 
Arabic numeral displayed during testing corresponded to the number of reinforced trials that 
would occur before one nonreinforced trial.  For example, the target numeral 4 corresponded to 
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an RRRRN series.  Both monkeys received a total of 1,500 test trials over the course of two 
sessions. 
Results 
 Both start times and response times were recorded for each trial and those measures were 
used to compute run time.  Start time was defined as the amount of elapsed time from the time at 
which the maze appeared on the screen to the time at which the monkey initiated the trial by 
moving the joystick.  Response time was defined as the time required to complete the trial 
successfully once it had been initiated.  Run time is the sum of start time and response time for 
each trial.  Analyses were completed separately for start time, response time, and run time.  Start 
time was found to be fairly constant, causing response time and run time to be highly correlated, 
r(5,300) = 0.85, p < 0.01.  Start time and run time were not as highly correlated, r(5,300) = 0.51, 
p < 0.01.  Due to the high correlation between response time and run time, and because run time 
was also the measure used by Capaldi and Miller (1988) to investigate the performance of rats in 
a similar study, we focused only on this measure.  
The monkeys were not restrained in any way during this task, and occasional 
disengagement from the task in the middle of a trial resulted in unrealistically long start or 
response times.  This caused the mean times to be much greater than the medians.  We recorded 
all trials with run times in excess of 10 s to be false trials because this length was about three 
times the length of the typical trial.  To ensure that the exclusion of these trials was justified we 
analyzed the medians for start time, response time, and total time.  The medians were 
comparable to the means obtained when excluding these trials, so the 10 s trial limit was used in 
all subsequent analyses.  
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With the exclusion of these trials, Lou’s run times during training ranged from 3.98 to 
9.98 s with mean ± SD = 5.54 ± 1.01 s on reinforced trials and 4.20 to 7.87 s with mean ± SD = 
5.56 ± 0.80 s on nonreinforced trials.  Murph’s run times during training ranged from 4.16 to 
9.94 s with mean ± SD = 5.88 ± 0.89 s on reinforced trials and 4.70 to 9.57 s with mean ± SD = 
6.12 ± 0.87 s on nonreinforced trials.  
After two sessions of training, the data from both monkeys were analyzed to determine 
whether they should be moved to the test phase of the experiment.  Both monkeys performed 
significantly slower on the fourth (nonreinforced) trials compared to the third (reinforced) trials 
during training [Murph: F(1, 576) = 14.49, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.03; Lou: F(1, 429) = 25.05, p<0.01, 
η2 = 0.06] so they were moved to test trials. 
The training trials for both monkeys then were divided into blocks of 100 trials to assess 
progress over time.  Figure 4.2 shows that by block 2, Lou developed a pattern of running slowly 
on the first trial: mean ± SD = 5.77 ± 0.91 s, faster on the next two trials: mean ± SD = 5.61 ± 
1.14 s, 5.06 ± 0.67 s, and slower on the last nonreinforced trial: mean ± SD = 5.49 ± 0.62 s.  This 
pattern persisted through the next block of trials as well.  
By block 2, Murph developed a pattern of performing slowly on the first two trials: mean 
± SD = 5.97 ± 0.76 s, 5.96 ± 0.97 s, faster on the third trial: mean ± SD = 5.82 ± 0.86 s, and 
slower again on the last nonreinforced trial: mean ± SD = 6.15 ± 1.01 s, which persisted through 
block 3.  During block 4, however, Murph developed a pattern of performing progressively 
slower on trials 2, 3, and 4: mean ± SD = 5.49 ± 0.48 s, 5.98 ± 0.79 s, 6.08 ± 0.63 s, of each 
series.  
Lou’s run times during testing ranged from 3.78 to 9.99 s with mean ± SD = 5.45 ± 0.9 s 
on reinforced trials and 4.36 to 9.93 s with mean ± SD = 5.71 ± 0.98 s on nonreinforced trials.  
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Murph’s run times during testing ranged from 4.16 to 9.92 s with mean ± SD = 5.83 ± 0.87 s on 
reinforced trials and 4.87 to 9.73 s with mean ± SD = 6.19 ± 0.76 s on nonreinforced trials.  
The first 10 probe trials of each novel numeral provided some evidence that immediate 
generalization to the new numerals occurred (see Table 4.1).  For both monkeys, the average run 
time of the first 10 probe trials (excluding trials exceeding 10 s) is greater for the last 
nonreinforced trial in each novel series than the reinforced trial before it.  
Figure 4.3 shows the mean run time for each trial number in each type of series for all 
1,500 test trials.  For both monkeys, a one-way ANOVA (run time  trial number) was 
performed separately for each of the three target series (2, 3, and 4).  Results for Lou revealed a 
significant difference in mean run times based on trial number for all three target numerals 
[target 2: F(2, 362) = 12.85, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.07; target 3: F(3, 513) = 12.85, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.07; 
target 4: F(4, 363) = 6.38, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.07].  Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that Lou’s 
performance on the last (nonreinforced) trial in each series was significantly slower (p < 0.05) 
than the next to last (reinforced) trial for target numerals 2 and 3.  On series involving the target 
numeral 4, Lou’s performance was significantly faster on trial numbers 2, 3, and 4 compared to 
trial number 1.  He was also significantly faster on trial number 3 compared to trial numbers 1 
and 4.  
The data for Murph also showed a significant difference in mean run times based on trial 
number for all three target numerals [target 2: F(2, 218) = 7.23, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.06; target 3: F(3, 
464) = 21.43, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.12; target 4: F(4, 561) = 13.63, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.09].  Tukey post-
hoc tests revealed that Murph’s performance on the last (nonreinforced) trial in each target series 
was significantly slower (p < 0.05) than his performance on the next to last (reinforced) trial in 
each series.  
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To investigate whether the monkeys were using temporal cues to predict the 
nonreinforced trial, a correlation was performed using run time on nonreinforced trials and run 
time on the previous reinforced trials for both monkeys.  These variables were not significantly 
correlated for either monkey [Murph: r(689) = -0.01, p = 0.71; Lou: r(639) = 0.07, p = 0.10]. 
Discussion 
With training, both monkeys developed a pattern of performing more slowly on the 
nonreinforced trial in an RRRN series compared to the reinforced trial before it.  Lou developed 
the slow, fast, fast, slow pattern that Capaldi and Miller (1988) and Burns et al. (1995) observed 
in rats after training with an RRRN series.  This provides evidence that Lou was anticipating the 
nonreinforced trial.  
Murph developed a pattern similar to Lou’s during blocks 2 and 3, but during block 4 he 
performed progressively slower on trials 2, 3, and 4 of the series.  Although this caused him to 
perform significantly slower on the last (nonreinforced) trials compared to the next to last 
(reinforced) trials, the pattern does not provide evidence that he was predicting exactly when the 
nonreinforced trial would occur.  
After being trained on a target 3 series, the monkeys showed signs of generalization to 
new target numerals 2 and 4.  During the first 10 probe trials of each novel series, both monkeys 
averaged a slower run time for the last nonreinforced trial in the series than the reinforced trial 
before it.  This was not accomplished by performing gradually slower on each trial in the series.  
This indicates that at the start of testing the monkeys may have already understood the 
importance of the Arabic numerals as a cue to the number of reinforced trials in each series.  It 
also indicates that the monkeys were applying previously acquired knowledge of Arabic 
numerals to a novel task.  
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Throughout testing, Lou performed significantly slower on the nonreinforced trial 
compared to the reinforced trial before it for target series 2 and 3.  He did not accomplish this by 
performing progressively slower on each trial in a series.  For target series 4, however, his 
performance became gradually slower after trial number 3.  Although Lou may not have been 
anticipating precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur in the target 4 series, his 
gradually increasing time indicates that he may have been predicting a nonreinforced trial to 
occur at some point after trial 3.  
Murph, on the other hand, learned to perform significantly slower on the nonreinforced 
trial compared to the reinforced trial before it for all three target series (2, 3, and 4).  Despite the 
pattern developed in training, Murph did not perform progressively slower on each trial in those 
series.  Instead, his run time after the first trial remained relatively stable until increasing 
significantly for the nonreinforced trial.  
Lou’s performance on target series 2 and 3, and Murph’s performance on all three target 
series indicate that both monkeys were using the changing target numerals visible during testing 
to help them distinguish between series and predict when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  
Based on these encouraging findings and the evidence of generalization to new target numerals, 
we designed a second experiment to replicate these findings and to test the performance of 
monkeys presented with the full range of Arabic numerals on which they had been previously 
trained.  We predicted that these new monkeys would show results similar to those Murph and 
Lou produced when presented with small target numerals in experiment 1.  Due to the increased 
difficulty involved in keeping track of a greater number of trials, however, we were unsure 
whether the monkeys would have similar success with larger target series. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
 Subjects.  Two male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), Willie and Gale, participated in 
this study.  New monkeys were used in experiment 2 in an effort to replicate the results of 
experiment 1 with a separate group of animals.  The new monkeys were 18 and 20 years old, 
respectively, and had testing histories similar to Murph and Lou in experiment 1.  The monkeys 
were individually housed according to federal animal housing standards and were not food or 
water deprived during this study.  
 Apparatus, task, and training procedure.  The apparatus, training task, and training 
procedure were identical to those used in experiment 1.  After several sessions of training the 
data were analyzed to determine whether the monkeys should be moved to test phase or continue 
training using only the Arabic numeral 3.  As was the case in experiment 1, the monkeys were 
considered ready for test phase if they showed significantly slower response times on the fourth 
(nonreinforced) trials compared to the third (reinforced) trials.  Gale received 1,040 training 
trials (260 series) and Willie received 724 training trials (181 series) over the course of two 
sessions before they were moved to the test phase of the experiment. 
 Testing procedure.  During testing, probe trials consisting of the Arabic numerals 2-8 
were randomly interspersed with the familiar Arabic numeral 3 trials.  A new numeral was 
randomly selected and introduced every 100 trials.  As was true during training, the Arabic 
numeral displayed during testing corresponded to the number of reinforced trials that would 
occur before one nonreinforced trial.  For example, the target numeral 5 corresponded to an 
RRRRRN series.  In total, Willie completed 3,472 test trials over the course of seven sessions 
and Gale completed 6,853 test trials over the course of eight sessions. 
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Results 
 Data from experiment 2 were analyzed using the same procedure as experiment 1.  
Again, we excluded all trials with a run time in excess of 10 s.  We analyzed the medians for 
each trial number to ensure that they were comparable to the means obtained when excluding the 
trials exceeding the 10 s limit.  As was true in experiment 1, start time was somewhat correlated 
with run time, r(12,089) = 0.41, p < 0.01.  As was also true in experiment 1, response time was 
highly correlated with run time, r(12,089) = 0.83, p < 0.01, so only run time was used in 
subsequent analyses.  
 Gale’s run times during training ranged from 2.42 to 6.43 s with mean ± SD = 3.51 ± 
0.69 s on reinforced trials and 2.68 to 9.94 s with mean ± SD = 3.83 ± 0.83 s on nonreinforced 
trials.  Willie’s run times during training ranged from 2.68 to 9.94 s with mean ± SD = 3.84 ± 
0.99 s on reinforced trials and 2.59 to 9.27 s with mean ± SD = 3.96 ± 1.20 s on nonreinforced 
trials. 
 After two sessions of training, the data from both monkeys were analyzed to determine 
whether they should be moved to the test phase of the experiment.  Gale performed significantly 
slower on the fourth (nonreinforced) trials compared to the third (reinforced) trials during 
training, F(1, 479) = 4.05, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.01, so he was moved to test trials.  Willie did not 
perform significantly slower on the fourth trials compared to the third trials when all of the 
training trials were combined; rather he performed significantly slower on the fourth trials 
compared to the third trials during the second block of 100 training trials, F(1, 162) = 5.66, p < 
0.05, η2 = 0.03.  During the second block of 100 trials he also developed a pattern of performing 
slowly on the first trial: mean ± SD = 3.71 ± 0.91 s, faster on the next two trials: mean ± SD = 
3.66 ± 0.98 s, 3.55 ± 0.74 s, and slower on the last nonreinforced trial: mean ± SD = 3.97 ± 1.43 
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s, indicating that he was anticipating when the nonreinforced trials would occur.  Based on the 
statistical significance, as well as the general pattern of Willie’s data from the second block of 
trials, Willie was moved to test trials as well.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the training trials for both monkeys, divided into blocks of 100 trials.  
Unlike Willie, Gale developed a pattern of performing progressively slower on trials 2, 3, and 4: 
mean ± SD = 3.18 ± 0.46 s, 3.47 ± 0.76 s, 3.93 ± 0.87 s, during the third block of training trials. 
 Gale’s run times during testing ranged from 2.43 to 5.99 s with mean ± SD = 3.52 ± 0.54 
s on reinforced trials and 2.52 to 5.98 s with mean ± SD = 3.64 ± 0.58 s on nonreinforced trials.  
Willie’s run times during testing ranged from 2.45 to 7.42 s with mean ± SD = 3.91 ± 0.89 s on 
reinforced trials and 2.57 to 7.42 s with mean ± SD = 3.98 ± 0.92 s on nonreinforced trials.  
 The average run times for the first 10 probe trials of each novel numeral provided little 
evidence that the monkeys generalized to the new numerals.  The monkeys performed more 
slowly on the nonreinforced trial for some novel series, but this was not a consistent pattern. 
 Figure 4.5 shows the mean run times for both monkeys on each type of testing series.  
During testing, Gale showed the same pattern of steadily increasing time for each trial in the 
target 3 series as he did in training.  A similar pattern can also be seen for the target 2 and target 
4 series.  Gale did not develop a recognizable pattern on series with target numbers 5-8.  One-
way ANOVAs (trial number run time) for each target series revealed a significant difference in 
mean run time based on trial number for target series 3 and 6 [target 3: F(3, 946) = 5.05, p < 
0.01, η2 = 0.02; target 6: F(6, 996) = 2.38, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.01].  Tukey post-hoc tests showed 
that for target series 3, Gale’s mean run times for trials 1 and 2 were significantly slower 
compared to trial 4 and for target series 6, Gale’s mean run time was significantly slower for trial 
1 compared to trial 6 (p < 0.05).  
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 Willie showed the same pattern in the target 3 series during testing as he did during 
training with run times for trials 1 and 4 being the longest.  The peak at trial 4 is present in every 
other target series except 7.  One-way ANOVAs (trial number run time) for each target series 
revealed a significant difference in mean run time based on trial number for target series 8, F(8, 
934) = 2.31, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.02.  A Tukey post-hoc test for target series 8 showed that Willie’s 
performance was significantly slower on trial 3 compared to trials 7 and 9 (p < 0.05).  
 One-way ANOVAs (target series  run time) for both monkeys revealed significant 
differences in mean run times based on the target series [Gale: F(3, 946) = 5.05, p < 0.01, η2 = 
0.05; Willie: F(6, 5088) = 24.91, p < 0.01, η2 = 0.03].  Tukey post-hoc tests revealed that, in 
general, mean run times for both monkeys were faster on series with higher target numbers (see 
Table 4.2).  
 For both monkeys, a correlation was performed using run time on nonreinforced trials 
and run time on the previous reinforced trials to investigate the possibility that they were using 
temporal cues to predict the nonreinforced trial.  These variables were not significantly 
correlated for either monkey [Gale: r(679) = -0.03, p = 0.52; Willie: r(185) = 0.01, p = 0.93]. 
Discussion 
 Like Murph in experiment 1, Gale developed a pattern of performing progressively 
slower on each trial in the RRRN series during training.  Although this caused his mean times for 
nonreinforced trials to be higher than his mean times for reinforced trials, it does not provide 
evidence that he was predicting precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur. 
 Willie’s slow, fast, faster, slow pattern of performance during training was very similar to 
the pattern developed by Lou in experiment 1.  This pattern indicates that he was predicting 
when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  The established pattern also can be seen at the 
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beginning of some of the longer series presented during testing.  This indicates that Willie 
continued to use the strategy learned during training, even when it was no longer appropriate.  
 We anticipated that for some of the target series presented during testing the monkeys 
would use the changing target numerals (2-8) to develop a strategy of performing quickly on the 
reinforced trials and slowly on the nonreinforced trial.  This was the strategy adopted by both 
Murph and Lou in experiment 1.  Instead, the monkeys performed more slowly overall on series 
with higher target numbers.  One possible explanation for this behavior is that the monkeys 
recognized that during series with higher target numbers, more reinforced trials occurred before 
the one nonreinforced trial.  This might have motivated the monkeys to perform faster overall on 
series with higher target numbers. 
General Discussion 
 During training, all four monkeys developed a pattern of performing more slowly on the 
nonreinforced trial in an RRRN series than on the reinforced trial before it.  The patterns 
developed by the monkeys were different, however, and may indicate different strategies for 
performing this task.  Lou and Willie developed the slow, fast, fast, slow pattern similar to that 
observed in rats trained on an RRRN series (Capaldi and Miller 1988; Burns et al. 1995).  This 
provides evidence that these two monkeys were anticipating the nonreinforced trial.  It is unclear 
why the monkeys ran slowly on the first trial in each series, but it is possible that they were 
slightly less motivated to perform the task after receiving no reward on the previous trial (the 
terminal N trial of the previous series).  It is also possible that the monkeys took breaks during 
the inter-series intervals, which slightly delayed the start of each series.  
 Although two of the monkeys developed a pattern of responding similar to the pattern 
observed in rats (Capaldi and Miller 1988; Burns et al. 1995), both monkeys performed several 
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hundred series before this pattern emerged.  In contrast, the rats developed the pattern after 
performing less than 50 series.  The monkeys may have required more training because of their 
extensive test histories.  In most tasks previously performed by the monkeys a nonreinforced trial 
signaled an incorrect response.  Therefore, the monkeys had to overcome the prior meaning of a 
nonreinforced trial before learning to predict when it would occur.  The disparity in number of 
series required to develop the pattern may also indicate that the monkeys and rats were using 
different processes to perform this task.  
 There are several possible cues Lou and Willie may have been using to predict when the 
nonreinforced trial would occur.  For instance, the monkeys initiated the trials themselves and 
there was no strict control of temporal cues so it is possible that they were using the duration of 
the first three trials to predict when the fourth nonreinforced trial would occur.  The run times for 
the reinforced trials varied, however, with standard deviations during testing and training ranging 
from 0.54 to 1.01 s for the four monkeys.  Therefore, run time was an imprecise cue and errors 
would likely occur.  Those errors would most likely cause the occasional misjudgment of trial 3 
as the final trial and therefore manifest themselves as an increased average time for trial 3.  Lou 
and Willie showed a much faster time on trial 3 than any other trial in the RRRN series so it is 
unlikely that they were using the duration of the reinforced trials to predict when the 
nonreinforced trial would occur.  In addition, run time on the nonreinforced trial could not be 
predicted by the total amount of time on the reinforced trials before it for any of the monkeys. 
 The naturally occurring variation in trial times also argues against the rhythm method 
(Davis and Pérusse 1988) of anticipating the nonreinforced trial.  It is possible, however, that a 
larger variation is needed to disrupt the formation of a rhythmic pattern cue.  In future studies, 
the inter-trial intervals could be varied systematically to test this hypothesis more directly.  
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 Although response effort accumulated over the nonreinforced trials, it was also an 
unreliable metric for predicting when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  Given that the 
monkeys performed thousands of trials a day, we would expect natural variations in arousal, 
fatigue, and hunger.  Individual maze trials also varied unpredictably in effort any time the 
monkeys brought the cursor into contact with a wall of the maze during the solution.  These 
natural variations would cause variations in response effort for individual trials.  
 In light of the arguments against the use of temporal, rhythmic, and accumulated effort 
cues, one explanation for the performance pattern shown by Lou and Willie on the RRRN series 
is that they were using numerical cues to predict when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  
Capaldi and Miller (1988) labeled this behavior as counting because they believed the rats were 
assigning abstract tags to the individual reinforced trials in accord with the one-to-one 
correspondence, stable-order, order irrelevance, and abstraction principles set forth by Gelman 
and Gallistel (1978) as the hallmarks of true counting.  
 In the current study and the previously discussed studies involving rats, the number of 
trials covaried with the number of rewards received.  If the animals were responding based on 
numerousness the salient stimulus may have been the number of trials or the number of food 
pellets received.  In either case, however, the theoretical implications would be the same.  
 Unlike Lou and Willie, Gale showed a pattern of increasing time for each trial of the 
RRRN series during training.  Murph, who showed a pattern similar to Lou and Willie during the 
first part of training, also developed this pattern of increasing time during his last block of 
training.  It is possible that Willie and Murph were anticipating a nonreinforced trial, but failed to 
use numerical information to pinpoint exactly which trial would be nonreinforced.  
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 It is also possible that once rewarded for the first trial, Murph and Gale lost some interest 
in the task and therefore performed more slowly on the next trial.  It is possible that this decrease 
in interest became greater with each trial, causing the final trial in the series to be the longest.  
According to this logic, the nonreinforced trial would have again stimulated interest and caused 
them to perform faster on the first trial in the next series.  This scenario is unlikely given that 
both monkeys performed thousands of trials a day of this and other tasks, indicating very high 
motivation overall. 
 The clear pattern of increasing time per trial in each series most likely indicates that 
Murph and Gale were anticipating a nonreinforced trial occurring at some point after the initial 
trial.  The use of an imprecise cue, such as the sum of the inter-trial times, response times, or run 
times would be expected to produce a pattern of increasing times for each trial.  By using a 
temporal cue such as this, Murph and Gale would be less likely to mistake the first trial for the 
last trial, more likely to mistake the second trial for the last, and even more likely to mistake the 
third trial for the last.  Mistakenly identifying a trial as nonreinforced should cause an increase in 
the run time for that trial.  
 It is also possible that Murph and Gale were using numerical cues to predict the 
nonreinforced trial without enumerating each individual trial and keeping track of the exact 
magnitude or cardinal value.  Knowing that the nonreinforced trial occurs after “a few” 
reinforced trials would also cause errors in estimation.  These errors would be expected to create 
a pattern of results similar to those observed for Murph and Gale.  
 This does not mean, however, that Murph and Gale are incapable of using numerical cues 
to predict precisely when an event will occur.  In fact, Murph’s strategy changed during testing 
and he was able to predict when the nonreinforced trial would occur for an RRN, RRRN, and 
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RRRRN series, with only an Arabic numeral cue to help him distinguish between series.  A 
possible reason for the use of an imprecise strategy involves the reinforcement schedule.  The 
reward did not increase based on accuracy, so there was little motivation to anticipate the 
nonreinforced trial exactly.  In this case, reliance on nonnumerical cues would provide a decent 
estimation of when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  
 Despite different performance strategies during training, both Murph and Lou learned to 
use the changing target numeral during testing to predict when the nonreinforced trial would 
occur.  In fact, there is some evidence that the monkeys generalized the information obtained 
during training to new target numerals within the first 10 probe trials.  Results from the entire 
testing phase show that Lou learned to predict the nonreinforced trial for target series involving 
the numerals 2 and 3 and Murph learned to predict the nonreinforced trial for target numerals 2, 
3 and 4.  This indicates that both monkeys recognized the connection between the Arabic 
numerals and the variable maze series, and incorporated those numerical cues into their 
performance strategies.  
 Although Willie and Gale did not use the changing target numerals (2-8) to predict 
precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur in each series, they did respond differentially 
to the changing target numerals.  The fact that both monkeys ran faster overall on series with 
higher target numerals indicates that Willie and Gale also incorporated the numeral cues into 
their strategy for performing this task.  
 Although this study illustrates the numerical competence of rhesus monkeys, there is no 
direct evidence that the monkeys were enumerating the individual maze trials with abstract tags, 
which is necessary for true counting as defined by Gelman and Gallistel (1978).  It is possible 
that the monkeys were using an object-file (Uller et al. 1999) or accumulator mechanism 
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(Dehaene 1997; Gallistel and Gelman 2000) to perform this task.  Although the results from the 
testing phase of experiment 2 could be used as evidence in favor of the object-file model because 
the monkeys were unable to predict the nonreinforced trial on target series higher than 4, we 
believe they are a better fit with the accumulator model.  If the monkeys were using an object-
file mechanism to store each individual trial in a slot in working memory, they would have 
performed at random when the slots became full.  In experiment 2, however, both Willie and 
Gale developed a pattern of performance involving all the target numerals.  This indicates that 
they were representing, at least in approximate form, the numerical value of the target numbers 
2-8.  
 It should be noted that one major procedural difference distinguishes the experiments 
reported here from previous studies in which rats have been trained to anticipate nonreinforced 
trials in a series of maze runs.  Whereas the rats were trained with one (or very few) series each 
day, the monkeys performed hundreds of trials each day on the maze task.  A series of RRRN 
trials (cued by the numeral 3 as the target) was just four trials in an incredibly long sequence of 
reinforced and nonreinforced trials.  Thus, the monkeys had to keep track of how many 
consecutive trials had been reinforced, relative to the target number for the trial, and also reset 
this sum with each new numeral sequence.  Indeed, it is amazing that the monkeys even cared 
which trial would be nonreinforced, as even these N trials had to be completed for the animal to 
get to the next sequence of reinforced trials.  Doubtless, this procedure contributed to the amount 
of variability observed in these data, and it seems reasonable to suggest that the effects would 
have been even cleaner and clearer if the monkeys had been tested with just a few distinct 
sequences each day.  
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 Notwithstanding, this study provides the first evidence that number-trained rhesus 
monkeys can use Arabic numerals as a cue to help them perform a task involving sequential 
presentations, also known as a “constructive” enumeration task (Xia et al. 2000; Beran and 
Rumbaugh 2001).  However, the pattern established by Murph and Gale during training of 
performing gradually slower on each trial in a series, and the failure of Gale and Willie to 
generalize the pattern learned during training to new target numerals, highlights the need for a 
task that specifically addresses the monkeys’ understanding of when a series is finished. 
 
. 
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Table 4.1 
 
Average Run Time (in Seconds) for the First 10 Probe Trials of Each Novel Numeral 
        
 Lou  Murph 
 Target 2 Target 4  Target 2 Target 4 
Trial 1 5.67 5.67  5.84 6.21 
Trial 2 5.41 5.60  5.79 5.80 
Trial 3 5.61 6.00  5.96 5.57 
Trial 4  5.14   5.62 
Trial 5  5.30   6.15 
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Table 4.2 
 
Mean Run Times (in Seconds) for Each Target Series during Testing 
 
 
 Target 2 Target 3 Target 4 Target 5 Target 6 Target 7 Target 8 
Gale 3.80d 3.74d 3.65c 3.54 b 3.48 ab 3.46 a 3.47 ab 
Willie 4.20 c 4.10 bc 4.03 b 3.88 a 3.76 a 3.78 a 3.84 a 
 
Note.  Means in the same row that do not share subscripts differ at p < 0.05 in a Tukey post-hoc 
comparison 
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Figure 4.1. The display used during training in Experiments 1 and 2. The goal was to move the 
cursor in the lower right hand corner to make contact with the numeral 3. 
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Figure 4.2. The mean run time for each trial number (in blocks of 100 trials) for the RRRN series 
used during training. 
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Figure 4.3. The mean run time for each trial number in each target series during testing. The 
numeral 2 in the legend denotes an RRN series, the numeral 3 an RRRN series, and the numeral 
4 an RRRRN series. 
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Figure 4.4. The mean run time for each trial number (in blocks of 100 trials) for the RRRN series 
used during training. 
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Figure 4.5. The mean run time for each trial number in each target series during testing. 
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Chapter 5: Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) select Arabic numerals or visual quantities 
corresponding to a number of sequentially completed maze trials4 
 
Abstract 
Four number-trained rhesus monkeys were trained to enumerate their sequential responses.  
After completing a series of computerized maze trials, the monkeys were given a same/different 
discrimination involving a numerical stimulus (an Arabic numeral or a visual quantity) and the 
letter D.  The goal was to choose the numerical stimulus if it matched the number of just-
completed maze trials, and to choose the letter D if it did not.  There were large individual 
differences in performance, but one animal performed above 70% when receiving randomly 
intermixed series of 1, 3, 5, and 9 maze trials.  This indicates that the monkey was keeping track 
of the approximate number of maze trials completed in each series and using that numerical cue 
to respond during the same/different discrimination.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4 This chapter was previously published as: Harris, E.H., Washburn, D.A., Beran, M.J., & Sevcik, R.A. (2007). 
Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) select Arabic numerals or visual quantities corresponding to a number of 
sequentially completed maze trials. Learning and Behavior, 35, 53-59 
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Several different paradigms have been used to investigate numerical ability in animals.  
These include relative numerousness judgments, in which the animals choose between two or 
more sets of items on the basis of quantity (e.g., Beran, 2001; Boysen & Berntson, 1995; 
Brannon & Terrace, 2000; Call, 2000; Hauser, Carey, & Hauser, 2000; Nieder, Freedman, & 
Miller, 2002; Roberts & Mitchell, 1994; Thomas, Fowlkes, & Vickery, 1980) and tasks in which 
the absolute number of items is relevant (e.g., Beran & Rumbaugh, 2001; Boysen & Berntson, 
1989; Capaldi & Miller, 1988; Davis, 1984; Emmerton, 1998; Matsuzawa, 1985; Murofushi, 
1997; Pepperberg, 1994; Xia, Emmerton, Siemann, & Delius, 2001).  The present study uses a 
paradigm in which the “to-be-enumerated” items are sequential events rather than visible items 
because we were interested in whether number-trained rhesus monkeys can match their own 
sequential responses with an Arabic numeral or visual dot quantity. 
One of the many important aspects of human numerical competence involves the ability 
to keep track of sequentially presented items or events and to provide a numerical label 
corresponding to the cardinal value of the set.  For example, adult humans asked to keep track of 
the number of traffic lights they pass on their way to work each morning would probably be able 
to provide the correct number.  Several researchers have used the sequential presentation of 
items or events to investigate numerical ability and serial learning in rats (e.g., Burns & Criddle, 
2001; Burns, Johnson, Harris, Kinney, & Wright, 2004; Capaldi & Miller, 2004).  In one such 
study, Davis & Bradford (1986) trained rats to enter either the third or fourth tunnel in a series of 
six tunnels.  The configuration of the tunnels and distance between them varied from trial to trial, 
so the only available cue was the number of previously encountered tunnels.   
Capaldi and Miller (1988) trained rats with a three-trial series of maze runs consisting of 
two reinforced trials followed by a nonreinforced trial (RRN) and a four-trial (NRRN) series 
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beginning and ending with a nonreinforced trial.  The rats quickly developed a pattern of running 
more slowly on the terminal nonreinforced trial of each series than on the other, reinforced trials.  
This indicates that they were keeping track of the number of completed trials and predicting 
when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  Burns, Goettl, and Burt (1995) systematically varied 
the intertrial intervals in a series of runway trials and concluded that the slower running times 
observed on the terminal nonreinforced trials could not be explained by rhythmic cues, as had 
been suggested by Davis and Pérusse (1988).   
 A recent study from our laboratory focused on the ability of four number-trained rhesus 
monkeys, including those in the present study, to use an Arabic numeral cue to predict when a 
nonreinforced event would occur (Harris & Washburn, 2005).  The monkeys were presented 
with a computerized task consisting of three reinforced maze trials followed by one 
nonreinforced trial (RRRN).  The goal of the maze was an Arabic numeral 3, which 
corresponded to the number of reinforced trials in the series.  Two of the monkeys eventually 
developed a “slow, fast, faster, slow” pattern similar to that of the rats in the Capaldi and Miller 
(1988) study.  Judging by the slow running time on the terminal nonreinforced trial of the series, 
the monkeys had been anticipating the nonreinforced trial.  The other two monkeys performed 
gradually slower on each trial in the series, which made it difficult to speculate on their ability to 
predict the nonreinforced trial.   
Two of the monkeys then were given probe series of the numerals 2 and 4, and the 
remaining two monkeys were given probe series of the numerals 2 through 8.  These probe series 
were randomly intermixed with the familiar numeral 3 series.  As was true during training, the 
Arabic numeral displayed in the maze corresponded to the number of reinforced trials that would 
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occur before one nonreinforced trial.  For instance, a numeral 2 indicated that it was an RRN 
series.   
The monkeys receiving the probe series 2 and 4 showed generalization to the new 
numerals and developed a pattern of performing more slowly on the nonreinforced trial than on 
the reinforced trials before it, indicating the use of the changing target numeral to anticipate the 
nonreinforced trial.  The monkeys receiving probe series of the numerals 2 through 8 did not use 
the changing numerals to predict precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur in each 
series, but they did incorporate numerical cues into their performance strategy.  They responded 
differentially to the targets by running faster overall on series with higher target numerals.  One 
explanation for this result is that the monkeys recognized that a higher target numeral indicated 
more reinforced trials before the one nonreinforced trial.  This may have motivated the monkeys 
to perform faster overall on those series. 
 Although not all of the monkeys in the Harris and Washburn (2005) study used the target 
numbers in the way anticipated, there was little motivation for the monkeys to keep track of the 
absolute number of trials.  The reinforcement pattern remained the same, no matter what strategy 
the monkeys used to perform the task.  During training, for instance, the monkeys always 
received three reinforced trials followed by one nonreinforced trial, regardless of how quickly 
they completed each maze trial.  In addition, the monkeys performed thousands of trials a day on 
this task and other tasks, so a few nonreinforced trials were probably not very salient.  
In the present study, the monkeys were required to compare the number of maze trials 
they had just completed to two choice options, and they were reinforced only when they made a 
correct response.  This would increase motivation to perform at high levels because of the time 
invested in each series of maze trials.  The current study is unique in that it not only tests the 
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ability of number-trained monkeys to keep track of sequential events, but also tests their ability 
to compare numerical labels for cardinal values to sequentially completed responses that must be 
enumerated.  Although chimpanzees have demonstrated an ability to label a visible quantity of 
items with an Arabic numeral (e.g., Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001; Boysen & Berntson, 1989; 
Matsuzawa, 1985; Murofushi, 1997; Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 2002), this ability in rhesus 
monkeys has never been demonstrated with simultaneously visible items or sequentially 
completed events. 
In this experiment, the monkeys received series of 1, 2, 3, 5, or 9 computerized maze 
trials, followed by two response options.  One option was a numerical stimulus (either an Arabic 
numeral or a dot array) that either matched or differed from the number of maze trials that had 
been completed.  The other option was a letter D, which represented “different” from the number 
of maze trials in the syntax of the computer program.  We were interested in whether the 
monkeys could learn to choose the numerical stimulus when it matched the number of just-
completed maze trials, or to choose the D when the numerical option did not match the number 
of just-completed maze trials.  Because these animals had previously been trained to use Arabic 
numerals in quantity judgment tasks (e.g., Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991), we also wanted to 
investigate any potential differences in performance as a function of the form that the numerical 
response option took (as either a numeral or a dot quantity).  Given the previous manner in which 
the monkeys used numerals, we predicted that sequentially enumerated sets might be more easily 
represented as visual quantities, and that performance might be higher when the numerical 
response option took the form of a visual dot quantity.  However, if Arabic numerals represented 
abstract quantities for the monkeys, then perhaps those stimuli also could be used appropriately 
within this task. 
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Method 
Subjects 
Four male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta; Willie, Gale, Lou, and Hank) participated 
in this study.  Their ages were 18, 20, 10, and 18 years, respectively.  The monkeys were housed 
individually at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University according to federal 
animal housing standards.  They were not deprived of food or water during this study.   
All of these monkeys had participated in previous studies that required them to make 
relative numerousness and ordinal judgments using Arabic numerals and visual dot displays 
(e.g., Gulledge, 1999; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991).  All except Hank also had experience in 
performing series of maze trials (Harris & Washburn, 2005).  In addition, all four monkeys had 
participated in computerized joystick tasks related to various areas of cognitive research (e.g., 
Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003; Washburn & Gulledge, 2002; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 
1997), including same/different judgments similar to those used in the current task, but with 
nonnumerical stimuli.  
Design and Procedure 
The monkeys were tested in their home cages using the Language Research Center 
Computerized Test System (see Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rumbaugh, & 
Hopkins, 1989, for a description), which consists of a joystick attached to a computer and color 
monitor.  The monkeys moved the joystick to control the movement of the cursor on the screen.  
The computer program recorded the target number along with the duration of each maze trial, the 
choices presented, and the accuracy and response time for each stimulus choice.   
The computerized display consisted of a black H-shaped maze on a white background 
(Figure 5.1).  The goal stimulus in the maze was a green rectangle appearing in one of four 
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corners of the maze.  The computer program randomly selected the corner on each trial.  The 
monkey initiated the start of each trial by moving the joystick.  At the beginning of each trial, the 
cursor appeared in the middle of the maze, and the monkey was required to move the cursor 
through the maze to the goal in order to complete a trial successfully. 
Each series consisted of 1, 2, 3, 5, or 9 maze trials.  The monkeys started with series of 1 
and 9 maze trials, and additional series were added as the monkeys reached an accuracy criterion 
(see below).  Once contact was made with the square at the end of the maze, the cursor returned 
to the middle of the maze and a new trial began with a new, randomly selected goal location.  
This meant that the animals could not use learned motor sequences for different numbers of 
maze trials because of the high number of variations of placement of the goals during each 
series.  Completion of individual trials was not reinforced.  
The monkeys involved in this study had been trained previously to pick the stimulus 
displaying the largest numerosity from an array.  In contrast, this study required the monkeys to 
choose only numerical stimuli that matched the number of maze trials in a series.  To avoid the 
monkeys’ bias toward picking larger numbers, a same/different judgment was used instead of a 
matching-to-sample procedure.    
Upon completion of all the maze trials in a series, the maze disappeared and two different 
stimulus choices immediately appeared on the screen.  One choice (the numerical choice) was an 
Arabic numeral or visual quantity display and the other was a letter D, for “different.”  The D 
was white on a black background and was sized approximately 3 cm  3 cm.  The Arabic 
numerals also were white on a black background, and all were approximately 3 cm  3 cm.  The 
visual quantity display used randomly chosen white polygons of different sizes (hereafter 
referred to as “dots”) on a black background.  These polygons were unlike the round dot stimuli 
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previously used with the monkeys in other numerical tasks.  There were 10 different polygons 
used in the study, varying in approximate size from .5 and .75 cm.  Each polygon in the visual 
array was placed in a random location within an invisible 5  5 matrix.  Both the Arabic 
numerals and the dots were presented within a white 5 cm  5 cm square.   
The numerical stimulus presented during the labeling phase always corresponded to a 
possible number of maze trials from that test session.  For example, when the monkeys were 
receiving only 1 or 9 maze trials in a series, the stimuli 1 and 9 (presented as numerals or dot 
quantities) were the only numerical stimuli choices used in the labeling phase.  Within this 
constraint, the value of the Arabic numeral or number of dots was selected randomly by the 
computer program.  The computer program randomly assigned the numerical stimulus to appear 
on the left or right side of the screen with the constraint that no more than four consecutive series 
could have the numerical stimulus displayed on the same side.  The D appeared on the opposite 
side of the screen from the numeral or dot stimulus (Figure 5.2). 
The type of numerical stimulus (numeral or dot quantity) that was presented also varied 
randomly from series to series, with the constraint that no more than four consecutive series 
could have the same type of stimulus.  This was to ensure that one type of stimulus was not 
presented much more often than another, which would have caused the monkeys to form a bias 
toward the particular numeral or visual display, on the basis of the number of trials received. 
If the numeral or visual dot quantity displayed during the labeling phase matched the 
number of maze trials in that series, the goal for the monkey was to move the cursor from the 
middle of the screen and make contact with that numerical stimulus.  If the numeral or number of 
dots did not match the number of maze trials in the series, the goal was to move the cursor and 
make contact with the letter D.   
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Before each labeling phase, the computer program randomly determined whether the 
correct choice would be “same” or “different.”  Therefore, the correct choice was the dot 
quantity or numeral for approximately half of the discriminations and the letter D for the other 
half.  This ensured that the monkeys needed to use the changing number of maze trials in order 
to be reinforced at a greater-than-chance level. 
Correct responses during the labeling phase were rewarded with sound feedback and the 
automatic delivery of 94-mg fruit-flavored pellets.  The number of pellets delivered 
corresponded to the number of maze trials in that series.  For instance, a correct response after a 
two-trial series was rewarded with two pellets.  Incorrect responses resulted in a 15-sec time-out 
and a negative buzzing sound.  After the monkeys had completed the labeling phase of a series, a 
new series of maze trials began.  To prevent the monkeys from developing a bias toward the D or 
the numerical stimuli, incorrect series were repeated until the monkeys made the correct choices.  
The monkeys had continuous access to the task for several hours a day, several days a 
week.  At the start of testing, they were presented with randomly intermixed series consisting of 
1 or 9 maze trials and discriminations involving only the numerical stimulus 1 or 9 and the D.  
(We started the maze trials with the extreme values of 1 and 9 to aid the monkeys in conceptually 
connecting the maze trials and the discriminations.)  Trials were administered in 100-series 
blocks.  One additional numerosity (5, 3, or 2, in that order) was added each time the monkeys 
reached a performance level of 70% or better over the three most recent blocks.  These additional 
numerosities were randomly intermixed with the familiar numerosities.   
The additional numerosities (5, 3, and 2) were all chosen to facilitate learning of the task.  
The numeral 5 was chosen to take advantage of the distance effect, which suggests that 
discriminations are easier when two numbers are farther apart.  The numerals 2 and 3 were 
188 
chosen to take advantage of the magnitude effect, which suggests that when distance is held 
constant, discriminations are easier with smaller numbers compared to larger ones (Moyer & 
Landauer, 1967).   
Testing ended for each monkey when it failed to reach criterion after 30 blocks (3,000 
series) with a given set of randomly intermixed numerosities.  Additional numerosities were not 
used because none of the monkeys achieved the accuracy criterion with the numerosities 1, 2, 3, 
5, and 9.   
Analyses 
As stated previously, when a monkey gave an incorrect response, the series was repeated 
until a correct response was given.  The first response was included in analyses, and all 
correction series were excluded.   
The monkeys were not restrained during this task, so they occasionally took a break to 
rest, eat, drink water, utilize another enrichment device, or engage in social behavior.  This could 
result in unrealistically long trial times, and it caused the mean times to be much greater than the 
medians.  All series in which a maze trial lasted longer than 10 sec were excluded from analyses, 
because this duration was about three times that of the typical maze trial.  Across the four 
monkeys, this resulted in the exclusion of an average of 3.73% of the series.  To ensure that the 
exclusion of these series was justified, the medians for the maze trials were analyzed.  The 
medians were comparable to the means obtained when excluding these series, so the 10-sec trial 
limit was used in all subsequent analyses.   
Results 
Table 5.1 shows the number of blocks (100 series each) required by each monkey to 
reach the 70% accuracy criterion after each new numerosity was added.  All of the monkeys 
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achieved the accuracy criterion when presented with only the numerosities 1 and 9, three of the 
four monkeys reached criterion with the numerosities 1, 5, and 9; and one monkey reached 
criterion with the numerosities 1, 3, 5, and 9.  However, none of the monkeys was able to reach 
criterion when presented with the numerosities 1, 2, 3, 5, and 9.  The number of trials required 
for the monkeys to reach criterion with two numerosities was not a good predictor of how well 
they performed overall on this task.  For example, Hank required more trials than any other 
monkey to reach criterion with two numerals, but he was the only monkey to achieve criterion 
with four numerosities.  
Only data from the last 3,000 series performed by the monkeys were used in subsequent 
analyses.  These trials were chosen because they contain the greatest range of numerosities for 
each monkey and therefore provide the greatest opportunity for analyses relevant to the 
experimental questions and hypotheses.  Although the monkeys did not achieve the 70% 
accuracy criterion for these trials, they had achieved the accuracy criterion for the previous set of 
numbers.  Therefore, at the start of the 3,000 series, the monkeys were already performing at 
greater-than-chance levels with every numerosity except the most recent addition.   
To assess possible practice effects over the course of the last 3,000 series (30 blocks), 
correlation coefficients were computed for each monkey to determine whether accuracy 
increased or decreased as block number increased.  No significant correlations (p < .05, two-
tailed) were found for any of the monkeys (Willie, r = .11; Lou, r = .06; Gale, r = .24; Hank, r = 
-.18), indicating that the performance of these monkeys did not change significantly.  Thus, these 
3,000 series represent full, mature performance on the task. 
Figure 5.3 shows the percentage accuracy for each number of maze trials and each 
stimulus type.  Although Gale and Willie both show significantly higher accuracy (p < .05) when 
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presented with numerical stimuli in the form of Arabic numerals for at least one number of maze 
trials, there is no consistent pattern to indicate a meaningful interaction.  For example, Gale and 
Willie were not consistently more accurate on numeral trials than on dot quantity trials for series 
with low, high, or intermediate numbers of maze trials.  Lou showed the opposite pattern of 
performance for series with one maze trial, which provides further evidence that there is no 
meaningful interaction between stimulus type and target number.   
A two-way ANOVA of the effect of stimulus and trial type on accuracy was performed, 
using data from all four monkeys.  Stimulus type refers to the form in which the numerosity was 
presented (numeral or dot quantity) and trial type refers to the correct response required for that 
trial (the numerical stimulus or the D).  Although power was low, this analysis yielded no 
significant differences [stimulus type, F(1,3) = 3.33, p = .17, 2 = .53, observed power = .25; 
trial type, F(1,3) = 1.63, p = .29, 2 = .35, observed power = .15; stimulus type  trial type 
interaction, F(1,3) = 1.20, p =.35, 2 = .29, observed power = .12].  Descriptive statistics also 
indicate that there was no bias toward one type of stimulus or trial type [dots with a numerical 
stimulus response M(SD) = 62.52% (8.50%); dots with a D response M(SD) =  63.03% (8.87%); 
numerals with a numerical stimulus response M(SD) = 72.55% (3.36%); numerals with a D 
response M(SD) = 62.77% (3.81%)].  Given this result of no difference in performance as a 
function of the form of the numerical stimulus presented at the labeling phase of the series, trial 
type and stimulus type were combined for all subsequent analyses, unless otherwise noted. 
To test for a distance effect, the accuracy of all four monkeys was regressed on the 
numerical difference between the number of maze trials completed and the numerical stimulus 
that was presented during the labeling phase.  The regression analysis revealed that accuracy was 
positively associated with the difference [F(1,15) = 48.55, p < .05, R2 = .76].  It must be noted, 
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however, that practice effects may have contributed to this correlation.  The monkeys had the 
most practice with the numerosities 1 and 9, which are also the two numerosities farthest apart in 
distance.  The magnitude of the numerosities involved could also have affected the correlation.  
To take into account the magnitude of the numerosities as well as their numerical distance, 
accuracy was regressed on the ratio of the smaller numerosity to the larger numerosity used in 
each series.  For example, if a monkey completed one maze trial and was presented with the 
numeral 5 during the labeling phase, the ratio would equal 0.2.  This regression analysis revealed 
that accuracy was significantly associated with ratio [F(1,20) = 63.39, p < .01, R2 = .76].  This 
effect is illustrated in Figure 5.4.   
To determine whether the monkeys were using the combined duration of the maze trials, 
instead of their numerical value to perform this task, data were analyzed from all of the trials on 
which the monkeys chose the numerical stimulus during the discrimination trial.  We chose to 
look at this question post hoc rather than controlling for duration experimentally, because 
manipulating the duration of the trial would have caused other factors, such as rate of maze 
completion, to covary with the number of trials in a series.  If the monkeys were using duration 
as a cue to this task, incorrect trials in which the monkeys chose a numerosity smaller than the 
number of maze trials performed should have occurred when the total duration of the maze trials 
was shorter than it usually was when they responded correctly for a given number of maze trials 
(i.e., incorrect maze trial duration < mean correct maze trial duration).  In contrast, incorrect 
trials in which the monkeys chose a numerosity larger than the number of maze trials performed 
should have occurred when the total duration of the maze trials was larger than it usually was for 
correct trials (i.e., incorrect maze trial duration > mean correct trial duration).    
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For each monkey, a one-way ANOVA assessing the effects of trial type on the total 
duration of the maze trials was performed for each number of maze runs.  The types of trial were 
categorized as those in which the monkey chose a numerical stimulus larger than the number of 
maze runs, those in which the monkey chose a numerical stimulus smaller than the number of 
maze runs, and those in which the monkey correctly chose the numerical stimulus.  The only 
significant effect was found for Willie.  For trials in which he performed only one maze run, his 
maze trial durations were significantly shorter on trials in which he chose a numerical stimulus 
larger than the number of maze trials compared with trials in which he correctly chose the 
numerical stimulus [F(1,405) = 4.49, p < .05, 2 = .01].  This effect is opposite to what was 
predicted for a strategy involving duration as a cue to the correct response.  Thus, none of the 
monkeys used differences in maze completion duration as the cue for which stimulus to select 
during the labeling phase. 
Discussion 
During the course of this study, the monkeys learned to label a series of sequentially 
completed maze trials with the corresponding Arabic numeral or visual dot quantity (or a D if the 
numerical option was not equal).  All of the monkeys learned to match randomly intermixed 
series of 1 or 9 maze trials with the correct Arabic numeral or visual quantity when tested with a 
same/different discrimination.  This provides evidence that the monkeys understood the task on 
some level and conceptually connected the maze series with the same/different discriminations.   
This part of the task, however, could be performed by representing the number of maze 
trials simply as “few” and “many” (or “one and “many”), without representing the number of 
maze runs as a specific quantity.  In fact, Willie seems to have used one of those strategies 
throughout this experiment.  Willie achieved an accuracy level of 70% fairly quickly when 
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presented with series of one and nine maze trials, but he did not achieve the accuracy criterion 
when the numerosity 5 was added.  His pattern of errors revealed that after performing one maze 
run he almost never chose the numerosities 5 or 9, but after performing five maze runs he was 
more likely to choose 9 than 1, and after performing nine maze runs he was more likely to 
choose 5 than 1.  This indicates confusion between the numerosities 5 and 9 that was not present 
for the numerosity 1. 
Two of the monkeys participating in this study achieved accuracies greater than 70% for 
the numerosities 1, 5, and 9, within the first 500 presentations, but they did not reach criterion 
when the numerosity 3 was added to the experimental set.  Their ability to perform the task with 
three numerosities indicates that their representation of the maze runs went beyond a simple 
representation of “one” and “many.”   
The fourth monkey in the study, Hank, performed the task with the numerosities 1, 3, 5, 
and 9, but failed to achieve the 70% accuracy criterion after the numerosity 2 was added to the 
set.  It is important to note that these numerosities were randomly intermixed, so Hank never 
received blocks of series containing only one numerosity.  Rather, each new series of maze trials 
could consist of any of the numerosities in the set.     
The monkeys were reinforced for correct choices with a number of pellets equal to the 
number of maze trials performed in the just-completed series as a motivation to complete the 
longer series.  This did cause a slight high-number choice bias on pairs of trials in which the 
distance and magnitude of the two numerosities were the same.  For instance, the monkeys were 
less accurate on trials in which they ran one maze trial and were presented with the numerosity 9 
than they were on trials in which they ran nine maze trials and were presented with the 
numerosity 1 (an average accuracy of 79% in the former case and 95% in the latter).  However, 
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this bias did not prevent any of the monkeys from exceeding 70% accuracy for trials in which 
they performed 1 maze run and were presented with the tempting numerosity 9.  The bias was 
even less pronounced for the numerosities 2, 3, and 5. 
There is some evidence that the monkeys were using an approximate and variable 
representation of the number of maze runs to perform this task.  Accuracy increased as a function 
of distance between the number of maze trials and the numerosity presented during the 
discrimination.  Accuracy also decreased as a function of the ratio of the smaller numerosity to 
the larger numerosity used in each series, as predicted by Weber’s law.  Although a greater 
amount of practice with the numerosities 1 and 9 as compared to other numerosity pairs may 
have contributed to this correlation, a distance effect and adherence to Weber’s law would occur 
if the monkeys’ numerical representations were composed of inexact magnitudes.  This is 
because inexact magnitudes would be more difficult to compare when the numerosities were 
close in distance and/or large in magnitude (Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000).   
The monkeys’ error patterns were not related to the amount of time they spent on the 
maze trials in each series.  The monkeys did not tend to choose numerosities that were higher 
than the correct choice after spending more time than usual on a particular series; therefore, they 
were not using duration alone as a cue to performing this task.   
It is interesting that the monkeys performed equally well when the numerical stimulus 
was in Arabic numeral or visual dot quantity form.  Although the visual quantities provide more 
inherent numerical information than the numerals, the monkeys have had a variety of testing 
experiences involving Arabic numerals.  Their ability to match a series of maze trials to either a 
visual quantity or an Arabic numeral indicates flexibility in their performance strategy. 
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The ability of the monkeys to perform this task is impressive, due to the working memory 
demands and the absence of perceptual cues, such as surface area or density, to aid in the 
formation of their numerical representations.  The monkeys were required to form a 
representation of a series of events, which lacked standard perceptual features, to update this 
representation throughout the series of maze trials, and to keep this representation in working 
memory while they chose the appropriate stimulus during the same/different discrimination.   
Previous studies have found that nonhuman primates are capable of representing, 
combining, and comparing nonvisible, sequentially presented sets of items (e.g., Beran, 2001; 
Call, 2000; Hauser et al., 2000).  This experiment provides strong evidence that monkeys can 
enumerate, albeit approximately, their own sequential responses and can match the number of 
responses with the corresponding Arabic numeral or visual quantity. 
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Table 5.1   
The Number of Blocks (100 Series per Block) Required for Each Monkey to Reach the 70% 
Accuracy Criterion on Each Set of Numerosities   
 1,9 1,5,9 1,3,5,9 
Willie 10   
Gale 3 3  
Lou 4 5  
Hank 13 4 10 
 
Note.  Empty cells indicate that the monkey did not reach criterion for that set of numerosities 
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Figure 5.1. The maze display used during the series. The goal was colored green. 
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Figure 5.2. Example of display used during the labeling phase of a series. The + in the center of 
each figure is the cursor. 
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Figure 5.3. Percent accuracy for each type of stimulus and each number of maze runs. The dotted 
line denotes chance level. Error bars denote 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 5.3. Continued 
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Figure 5.4. Accuracy as a function of the ratio of the smaller numerosity to the larger 
numerosity. 
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Chapter 6: Numerical abstraction across presentation mode by rhesus monkeys 
 
Abstract 
The ability of rhesus monkeys to transfer numerical rules learned in a sequential task to a 
simultaneous task was tested.  In Experiment 1, eight monkeys were trained to make one 
response after viewing three sequentially presented circles on a computer screen and another 
response after seven sequential circles.  During testing, the monkeys received nonreinforced 
simultaneous probe trials.  Half of the monkeys showed some tendency to make a spontaneous 
“three” response after viewing three simultaneous circles and a “seven” response after viewing 
seven simultaneous circles, but only one monkey performed consistently above chance on the 
simultaneous trials.  In Experiment 2, a different transfer paradigm was employed to investigate 
further the possibility of numerical transfer from a sequential to a simultaneous task, but no 
evidence of transfer was found.  Overall, these experiments indicate that some monkeys can 
abstract number across different presentation modes, but this ability is exhibited only under 
limited conditions.   
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For adult humans, number is a broad category that can include objects, actions, and 
events that differ in perceptual features and modality.  For example, three apples, three flashes of 
lightning, and three trips to the grocery store share the abstract numerical property of three.  
Gelman and Gallistel (1978) recognized abstractness as one of the five principles of formal 
counting and Davis and Pérusse (1988) argued that the ability to abstract number across different 
contexts and modalities is necessary for a true concept of number.  Although adults routinely 
abstract number across different conditions, it is unclear whether this ability is shared by 
nonverbal populations with less numerical experience, such as human infants and nonhuman 
animals. 
To date, only a small number of studies have been conducted to investigate numerical 
abstractness in infants and animals.  In studies by Starkey and colleagues (Starkey, Spelke, & 
Gelman, 1983, 1990) infants were able to detect numerical correspondences between the visual 
and auditory modalities.  While listening to a temporal sequence of two or three drumbeats, 6- to 
9-month-old infants were presented with side-by-side photos depicting two and three household 
objects.  Researchers found that when the infants were listening to three drumbeats they looked 
reliably longer at the visual display of three objects and when they were listening to two 
drumbeats they looked reliably longer at the display of two objects.  Results were similar even 
when the duration of the two and three beat sequences were equated.  In similar studies, Jordan 
and colleagues (Jordan, Brannon, & Gallistel, 2006; Jordan, Brannon, Logothetis, & Ghazanfar, 
2005) provided evidence that rhesus monkeys and 7-month-old infants preferred to look at 
videos containing a number of conspecifics equal to the number of vocalizations they heard.  
These studies suggest that rhesus monkeys and very young human children possess an abstract 
concept of number that reaches across two sensory modalities.   
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Fernandes and Church (1982) presented rats with sequences of white noise and rewarded 
them for pressing the lever on the right when they heard two bursts of noise and the lever on the 
left when they heard four bursts of noise.  Temporal cues were controlled by varying the duration 
of each burst as well as the total duration of the auditory sequences.  With training the rats 
learned to respond based on the number of noise bursts.  When the experimenters substituted 
light flashes for sounds, the rats immediately transferred their knowledge to the new task, which 
suggests that their representation of number was not tied to the auditory modality.   
 In a similar study, Church and Meck (1984) taught rats to press a lever on the left after 
viewing a sequence of two light flashes or hearing a sequence of two white noise bursts and a 
lever on the right after viewing a sequence of four light flashes or hearing a sequence of four 
noise bursts.  When the rats were then presented with a combination of two lights and two noise 
bursts they spontaneously integrated the number of visual and auditory stimuli and responded by 
pressing the right lever.  This indicates that the rats based their behavior on an abstract, amodal 
representation of number.   
Davis and Albert (1987) trained rats on a more complex task that required them to 
discriminate between two, three, or four bursts of noise.  When the experimenters substituted 
light flashes for the noise bursts they found no evidence of transfer.  These results, combined 
with the results of the Fernandes and Church (1982) study suggest that abstract representations in 
rats may be confined to simple tasks requiring only a “less” and “more” judgment. 
The monkeys in our lab have had extensive experience with many types of numerical 
tasks, but it is unclear whether the numerical knowledge gained from one task transfers to 
different types of tasks.  The goal of this study was to investigate whether the monkeys in our 
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laboratory possess a broad concept of number that includes different types of tasks and different 
presentation methods.   
In Experiment 1, monkeys were trained to make one response after viewing a sequence of 
three circles flashed on a computer screen and another response after viewing a sequence of 
seven circles flashed on a computer screen.  The monkeys were then presented with 
nonreinforced probe trials consisting of three or seven simultaneously visible circles.  The goal 
was to assess whether or not the monkeys transferred the numerical knowledge gained in the 
sequential task to the simultaneous task by spontaneously providing a “three” response when 
presented with three simultaneously visible circles and a “seven” response when presented with 
seven simultaneously visible circles.  Evidence of transfer would suggest that the monkeys 
possess an abstract representation of number that is not tied to a specific mode of presentation. 
In Experiment 2, a different transfer paradigm was employed to investigate number 
concept in the same group of monkeys.  In this experiment, the monkeys received reinforced 
presentations of simultaneously visible circles.  For half of the monkeys, the correct response 
when presented with three simultaneously visible circles was the same as the correct response 
when presented with three sequentially presented circles in the prior experiment.  Similarly, the 
correct response when presented with seven simultaneous circles was the same as the correct 
response when presented with seven sequential circles.  For the other half of the monkeys, the 
reward contingencies were reversed so that the correct response for three simultaneous circles 
was the same as the correct response for seven sequential circles and the correct response for 
seven simultaneous circles was the same as the correct response for three sequential circles.  If 
the monkeys transfer numerical knowledge from the sequential to the simultaneous task then it 
should be more difficult for the group with the reversed reward contingencies to learn this task 
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than the group for which the reward contingencies stayed the same.  Together, these two 
experiments will shed light on whether or not the monkeys in our laboratory have an abstract 
concept of number that spans different contexts and methodologies. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  Eight male rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) participated in this 
experiment.  The monkeys, Gale (age 24 years), Hank (age 24 years), Willie (age 22 years), 
Murph (age 14 years), Chewie (age 6 years), Luke (age 6 years), Obi (age 2 years), and Han (age 
3 years) were housed individually at the Language Research Center of Georgia State University 
according to federal animal housing standards and were not be food or water deprived during this 
study.   
All of these monkeys are joystick-trained and have participated in previous computerized 
tasks related to various areas of cognitive research such as attention, metacognition, and concept 
learning (e.g., Flemming, Beran, & Washburn, 2007; Smith, Shields, & Washburn, 2003; 
Washburn & Gulledge, 2002).  In addition, they have participated in a variety of tasks focusing 
on numerical ability.  Some of these monkeys have previous experience with simultaneous and 
sequential numerical tasks, but none have experience with the specific sequential or 
simultaneous task used in the present experiment.   
The older monkeys, Hank, Gale, Murph, and Willie have participated in a task requiring 
them to compare Arabic numerals to arrays of one through nine uniformly sized circles.  Three 
of these monkeys were reinforced with a number of pellets proportional to the value of the 
stimulus chosen (i.e., four pellets for choosing the numeral 4 and three pellets for choosing an 
array of three circles).  The fourth monkey, Hank, was reinforced with one pellet for choosing 
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the stimulus with the highest value.  All of the monkeys quickly learned to choose the stimulus 
with the highest numerical value (Harris, Gulledge, Beran, & Washburn, 2008).  The current 
study also employed visual arrays of circles, but the circles varied widely in size.  Also, the 
current task did not require the monkeys to compare two numerical stimuli.  Instead, the 
monkeys learned to perform one response in the presence of three circles and another response in 
the presence of seven circles.   
Three of the monkeys, Gale, Hank, and Willie have also participated in a task in which 
they learned to enumerate their sequential runs through a computerized maze and to choose the 
Arabic numeral or group of polygons that matched the number of runs in each series (Harris, 
Washburn, Beran, & Sevcik, 2007).  The present study also involved a sequential task, but the 
monkeys were required to enumerate sequentially presented visual stimuli instead of their own 
sequential motor movements.  Thus, specific knowledge about the sequential maze task was not 
applicable to the present study. 
One of the monkeys, Murph, participated in a study that required him to watch as a 
computerized hand dropped items, one-at-a-time, into a cup on the computer screen (Beran, 
2007).  Although this task required Murph to enumerate sequential visual stimuli, he did not 
acquire any experience associating a sequence of items with an array of simultaneously 
presented items. 
Apparatus.  The monkeys were tested in their home cages using the LRC Computerized 
Test System (Rumbaugh, Richardson, Washburn, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hopkins, 1989), which 
consists of a joystick attached to a computer and color monitor.  The monkeys moved the 
joystick to control the movement of the cursor on the screen.  The computer program recorded 
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the stimulus displayed, the total size of the circles, the monkey’s response, and the response time 
on each trial. 
Stimuli.  This experiment utilized both sequentially presented and simultaneously 
presented stimuli.  The sequentially presented stimuli consisted of solid black circles flashed one 
at a time on a white background.  The size of the circles ranged from 4 to 23 mm in diameter and 
the size of each circle was randomly chosen by the computer program before it was presented.  
Each time a circle flashed on the screen the computer program randomly assigned it to appear in 
one of 16 locations within the outline of a 100 mm  100 mm square.  Each trial consisted of 
three or seven sequentially presented circles.  The numbers three and seven were chosen based 
on evidence from several studies that rhesus monkeys perform well above chance when 
comparing stimuli of a similar ratio (Beran, 2007; Harris et al., 2007; Harris et al., 2008).   
The amount of time each circle was visible on the screen ranged from 200 to 700 ms and 
the inter-stimulus interval between the circles ranged from 100 to 350 ms.  On each trial, the 
computer program randomly chose the presentation duration for each circle and the inter-
stimulus intervals.  This ensured that the total duration of the sequence and the rate of 
presentation varied from trial to trial.  A sequence of three circles could range in total duration 
from 800 to 2,800 ms and a sequence of seven circles could range in total duration from 2,000 to 
7,000 ms. 
The simultaneously visible displays also consisted of three or seven circles.  The circles 
used in the simultaneous displays were slightly smaller than those used in the sequential displays 
(2 - 21 mm rather than 4 - 23 mm in diameter) to avoid potential overlap on the screen, but they 
were otherwise identical.  As was true for the sequential displays, the computer program 
randomly chose the size of the circles on every trial.  At the start of each trial, the computer 
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program randomly assigned each circle in the visual array to one of 16 locations within a square 
identical to the one used in the simultaneous displays.  The circles all appeared on screen at the 
same time and remained visible until the monkey made a selection. 
The third type of stimulus used in this experiment was an abstract red and blue shape 
approximately 75 mm  75 mm.  This shape was presented as a possible choice on every trial 
and its appearance remained constant throughout the experiment. 
Training.  The goal of training was to teach the monkeys to make one response after 
viewing three sequentially presented circles and another after viewing seven sequentially 
presented circles.  Two of the four younger monkeys (Obi, Han, Chewie, and Luke) were 
randomly assigned to Group 1 and the other two were assigned to Group 2 because none of these 
monkeys had experience enumerating sequential items or events.  Two of the four older monkeys 
were then randomly assigned to Group 1 and the other two were assigned to Group 2.   
The target stimulus for Group 1 was three sequential circles and the target stimulus for 
Group 2 was seven sequential circles.  This means that if the sequence consisted of three circles 
the monkeys in Group 1 were rewarded for moving the cursor into contact with the square 
outline in which the circles had appeared and the monkeys in Group 2 were rewarded for 
choosing the abstract shape.  Conversely, if the sequence consisted of seven circles then the 
monkeys in Group 1 were rewarded for choosing the abstract shape and the monkeys in Group 2 
were rewarded for choosing the square outline.  For each trial, the computer program randomly 
determined whether three or seven circles would be presented.  Therefore, approximately half of 
the sequences consisted of three circles and half consisted of seven circles.   
 In order to initiate a trial the monkeys were required to move the cursor into contact with 
a blue rectangle.  After the rectangle was contacted it disappeared and the abstract shape 
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appeared in the upper left corner of the screen and the square outline appeared in the upper right 
corner of the screen.  Immediately after the square outline appeared, the sequential presentation 
of circles began.  When the sequence was complete, a cursor appeared in the center of the bottom 
half of the screen and the monkey was allowed to choose one of the two stimuli.   
Correct choices were rewarded with a melodic tone and the automatic delivery of one 94-
mg fruit-flavored pellet.  Incorrect responses resulted in a negative buzzing sound and a 10 
second time-out, during which the computer screen remained blank.  After the monkey received 
his reward or time-out, the blue rectangle again appeared in the center of the screen, allowing the 
monkey to initiate a new trial.  Correction trials were utilized to prevent the monkeys from 
developing a side-bias in which they persisted in selecting the abstract shape or the square 
outline where the circles had appeared.  This means that every incorrect trial was followed by a 
trial in which the same number of circles was presented.  The number was repeated until the 
monkey made a correct response.   
The monkeys were allowed continuous access to the task for several hours a day, several 
days a week.  Trials were divided into 100 trial blocks for analysis and training for each monkey 
was complete when he reached an accuracy criterion of 80% correct for the three most recent 
blocks.  Progress was assessed at the end of each day’s training session and most of the monkeys 
reached criterion in the middle of a training session.  Thus, most of the monkeys received several 
additional blocks of trials after reaching criterion and before the session ended.   
Testing.  The goal of testing was to determine whether the monkeys would transfer the 
responses learned during the sequential task to a simultaneous task.  Novel simultaneous trials 
were randomly interspersed with the familiar sequential trials used during training.  The 
simultaneous trials accounted for approximately 20% of the total number of trials.  On the 
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sequential trials, the computer program randomly determined whether three or seven circles 
would be presented so three circles were presented on approximately half of the simultaneous 
trials and seven circles were presented on the other half.  The monkeys initiated the simultaneous 
trials in the same way as the sequential trials, by contacting the blue rectangle.  After the 
rectangle was contacted it disappeared and the abstract shape appeared in the upper left corner of 
the screen, as was true for the sequential trials, and the square outline containing circles appeared 
in the upper right corner of the screen.  The cursor appeared in the center of the bottom half of 
the screen at the same time as the other stimuli appeared.   
The sequential trials continued to be scored and reinforced in the same manner they were 
during testing.  The simultaneous trials were not reinforced.  After a monkey made a selection on 
a simultaneous trial the circles and abstract shape immediately disappeared and were replaced by 
the blue rectangle, which allowed the monkey to initiate a new trial.  The monkeys did not 
receive correction trials during the testing phase of the experiment.   
Although the simultaneous trials were not reinforced in any way, responses were scored 
as correct or incorrect by the computer program.  If the trial consisted of three simultaneous 
circles, Group 1 received a correct score for choosing the visible circles and Group 2 received a 
correct score for choosing the abstract shape.  Conversely, if the trial consisted of seven 
simultaneous circles, Group 1 received a correct score for choosing the abstract shape and Group 
2 received a correct score for choosing the visible circles.  This means that the target number for 
Group 1 was always three, regardless of whether the trial was sequential or simultaneous and the 
target number for Group 2 was always seven, regardless of the mode of presentation. 
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The monkeys were allowed continuous access to the testing task for several hours a day, 
several days a week.  Testing ended after the monkeys completed 2,000 trials, which equaled 
approximately 1,600 sequential trials and 400 simultaneous trials.  
Analysis.  As stated previously, when a monkey gave an incorrect response during 
training the trial was repeated until a correct response was given.  The first response was 
included in the analyses, and all correction trials were excluded.  Correction trials were not used 
during testing because the monkeys had already achieved accuracy criterion for the sequential 
trials. 
The monkeys were not restrained in any way during this task and occasional 
disengagement in the middle of a trial resulted in unrealistically long trial times.  All trials with 
response times longer than 10 seconds were excluded from analysis because this was 
approximately three standard deviations above the average trial time.  This resulted in the 
exclusion of an average of 1.93% of training trials and an average of .44 % of testing trials across 
all eight monkeys. 
Results 
Training.  The monkeys required between 8 and 67 blocks of training trials before 
reaching the accuracy criterion of 80% correct for the three most recent blocks.  The number of 
blocks required for each monkey to reach criterion is shown in Table 6.1.  A t-test comparing the 
accuracy of Group 1 and Group 2 revealed no significant difference, t(6) = 1.50, p = .18.  This 
means that the target stimulus (three or seven) did not have a significant effect on performance. 
The size of the circles varied within a sequential trial so that a sequence of three or seven 
circles usually consisted of a range of small and large circles.  Despite this variation, when the 
areas of all circles in the sequence were summed together, sequences of seven circles consisted 
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of a slightly larger average area compared to sequences of three circles.  Across all eight 
monkeys, the average total area was 61.77 cm for sequences of three circles and 84.28 cm for 
sequences of seven circles.   
To investigate the possibility that the monkeys were using the total area of the circles in 
each sequence instead of the number of circles as a cue to performing this task, the trials were 
divided into fifteen categories based on the total area of the circles.  All size categories contained 
trials within a 10 cm range, with the smallest category consisting of trials with a total area of 15 - 
25 cm and the largest category consisting of trials with a total area of 156 - 165 cm.  The average 
performance across all eight monkeys as a function of the size category for trials consisting of 
three or seven circles is presented in Figure 6.1.  In general, accuracy for three circles remained 
relatively stable across size categories, with the exception of a decrease in accuracy for the 
largest size category.  It must be noted, however, that the largest category for 3 circles and 7 
circles and the smallest category for 7 circles contained less than 15 data points for each of the 
monkeys so accuracy data for those categories may not be fully representative of the monkeys’ 
abilities.  Accuracy for seven circles was also relatively stable, with a slight increase for the most 
extreme size categories.  The monkeys did not show sharp decreases in accuracy when the total 
size of three circles exceeded the average size for seven circles or when the total size of seven 
circles dropped below the average size for three circles, as would be expected if the monkeys 
were relying on the size of the circles to perform this task.  These results indicate that size of the 
circles was not the primary cue that the monkeys used to perform this task.  
Testing.  All eight monkeys performed above chance on the approximately 1,600 familiar 
sequential trials presented during testing (p < .05, binomial sign test).  It should be noted, 
however, that accuracy for half of the monkeys dropped below the 80% criterion level required 
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to end the training phase.  Thus it appears that the addition of nonreinforced simultaneous trials 
into the task disrupted performance on the sequential trials to some extent.  Accuracy levels for 
the familiar sequential trials were as follows: Hank = 66.73%, Murph = 87.79%, Chewie = 
87.90%, Luke = 88.57%, Han = 72.90%, Obi = 78.03%, Gale = 80.63%, Willie = 79.56%.  
Seven of the eight monkeys performed at chance levels on the approximately 400 
nonreinforced simultaneous trials presented during testing (p > .05, binomial sign test).  
Accuracy levels for those seven monkeys were as follows: Hank = 53.211%, Murph = 44.81%, 
Chewie = 50.68%, Luke = 46.43%, Han = 56.56%, Obi = 53.78%, Gale = 49.06%.  All of these 
monkeys showed a strong bias for choosing either the circles or the abstract shape on every 
simultaneous trial regardless of the number of circles presented, which no doubt contributed to 
their low levels of accuracy.  Murph, Chewie, Luke, and Han chose the circles on 91.39%, 
81.64%, 90.93%, and 78.13% of simultaneous trials respectively.  In contrast, Hank, Obi, and 
Gale exhibited a bias for the abstract shape and chose it on 70.05%, 77.76%, and 98.93% of 
simultaneous trials respectively. 
The eighth monkey, Willie, performed above chance levels by correctly completing 
59.84% of the nonreinforced simultaneous trials (p < .01, binomial sign test).  In other words, he 
tended to make the same response to three circles regardless of whether they were 
simultaneously visible or sequentially presented and the same response to seven circles 
regardless of the presentation mode.  Unlike the other seven monkeys, he did not show a strong 
bias for the circles or the abstract symbol, choosing the symbol on 56.60% of simultaneous trials.  
Thus, it appears that when Willie was confronted with novel simultaneous quantities, he was 
spontaneously able to transfer the numerical rules he had learned for sequentially presented 
circles to the novel and nonreinforced simultaneous task. 
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In a previous experiment involving nonreinforced probe trials, monkeys from our 
laboratory were able to maintain a high level of performance when presented with 500 
nonreinforced trials interspersed every fifth trial with familiar reinforced trials.  It was only 
during a second round of 500 nonreinforced trials that accuracy for the nonreinforced trials 
declined, which we speculated was due to decreased motivation for performing trials that were 
not associated with a reward.  Thus, it seemed likely that the monkeys would be able to maintain 
a high level of motivation while performing all 400 nonreinforced trials in this experiment.  In 
order to investigate the possibility that accuracy for the nonreinforced probe trials was higher at 
the beginning of the testing phase, accuracy was determined for each monkey after 250 testing 
trials (approximately 50 probe trials), 500 testing trials (approximately 100 probe trials), and 
1000 testing trials (approximately 200 probe trials).  First-trial performance for the simultaneous 
trials was also investigated to determine accuracy before the monkeys learned that the 
simultaneous trials would not be reinforced. 
Analysis of first-trial accuracy revealed that four out of the eight monkeys responded 
correctly to the first simultaneous trial.  This 50% overall accuracy rate provides no indication 
that the monkeys, as a group, immediately generalized to the new task.  The results of the 
accuracy analysis at four different points during testing are presented in Figure 6.2.  Willie’s 
performance was above 60% for the first 50 probe trials and it remained relatively high 
throughout testing.  In fact, his performance at 500, 1000, and 2000 trials exceeded chance levels 
of responding (p < .05, binomial sign test).  Hank, Murph, Luke, and Gale were consistently at 
chance throughout testing.  Chewie’s performance was never significantly above chance, but he 
performed at 57.14% (p = .39) accuracy for the first 50 trials before his performance declined to 
levels closer to 50%.  Han’s performance was above 60% for the first two accuracy 
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measurements and his performance of 61.96% after 500 trials was significantly above chance (p 
< .05).  Despite high accuracy at the beginning of testing, his performance was not above chance 
for the last two accuracy measurements.  Obi exhibited the highest evidence of spontaneous 
transfer at the beginning of testing.  He performed at 69.77% accuracy for the first 250 trials, 
which was significantly above chance (p < .05), but his performance fell to chance level by the 
end of testing.   
Discussion 
All eight monkeys reached the accuracy criterion during training, although the number of 
trials required by each monkey varied widely.  The average total size for seven circles was 
slightly larger than the average total size for three circles, which means that it was possible for 
the monkeys to rely on total size of the circles to perform the task.  Further analyses revealed, 
however, that the monkeys were still able to perform the task when the total size of three circles 
exceeded the average size of seven circles and the total size of seven circles dropped below the 
average size of three circles.  Thus, it appears that size of the circles was not the primary 
decision-making cue for the monkeys. 
During testing, four of the monkeys, Hank, Murph, Luke, and Gale performed at chance 
levels on the simultaneous task and therefore showed no evidence of spontaneous transfer from 
the previous task.  Han, Obi, and Chewie performed at high levels during the beginning of 
testing, but their performance declined towards the end of testing.  This suggests that they may 
have initially been using numerical knowledge learned during the sequential task to perform the 
simultaneous task, but lost motivation after receiving a large number of nonreinforced trials and 
resorted to a simpler strategy of always selecting the visible circles or the abstract shape on 
simultaneous trials.  The eighth monkey, Willie, exhibited high levels of accuracy on probe trials 
222 
throughout testing, which indicated that he was able to generalize his learned responses for three 
and seven sequentially presented circles to three and seven simultaneously presented circles. 
Experiment 2 
Method 
 Participants, Apparatus, and Stimuli.  In Experiment 2, the same participants, apparatus, 
and stimuli were utilized as Experiment 1.  
Training.  The transfer paradigm used in this experiment required the monkeys to have 
equal amounts of training on the sequential task.  The monkeys had all completed a different 
number of sequential trials during Experiment 1 so the first step was to give the monkeys the 
necessary number of training trials to ensure that they all had equal experience.   
During training the monkeys received sequential trials identical to those used in the 
training phase of Experiment 1.  The sequential trials were reinforced in the same manner as they 
were during Experiment 1.  The monkeys in Group 1 continued to receive food reinforcement for 
choosing the square outline after viewing three sequential circles and the abstract shape after 
viewing seven sequential circles and Group 2 continued to receive food reinforcement for 
making the opposite choices on the sequential trials.  Correction trials were used during this 
phase of training, as they had been in Experiment 1 training. 
The number of trials each monkey received depended on the number of sequential trials 
he had completed during the first experiment.  During this training phase, the monkeys received 
enough sequential trials to equal 100 blocks (10,000 trials) total across both experiments.  This 
included the 16 blocks of sequential trials completed during the testing phase of Experiment 1 
and any additional blocks of trials the monkey may have received after reaching the accuracy 
criterion in the training phase of Experiment 1.  For example, in Experiment 1 Hank required 67 
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blocks of sequential trials to reach criterion, received an additional 6 blocks after reaching 
criterion, and completed 16 blocks during testing.  Thus, he received 11 blocks of sequential 
trials in this training phase (100 – (67 + 6 + 16) = 11).  The blocks of sequential trials received 
by the other monkeys in this phase of training were as follows: Murph = 12, Chewie = 52, Luke 
= 47, Han = 44, Obi = 71, Gale = 42, and Willie = 66. 
Testing.  During testing, the monkeys were presented with trials involving three or seven 
simultaneously visible circles.  These trials were identical to the nonreinforced simultaneous 
trials used in the testing phase of Experiment 1, except reinforcement was provided during this 
phase of the experiment.  For half of the monkeys (two of the monkeys from Group 1 and two of 
the monkeys from Group 2), the correct response after viewing three simultaneous circles was 
the same as the correct response after viewing three sequentially presented circles in Experiment 
1.  Similarly, the correct response for seven simultaneous circles was the same as the correct 
response for seven sequential circles.  This group will be henceforth referred to as the “No 
Switch” group.  For the other half of the monkeys, the reward contingencies were reversed so 
that the correct response after viewing three simultaneous circles was the same as the correct 
response after viewing seven sequential circles and the correct response after viewing seven 
simultaneous circles was the same as the correct response after viewing three sequential circles.  
For example, Murph was in Group 1 during Experiment 1 and the reversed reward contingency 
group in this testing phase.  Thus, when he was presented with three sequential circles in 
Experiment 1 or 2 he was rewarded for making contact with the square outline where the circles 
had been located.  However, when he was presented with three simultaneously visible circles in 
the testing phase of Experiment 2 he was rewarded for making contact with the abstract shape.  
Making contact with the square outline containing three visible circles was scored as incorrect 
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and resulted in a buzzing sound and a time-out.   The reversed reward contingency group will be 
henceforth referred to as the “Switch” group. 
 Correct and incorrect testing trials resulted in the same feedback as correct and incorrect 
training trials.  Correction trials were used as they had been in training.  The monkey was given 
the opportunity to initiate a new testing trial after receiving his reward or time-out for the 
previous testing trial. 
The monkeys were allowed continuous access to the task for several hours a day, several 
days a week.  The trials were administered in 100 trial blocks and testing was complete for each 
monkey when he had reached an accuracy criterion of 80% correct for the three most recent 
blocks.   
Analysis.  As was true in Experiment 1, all correction trials and all trials with response 
times longer than 10 seconds were excluded from analysis.  The response time filter resulted in 
the exclusion of an average of 1.01% of training trials and an average of .13 % of testing trials 
across all eight monkeys. 
Results 
 Training.  All monkeys exhibited a high level of accuracy that exceeded, or came very 
close to exceeding, the accuracy criterion for training in Experiment 1.  Hank performed at 
79.64% accuracy, Murph at 88.42%, Chewie at 94.12%, Luke at 93.87%, Han at 86.64%, Obi at 
90.70%, Gale at 86.55%, and Willie at 89.02%.   
 Testing.  The goal of testing was to compare the performance of the monkeys in the No 
Switch group to the monkeys in the Switch group, which could be affected by the ability of the 
monkeys to learn a new numerical task and to perform the training task in particular.  To rule out 
these confounding variables the number of blocks required to reach criterion during the training 
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task in Experiment 1 and the accuracy of the monkeys when performing the training task in 
Experiment 2 were compared for the Switch and No Switch groups.  The No Switch group 
required an average of 34 blocks to reach criterion in Experiment 1, which was not significantly 
different than the average 30.5 blocks required by the Switch Group, t(6) = .21, p = .84.  In 
addition, the average accuracy for the No Switch group in the training phase of this experiment 
was 87.71%, which was not significantly different than the average accuracy of 89.53% for the 
Switch group, t(6) = .52, p = .62. 
 The number of trial blocks (100 trials per block) that each monkey required to reach the 
accuracy criterion is presented in Table 6.2.  On average, the No Switch group required 12 
blocks and the Switch group required 10.75 blocks of trials.  The target number for the monkeys 
varied within the Switch and No Switch groups depending on the group to which they were 
originally assigned in Experiment 1.  For instance, Murph was assigned to Group 1 during the 
first experiment so his target number during the training phase of both experiments was three.  
Murph was then assigned to the Switch group so his target for the testing phase of this 
experiment was seven.  Gale was also assigned to the Switch group, but he was originally in 
Group 2 so his target for the testing phase of this experiment was three.  A two-way ANOVA of 
the effects of original group and new group on the number of trials required to reach criterion 
was performed with data from all eight monkeys.  Original group refers to whether the monkeys 
were in Group 1 or Group 2 during training and new group refers to whether the monkeys were 
in the No Switch or Switch group during testing.  This analysis yielded no significant differences 
(original group, F(1, 4) = 1.67, p = .27; new group, F(1, 4) = .07, p = .81; original group  new 
group interaction, F(1, 4) = 4.93, p = .09). 
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 A rank ordering of the individual monkeys according to the number of trials required to 
reach criterion also did not reveal strong evidence of a group effect.  The order of the monkeys 
from least number of trial blocks to most number of trial blocks required is as follows: Obi (No 
Switch), Murph (Switch), Han (No Switch), Luke (No Switch), Willie (Switch), Chewie 
(Switch), Gale (Switch), and Hank (No Switch).  Luke, a monkey from the No Switch group, and 
Willie, a monkey from the Switch group, were tied for the middle position at 12 blocks of trials.  
Two monkeys from the No Switch group and one monkey from the Switch group required fewer 
trials than Luke and Willie and two monkeys from the Switch group and one monkey from the 
No Switch group required more trials than Luke and Willie. 
 Although the No Switch group did not reach criterion in fewer trials, as would be 
expected if the monkeys were transferring numerical knowledge from the sequential task to this 
simultaneous task, spontaneous transfer may have occurred at the very beginning of testing 
before the monkeys had a chance to learn from repeated reinforcement.  Results from the first 
five and ten probe trials for each monkey are presented in Table 6.3.  There were no significant 
differences between the accuracy of the No Switch and Switch groups for these initial probe 
trials, first five trials: t(6) = 1.46, p = .19 and first ten trials: t(6) = 1.12, p = .31.  However, the 
No Switch group did have a higher mean accuracy for the initial probe trials than the Switch 
group.  The No Switch group performed at 80% and 62.5% accuracy for the first five and first 
ten probe trials respectively, while the Switch group performed at 55% and 47.5% for those same 
probe trials.  Only the 80% accuracy level was significantly greater than chance (p < .05). 
Discussion 
During training, all monkeys exhibited a high level of accuracy that exceeded, or came 
very close to exceeding, the accuracy criterion for training in the first experiment.  The Switch 
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and No Switch groups did not differ significantly in the average number of blocks required to 
reach criterion during the training task in Experiment 1 or the average accuracy for the training 
task in Experiment 2.  Thus, the two groups exhibited an equal ability to learn a new numerical 
task and to perform the training task in particular.   
If the monkeys transferred numerical knowledge from the sequential task to the 
simultaneous testing task, the No Switch group would be expected to reach the accuracy criterion 
in fewer trials than the Switch group.  Results revealed that the No Switch and Switch groups did 
not differ significantly in the average number of trial blocks required to reach the accuracy 
criterion.  Spontaneous transfer that may have occurred at the very beginning of testing before 
the monkeys had a chance to learn from repeated reinforcement was also investigated by looking 
at the initial probe trials.  The average accuracy for the No Switch group was higher than that of 
the Switch group on the first five and first ten probe trials, but not significantly so.   
General Discussion 
All eight monkeys learned to make one response after viewing a sequence of three dots 
flashed on a computer screen and another response after viewing a sequence of seven dots.  The 
total size of the circles presented in each trial was somewhat correlated with number, so it was 
possible for the monkeys to use the size of the circles to perform some of the trials correctly.  A 
post-hoc analysis revealed that extreme size did affect performance, but that size was not the 
primary decision-making cue for the monkeys.   
The average total duration for a sequence of three circles was longer than the average 
total duration for seven circles, but duration and rate of presentation for each circle varied from 
trial to trial.  This means that it was possible for the monkeys to use temporal variables to help 
them perform the task, but these temporal variables were complicated and unreliable cues.  Even 
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if the monkeys were using temporal variables to perform the sequential task, temporal 
knowledge could not help them perform the simultaneous tasks.  Given that the monkeys were 
not relying on size cues to perform the sequential task and could not use temporal variables to 
aid them in the simultaneous task, any evidence of transfer between the two tasks was most 
likely due to transfer of numerical knowledge. 
Results from the testing phase of Experiment 1 revealed that four out of the eight 
monkeys showed no evidence of transfer from the sequential training task to nonreinforced 
simultaneous probe trials.  Instead of spontaneously providing a “three” response when presented 
with three simultaneously visible circles and a “seven” response when presented with seven 
simultaneously visible circles, they each developed a strong bias for contacting the numerical 
stimulus or the abstract shape, regardless of the number of circles presented.  The sequential and 
simultaneous trials were made as similar as possible to facilitate transfer, but despite this effort it 
is possible that the monkeys viewed them as two completely separate tasks.  If that is the case, it 
is not surprising that they did not use the same numerical rules to perform the sequential and 
simultaneous trials. 
In contrast, three of the monkeys performed at high levels on the simultaneous probe 
trials during the beginning of testing, but were unable to sustain performance across all 400 
probe trials (2,000 trials in total).  This suggests that they may have initially been using the 
reward contingencies learned during the sequential task to perform the simultaneous task, but 
lost motivation after receiving a large number of nonreinforced trials.  The eighth monkey, 
Willie, exhibited high levels of accuracy on probe trials throughout testing, which indicated that 
he was able to generalize his learned responses for sequentially presented circles to the same 
number of simultaneously presented circles.  Although this task proved difficult for most of the 
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animals, Willie’s success provides evidence that at least some rhesus monkeys have a capacity 
for numerical transfer.  
Only two quantities, three and seven, were used in this task so it could be performed by 
representing the number of sequential and simultaneous circles simply as “few” and “many” 
without representing the number of circles as a specific quantity.  This means that the monkeys 
could perform the simultaneous task without utilizing precise quantity information from the 
sequential task.  Despite this possibility, the only way to discriminate between a large and small 
quantity when perceptual and temporal cues are discounted is numerical information.  The 
monkeys must recognize that “few” and “many” differ in number in order to discriminate 
between these two choices.  Thus, some of the monkeys were capable of numerical transfer, 
regardless of whether the monkeys were representing the numbers precisely.  
In the second experiment, the monkeys were presented with reinforced simultaneous 
trials and the number of trials required for the monkeys to learn the task was measured.  The goal 
was to compare the performance of the No Switch group for which numerical contingencies 
remained the same regardless of presentation method (sequential or simultaneous), with 
performance of the Switch group in which numerical contingencies were reversed from the 
sequential task to the simultaneous task.  If the monkeys were categorizing sequentially and 
simultaneously presented stimuli together on the basis of number, the Switch group should have 
required more trials to learn the simultaneous testing task.  Results revealed, however, that the 
two groups required approximately the same number of trials to reach the accuracy criterion.   
The fact that Willie was performing above chance on simultaneous trials at the end of 
Experiment 1 likely affected his performance when he was presented with identical simultaneous 
trials in Experiment 2.  Willie was in the Switch group, however, which means that previous 
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proficiency with the task would most likely be a detriment to his performance in Experiment 2.  
This did not appear to be the case, as Willie required the same number of trials to learn the task 
as the No Switch group required on average.  This finding is interesting because it suggests that 
Willie did not transfer the numerical rule used during the testing phase of Experiment 1 to the 
testing phase of Experiment 2, even though the simultaneous trials were identical.    
 Although the No Switch group did not reach criterion in fewer trials, as would be 
expected if the monkeys were transferring numerical knowledge from the sequential task to this 
simultaneous task, spontaneous transfer may have occurred at the very beginning of testing 
before the monkeys had a chance to learn from repeated reinforcement.  Analysis revealed that 
the average accuracy for the No Switch group was 80% for the first five probe trials and 62.5% 
for the first ten probe trials, which was higher than that of the Switch group, although not 
significantly so.  Thus, neither the overall accuracy nor the accuracy on initial probe trials 
provided strong evidence that the numerical rules learned during the sequential task were 
affecting performance on the simultaneous task. 
Overall, these experiments indicate that some rhesus monkeys have an abstract concept 
of number that reaches across presentation mode.  These findings compliment the previous 
findings by Jordan et al. (2005) that rhesus monkeys possess an abstract concept of number that 
extends across two different sensory modalities.  The results of this study also indicate, however, 
that an abstract concept was not automatically activated in all numerical situations.  In the first 
experiment, there was some evidence that monkeys viewed three sequential circles as similar to 
three simultaneous circles and seven sequential circles as similar to seven simultaneous circles 
and responded based on previously learned reward contingencies for those numbers.  These same 
monkeys failed to show the same capacity in the second experiment. 
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The fact that the monkeys typically work on several different tasks each day might have 
interfered with any natural tendency to transfer knowledge from one task to another, regardless 
of how similar the tasks appeared.  In that were the case, the monkeys may have recognized that 
three sequentially presented circles and three simultaneously presented circles were in the same 
numerical category, without responding to both in the same manner.  Thus, the study may have 
failed to capture the full potential of the monkeys in terms of numerical transfer.  It is also 
possible that monkeys, unlike humans, cannot easily abstract number across different contexts, 
and therefore the ability is only exhibited by some monkeys under limited conditions.   
These remaining questions regarding numerical abstraction also leave open the question 
of whether or not rhesus monkeys behave in a way that fulfills all five of the counting principles 
proposed by Gelman and Gallistel (1978) and the definition of true counting proposed by Davis 
and Pérusse (1988).  It seems likely that numerical abstraction, like numerical ability in general, 
is not “all or none”, but rather a graded capacity that exists in nonhuman primates to a lesser 
extent than in adult humans with a lifetime of mathematical training.  If that is the case, devising 
an artificial threshold over which animals must pass before they are declared to possess 
numerical abstraction is less important than investigating the extent of this ability in different 
animal populations and the conditions under which the capacity is demonstrated. 
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Table 6.1 
The Number of Blocks (100 Trials Each) Required for Each Monkey to Reach the Accuracy 
Criterion in the Training Phase of Experiment 1 
 
 
 
Group 1 (Target 3) Group 2 (Target 7) 
Monkey Blocks Monkey Blocks 
Hank 67 Han 36 
Murph 63 Obi 13 
Chewie 22 Gale 29 
Luke 20 Willie 8 
Average 43 Average 21.5 
 
 
Note. The difference between the average of Group 1 and Group 2 was not significant, p > .05 
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Table 6.2  
The Number of Blocks (100 Trials Each) Required for Each Monkey to Reach the Accuracy 
Criterion in the Testing Phase of Experiment 2 
 
 
 
No Switch Switch 
Monkey Blocks Monkey Blocks 
Hank 29 Murph 4 
Luke 12 Chewie 13 
Han 4 Gale 14 
Obi 3 Willie 12 
Average 12 Average 10.75 
 
 
Note. The difference between the average of the No Switch and Switch group was not 
significant, p > .05 
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Table 6.3 
Percentage Accuracy for the First 5 and 10 Probe Trials in the Testing Phase of Experiment 2   
 
 
 
No Switch  Switch 
Monkey 5 probe 
trials 
10 probe 
trials 
 Monkey 5 probe 
trials 
10 probe 
trials 
Hank 100 70  Murph 80 70 
Luke 80 60  Chewie 40 50 
Han 80 80  Gale 80 50 
Obi 60 40  Willie 20 20 
Average 80 62.5  Average 55 47.5 
 
 
Note. The difference between the No Switch and Switch groups was not significant for the first 
five probe trials or the first ten probe trials, p > .05 
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Figure 6.1. The mean performance across all eight monkeys in the training phase of Experiment 
1 as a function of the total area of the stimuli presented. 
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Figure 6.2. Accuracy for the nonreinforced simultaneous trials after 250, 500, 1000, and 2000 
testing trials in Experiment 1. Horizontal dashed line denotes chance level of performance. 
Asterisks denote accuracy levels that are significantly above chance performance (p < .05). 
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
Two decades ago, Davis and Pérusse (1988) provided an influential review of the 
comparative literature on numerical competence.  Although their review served primarily to 
define terms and to identify methodological issues, it (and the commentaries that followed it) 
also articulated the theoretical debate that provides the foundation for the present study.  One 
position is that animals’ responsiveness to stimulus numerousness is best explained by 
psychologically fundamental mechanisms that reflect the animals’ experience with those specific 
stimuli, including the rich perceptual array of nonnumerical cues correlated with number, and the 
consequences of responses to those stimuli.  Another position is that an animal’s numerical 
competence is a reflection of mental representations of categorical knowledge about number 
(albeit imprecise) that emerge from experience with quantities in various contexts, and that can 
guide behavior under novel task demands. 
The studies included in this dissertation provided support for the latter perspective that 
monkeys possess a concept of number that is not based on simple associative or perceptual 
mechanisms.  The primary source of evidence for this conclusion is performance in a series of 
control tests in which reliance on nonnumerical cues was not possible and transfer tests in which 
the animals were presented with novel combinations of numerical stimuli, novel reward 
contingencies, and novel response demands.  In addition, the monkeys exhibited an ability to 
map arbitrary symbols, in the form of Arabic numerals, onto representations of analog quantities 
and to use the symbols in new and emergent ways.  This provides evidence that Arabic numerals 
are not simply sign-stimuli associated with specific response-reward histories, but rather serve a 
symbolic function.  
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Based on these abilities it is tempting to ascribe to these monkeys a numerical concept 
identical to our own.  However, when we look beyond the question of whether or not they can 
perform these numerical tasks and examine the underlying mental processes, species differences 
become clear.  For example, Chapters 2 through 5 provided ample evidence that monkeys 
represent number in a less precise manner than humans do, as predicated by the analog 
magnitude model (Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 1992).  In addition, the mixed findings 
regarding transfer from a sequential to a simultaneous task in Chapter 6 cast doubt on whether 
these monkeys have the same abstract concept of number as adult humans.   
The first step to determining whether monkeys have a concept of number and a symbolic 
understanding of Arabic numerals was to rule out nonnumerical variables that may be 
responsible for responding in numerical tasks.  For example, monkeys may compare numerals 
using representations of cardinal values, or they may make the same comparisons using a learned 
matrix of 2-choice discriminations (e.g., pick the numeral 7 when presented with 6, but not when 
presented with 8) or hedonic values acquired during training (e.g., pick the numeral 7 when 
presented with 6 because it is more satiating).   
The results from Chapter 2 revealed that monkeys were able to choose the largest value 
when presented with novel probe trials involving one numeral and one dot array.  This was true 
even on the first exposure to these trials.  This finding allowed us to rule out a matrix of learned 
values as the basis of responding.  Additionally, results from one monkey receiving probabilistic 
reinforcement suggested that the monkeys were not solving the comparisons based on the 
hedonic value of the numerals.  His responses were similar to the responses of the other 
monkeys, even when numerical value opposed hedonic value.  For example, he was able to 
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correctly respond to a comparison of four dots and the numeral 3, despite the fact that the 
numeral 3 had a much richer reinforcement history.   
The fact that the monkeys were not responding to numerical pairs based on a complex 
matrix of memorized responses or hedonic values suggests that these monkeys understood that 
Arabic numerals represented absolute values that could be ordered and compared on a relative 
basis.  It must be noted, however, that the monkeys appeared to be using approximate quantity 
information rather than exact.  Performance suffered when the numerical distance between the 
numeral and dot quantity was small. 
The evidence that monkeys are able to make comparisons based on approximate cardinal 
information is particularly interesting given that cardinal numerical information does not appear 
to be an ecological necessity for animals in the wild.  It is important for a monkey to know which 
fruit tree in the forest contains the most fruit, but it is less important to know the exact number of 
fruit on any of the trees or the absolute amount by which the trees differ.  It is also difficult to 
think of an example in which a monkey would need to associate a quantitative value with an 
abstract symbol.   
This discrepancy between behaviors demonstrated in the lab and behaviors routinely 
observed in the wild brings up the issue of untrained behaviors versus trained behaviors.  
Monkeys in the wild are obviously not familiar with computer joysticks and procedures such as 
match-to-sample.  However, they almost certainly have the same potential to learn these things 
as the monkeys in our laboratory.  Although laboratory research captures behaviors that are 
beyond the scope of the normal survival behaviors studied using experimentally naïve monkeys 
in their natural habitats, both perspectives are necessary to understand numerical cognition in 
animals.  Research conducted with experimentally naïve animals (e.g., Flombaum, Junge, & 
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Hauser, 2005; Hauser, Carey, & Hauser, 2000; Menzel, 1960; Santos, Barnes, & Mahajan, 2005; 
Uller, Hauser, & Carey, 2001), provides us with valuable information about cognitive 
adaptations, including those related to numerical processing, that produce survival benefits for 
those animals.  In other words, we learn how the animals use cognitive processes, such as 
quantitative comparisons, to maximize food intake, avoid dangerous conflicts, and excel at other 
activities that are necessary for their continued existence.  This research also provides us with a 
glimpse into our own possible hominid past.  We can imagine how our modern system of 
number processing arose from environmental adaptations that improved our own evolutionary 
fitness. 
In contrast to studies utilizing experimentally naïve monkeys, laboratory studies often 
involve experimentally savvy monkeys with years of training on numerical tasks.  The main goal 
of these studies is not to document the everyday behaviors that the animal might exhibit in its 
natural habitat, but rather to challenge the animal in novel and controlled ways that will uncover 
the animal’s natural learning potential.  In other words, the focus is on the capacity to learn 
numerical tasks, rather than the numerical behaviors that are normally observed in untrained 
animals.  By training monkeys on numerical tasks, just as humans are trained for years in math 
class, we can discover whether or not monkeys, like humans, are able to build on their innate 
mathematical foundations and succeed at more sophisticated tasks involving symbolic and 
absolute number knowledge.  Both the successes and failures of the monkeys on these complex 
tasks provide us with information about the nature and limits of their mental numerical models. 
Despite the benefits of laboratory study, the fact that many of the abilities observed in 
trained animals provide little survival advantage means that researchers must be especially 
careful to rule out other explanations before attributing performance to absolute numerical 
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knowledge.  For example, the ability of the monkeys to choose the largest value for probe trials 
involving one numeral and one dot array in Chapter 2 strongly suggested that the Arabic 
numerals represented absolute quantities, but there is an alternative possibility that should be 
mentioned.  It is possible that performance was not based on the comparison of numerical 
representations, but instead reflected integration of two learned sequences.  Previous research has 
shown that monkeys can learn to order two lists of arbitrary stimuli and immediately respond 
correctly at a greater than chance level when presented with comparisons of two items from 
different lists (D’Amato & Colombo, 1988; Terrace, Son, & Brannon, 2003).  It is possible that 
the monkeys in this study perceived the numerals as one arbitrary list of stimuli and the dot 
quantities as another arbitrary list and correctly responded to pairs of numerals and dots using 
only knowledge of their ordinal position.  In other words, monkeys may correctly order the same 
numerals using knowledge that the numeral 5 is followed by 4 is followed by three, or that 5 > 4 
> 3, without regard for the cardinal values of the numerals or the absolute difference between 
them.  
Thus, the second step in determining the nature of number concept in rhesus monkeys 
was to investigate the precision of the numerical representation by testing for ordinal versus 
absolute (cardinal) numerical knowledge.  The ordinal tasks in Chapter 3 revealed that both 
monkeys learned to produce three 5-item lists at greater-than-chance levels.  The monkeys 
showed no advantage when learning the list of Arabic numerals compared to the novel list of 
signs and the novel list of colors.  In the second experiment the monkeys performed significantly 
above chance levels for all types of pair-wise comparisons with items from different lists, with 
no clear facilitative effects for comparisons involving numerals.  These results indicate that the 
monkeys were responding on the basis of the newly learned ordinal positions of the items.   
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The fact that the monkeys showed no advantage when learning a list of Arabic numerals 
or integrating the numeral list with the lists of arbitrary signs and colors suggests that ordinal 
knowledge did not inhere in the representations formed during the presentation of Arabic 
numerals in the first experiment of Chapter 2.  Thus, the idea that the monkeys in Chapter 2 were 
able to compare probe trials of dots and numerals by integrating two learned ordinal lists was not 
supported by these findings.  However, it is also possible that the monkeys acquired ordinal 
knowledge during the experiment in Chapter 2, but that learning was lost between studies due to 
time and interference from intervening experimental tasks.   
In addition to successfully comparing numerals, colors, and signs that were trained as 
ordered lists, one monkey was able to make ordinal comparisons using analog quantities.  The 
monkeys had never received serial training involving lists of quantities, but when we presented 
analog quantities within the context of making ordinal judgments, one monkey spontaneously 
used the magnitude of the polygon set to determine its ordinal position relative to the learned-list 
stimuli.  
 In summary, the experiments in Chapters 2 and 3 strongly suggest that the monkeys 
possess a concept of number that includes both cardinal and ordinal value.  In other words, the 
monkeys are not representing visual quantities as separate and unrelated categories in the same 
way that we would represent categories such as “tree” and “flower.”  Instead, the monkeys 
understand that numerical categories have consistent ordinal relationships that allow them to be 
ordered and compared.  Likewise, the monkeys are not representing visual quantities as items in 
an arbitrarily ordered list in the same way that humans would represent letters of the alphabet.  
Instead, they understand that visual arrays are ordered based on absolute numerical values.  This 
knowledge allows the monkeys spontaneously to integrate visual quantities with arbitrary 
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symbols that were learned as an ordered list.  In addition, the monkeys learned through training 
that Arabic numerals with no inherent numerical meaning have symbolic value representing 
numerical quantities with both cardinal and ordinal properties.  Thus, these monkeys could 
compare and order Arabic numerals in the same way as visual arrays. 
Although these conclusions provide a fairly detailed picture of how the monkeys in our 
laboratory represent simultaneously presented Arabic numerals and visual arrays, the 
conclusions may not generalize to tasks involving sequential items or events.  Experiments in 
Chapters 2, 4, and 5 were designed to assess the use of a number concept by rhesus monkeys in a 
series of sequential tasks. 
In Chapter 4, we trained four Arabic numeral-experienced monkeys on a series of 
reinforced (R) and nonreinforced (N) computerized maze trials.  During training on an RRRN 
series, two of the four monkeys developed a “slow, fast, faster, slow” pattern, which suggested 
they were anticipating the final nonreinforced trial.  The monkeys initiated the trials themselves 
and no strict temporal controls were employed, but an analysis of the data made it clear that they 
were not using duration as a primary cue to predict when the nonreinforced trial would occur.  
The other two monkeys performed gradually slower on each trial in a series, which made it 
impossible to ascertain whether or not they were predicting precisely when the final trial would 
occur.   
During testing, the monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 and 4 developed a 
pattern of performing more slowly on the nonreinforced trials than the reinforced trials, 
indicating the use of the changing target numeral cues to anticipate those final nonreinforced 
trials.  The monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 through 8 did not use the changing 
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numeral to predict precisely when the nonreinforced trial would occur in each series, but did 
perform faster overall on series with higher target numerals.   
In the second experiment of Chapter 2, we presented monkeys with two Arabic numeral 
cues in a computerized maze and each numeral was “baited” with the corresponding number of 
pellets.  We reasoned that a monkey could travel to the larger numeral the corresponding number 
of times and then behaviorally indicate that he knew he had exhausted the pellets at that location 
by traveling to the smaller numeral.  In contrast, if the monkeys know only the ordinal and not 
absolute values corresponding to the numerals, then they would have no basis for knowing when 
to stop responding to the larger of the two numerals.  This design allowed us to assess the 
monkeys’ understanding of the absolute value of the numerals in a sequential task.   
For three of the four monkeys, responding was above chance levels and observed 
behavior was better simulated by an algorithm that selected numerals in proportion to their 
relative magnitudes than one that selected numerals by chance.  In other words, the monkeys 
were twice as likely to select the numeral 4 rather than the numeral 2 when they were paired, 
versus having a .50 probability of selecting each numeral.  However, even this simulation failed 
to capture the level of errorless trials that were observed with target proportions of 0.6 and 
greater.  These data suggest that the monkeys had some understanding of the quantity 
symbolized by the numerals. 
Despite performing at greater than chance levels, the monkeys tended to touch a target 
more times than was represented by the numeral.  These errors suggested that the monkeys were 
not representing that quantity precisely.  In other words, the monkeys were not enumerating 
exactly three responses to the numeral 3, but were instead responding in a more approximate 
manner.  Overall, this study suggests that Arabic numerals provide more information to the 
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monkeys than ordinality (which numeral is bigger) or even the relative magnitudes of the 
numerals, but do not provide them with exact quantity information. 
In Chapter 5, we further investigated the precision of the monkeys’ numerical 
representations by testing for absolute (cardinal) numerical knowledge in a sequential 
enumeration task.  During the course of this study, all of the monkeys learned to match randomly 
intermixed series of one or nine maze trials with the correct Arabic numeral or visual quantity 
when tested with a same/different discrimination.  Two of the monkeys achieved accuracies 
greater than 70% for the numerosities 1, 5, and 9, within the first 500 presentations, but they did 
not reach criterion when the numerosity 3 was added to the experimental set.  Their ability to 
perform the task with three numerosities indicates that their representation of the maze trials 
went beyond a simple representation of “one” and “many.”  The fourth monkey in the study 
performed the task with randomly intermixed series of the numerosities 1, 3, 5, and 9, but failed 
to achieve the accuracy criterion after the numerosity 2 was added to the set.   
The monkeys’ error patterns were not related to the amount of time they spent on the 
maze trials in each series.  The monkeys did not tend to choose numerosities that were higher 
than the correct choice after spending more time than usual on a particular series.  This finding 
indicates that responding was based on the number of maze trials and not the duration of the 
maze trials, which provides evidence for a concept of number rather than a reliance on timing 
processes. 
Interestingly, the monkeys performed equally well regardless of whether the numerical 
stimulus was an Arabic numeral or visual dot quantity.  Although the visual quantities provided 
more inherent numerical information than the numerals, the monkeys have had a variety of 
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testing experiences involving Arabic numerals.  Their ability to match a series of maze trials to 
either a visual quantity or an Arabic numeral indicates flexibility in their performance strategy. 
Together, the studies in Chapters 2, 4, and 5 suggest that the monkeys’ numerical 
competence in sequential tasks, as in the simultaneous tasks, reflects a mental representation of 
approximate cardinal number.  Although these animals, like adult humans, have the ability to 
keep track of their own sequential responses, alter their motor responses based on Arabic 
numeral cues, and match a number of sequential responses with the corresponding numeral or 
visual quantity, there is scant evidence that the monkeys generalized numerical learning in 
simultaneous tasks to these sequential tasks.  Nonetheless, it is clear that they can perform both 
types of tasks with training so their numerical abilities are not limited to a specific context.  
All of these studies demonstrated that the monkeys in our laboratory possess a concept of 
number that is not based on simple associative or perceptual mechanisms or experience with 
specific stimuli.  This numerical concept guided behavior under a variety of novel task demands.  
In addition, these studies provided evidence that the monkeys understood that numerals, which 
are abstract symbols with no physical properties that correlate with the quantities they represent, 
nonetheless do represent specific numerical quantities.   
When the data are inspected closely, however, it becomes clear that monkeys represent 
number in a less precise manner than humans, consistent with the analog magnitude model 
(Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Meck & Church, 1983).  Unlike adult humans, the 
monkeys were not able to take advantage of the numerical precision made possible by the use of 
Arabic numerals.  Instead, the monkeys were able to perform the tasks at levels greater than 
chance by representing approximate, rather than exact, quantities. 
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For example, in the first experiment in Chapter 2 the monkeys were able to compare 
numerals and dot quantities, but performance suffered when the numerical distance between the 
numeral and dot quantity was small.  This distance effect, which is commonly seen in animal 
numerical studies (e.g., Anderson, Stoinski, Bloomsmith, Marr, Smith, & Maple, 2005; Boysen 
& Berntson, 1995; Brannon & Terrace, 1998, 2000; Judge, Evans, & Vyas, 2005; Smith, Piel, & 
Candland, 2003), provides evidence that the monkeys were using continuous representations of 
magnitude rather than representations of exact number.  Two magnitude representations, like two 
physical magnitudes such as length or weight, are more difficult to compare when they are close 
in distance than when they are far apart (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Nieder & Miller, 2004; 
Whalen, Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999).   
A distance effect was also found in the ordinal learning experiment in Chapter 3 in which 
the monkeys compared numerals, colors, and abstract symbols from different lists.  The monkeys 
performed better as the ordinal distance between the two comparison items increased.  This 
remained true when the monkeys were given probe trials involving visual dot quantities that 
were not trained as lists.  These results indicate that although the monkeys were responding on 
the basis of the ordinal position of the items, the ordinal knowledge was inexact (i.e., the 
monkeys knew that the numeral 4 was near the beginning of the number list, but may not have 
known that it occupied the second ordinal position).   
In Chapter 4, two monkeys learned to use a changing Arabic numeral cue (2 through 4) to 
anticipate when a nonreinforced trial would occur within a series of reinforced and nonreinforced 
trials.  This positive finding contrasted with the failure of a different pair of monkeys to use a 
larger range of numerals (2 through 8) to anticipate nonreinforced trials.  Instead, they performed 
faster overall on series with higher target numbers.  One possible explanation for this behavior is 
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that the monkeys recognized that during the series with higher target numbers, more reinforced 
trials occurred before the one nonreinforced trial.  This may have provided increased motivation, 
which in turn led to faster performance times.  These results could be used as evidence in favor 
of the object-file model described by Uller, Carey, Huntley-Fenner, & Klatt (1999) because the 
monkeys were unable to predict the nonreinforced trial on target series higher than four, but we 
believe they are a better fit with the accumulator model described by Dehaene (1997) and 
Gallistel and Gelman (2000).  If the monkeys were using an object-file mechanism to store each 
individual trial in a slot in working memory, they would have performed at random when the 
slots became full.  However, the two monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 through 8 
developed a pattern of performance involving all the target numerals.  This finding indicates that 
those monkeys were representing, at least in approximate form, the numerical value of the target 
numbers 2 through 8. 
Evidence that the monkeys represent number with inexact magnitude representations can 
also be found in the second experiment of Chapter 2.  In this experiment, three out of four 
monkeys performed at better-than-chance level on a task requiring them to make a number of 
responses equaling an Arabic numeral.  Although the monkeys performed better than would be 
expected if they only knew the relative magnitudes of the numerals, errorless problems were still 
in the minority.  On most trials, the monkeys touched a target more times than was represented 
by the numeral.  Thus, it seems unlikely that the monkeys were enumerating responses toward 
some exact and absolute quantity (e.g., moving to the 3 exactly three times).  Instead, these data 
suggest that the monkeys were responding to the approximate quantity represented by each 
numeral. 
251 
The same conclusion can be drawn from the experiment in Chapter 5.  In this experiment, 
the monkeys learned to enumerate their own sequential responses and to match the number of 
responses with the corresponding Arabic numeral or visual quantity.  Although the monkeys 
were able to perform this task, there is evidence that they were using an approximate and 
variable representation of the number of maze trials.  Accuracy increased as a function of the 
distance between the number of maze trials and the numerosity presented during the 
discrimination.  Accuracy also decreased as a function of the ratio of the smaller numerosity to 
the larger numerosity used in each series, as predicted by Weber’s law.  A distance effect and 
adherence to Weber’s law would occur if the monkeys’ numerical representations were 
composed of inexact magnitudes (Dehaene, 1997; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000).   
Collectively, these experiments demonstrate that the monkeys do not have a human-like 
understanding of numerals.  Humans use number words and symbols to move beyond the realm 
of approximation and communicate the precise numerical values required for formal 
mathematics.  To an adult human, the numeral 4 symbolizes exactly four items or actions, which 
is a quantity that is precisely one unit less than five and one unit more than three.  In contrast, the 
monkeys behaved as if the representations underlying the Arabic numerals were fuzzy 
approximations of true set size rather than precise quantities.   
Monkeys have an inherent disadvantage compared to humans in that they cannot use 
number words and symbols to communicate precise quantities and perform formal mathematical 
operations.  However, animals in the wild typically confront situations where relative knowledge 
is sufficient.  For example, it is important for an animal to know whether its allies outweigh its 
foes before engaging in a conflict, but it is not necessary to know the exact number of friends or 
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foes.  Thus, in most situations an approximate representation of number provides the information 
necessary for efficient decision-making.   
Another area in which the monkeys may not possess a human-like understanding of 
number is their ability to generalize numerical knowledge from one task to another.  Adult 
humans have a generalized concept of number that allows them to abstract number across 
different contexts, even when the numerical stimuli differ in perceptual features and modality.  
For example, adults understand that three apples, three flashes of lightning, and three trips to the 
grocery store can all be classified in the same numerical category, even though these items and 
events occur in different contexts and modalities and do not resemble each other perceptually.  
The question is whether the nonverbal, less numerically experienced rhesus monkeys in our 
laboratory possess similar representations of number.  Thus, the last step to determining the 
nature of the monkeys’ concept of number was to determine the generality of their 
representations by testing their ability to abstract number across different presentation modes. 
The potential difference in numerical generalization abilities between our monkeys and 
adult humans became apparent after conducting the ordinal experiment in Chapter 3.  The 
monkeys in that experiment both had experience comparing Arabic numerals (Harris, Gulledge, 
Beran, & Washburn, 2008), altering their behavior based on a changing target numeral (Harris & 
Washburn, 2005), and matching an Arabic numeral to the corresponding number of sequential 
behaviors (Harris, Washburn, Beran, & Sevcik, 2007), but showed no advantage when learning 
lists of Arabic numerals versus lists of novel colors and signs.  The study in Chapter 3 was 
conducted approximately six months after the monkeys were last exposed to Arabic numerals so 
it is possible that numerical learning was lost between studies due to time and interference from 
intervening experimental tasks.  This possibility would be surprising, however, in light of the 
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evidence that chimpanzees can retain the values of Arabic numerals for an interval of over three 
years (Beran, 2004).  It is also possible that the type of numerical knowledge learned in the 
previous tasks was not applicable to the ordinal numerical task.  Thus, it was unclear whether the 
monkeys could transfer numerical knowledge from one context to another. 
 Findings from the training phase of Chapter 4 also provided no evidence of numerical 
transfer.  In this study, two Arabic numeral-experienced monkeys learned to use a changing 
target numeral to predict when a nonreinforced trial would occur, but they both performed 
several hundred series before the pattern emerged.  In contrast, rats in similar studies developed 
the pattern after performing less than 50 series (Burns, Goettl, & Burt, 1995; Capaldi & Miller, 
1988).  The monkeys may have required more training because in previous tasks a nonreinforced 
trial signaled an incorrect response.  Therefore, the monkeys had to overcome the prior meaning 
of a nonreinforced trial before learning to predict when it would occur.  Another explanation is 
that the monkeys required extensive training because they were unable to generalize their 
previous numerical experience to the current task. 
In the testing phase of the Chapter 4 study, we introduced probe trials involving a range 
of Arabic numerals and hypothesized that the monkeys’ prior knowledge of Arabic numerals 
would allow for spontaneous transfer from one Arabic numeral to another during this sequential 
task.  For the monkeys receiving probe trials of the numerals 2 and 4, the first ten probe trials of 
each novel numeral provided some evidence that immediate generalization to the new numerals 
occurred.  The average performance time for those trials was greater for the last nonreinforced 
trial in each novel series than the reinforced trial before it.  However, the monkeys receiving 
probe trials of the numerals 2 through 8 failed to generalize to the new numerals.   
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All of these instances in which the monkeys failed to demonstrate transfer of numerical 
knowledge from one task to another could be explained by the time elapsed between studies or 
the fact that the tasks utilized in the different studies had widely varying procedures and goals. 
Another explanation for the lack of positive findings is that the monkeys form numerical 
representations that are strongly tied to context and not easily abstracted across different tasks, 
modalities, and perceptual features.  In other words, the numerals are functioning as part of a 
specific stimulus-response-reward association which allows the monkeys to generalize a 
numerical rule to novel numerals and combinations of numerals within a task, but does not allow 
them to abstract that numerical value across different contexts.  The study in Chapter 6, in which 
the monkeys were tested on their ability to transfer numerical knowledge from a task involving 
sequentially presented stimuli to a very similar task involving simultaneously presented stimuli, 
was designed to investigate these two competing proposals.     
The results of this study revealed that four out of the eight monkeys showed no evidence 
of transfer from the sequential training task to nonreinforced simultaneous probe trials in 
Experiment 1.  In contrast, three of the monkeys performed at high levels on the simultaneous 
probe trials during the beginning of testing, but were unable to sustain performance across all 
400 probe trials.  This suggests that they may have initially been using the reward contingencies 
learned during the sequential task to perform the simultaneous task, but lost motivation after 
receiving a large number of nonreinforced trials.  The eighth monkey exhibited high levels of 
accuracy on probe trials throughout testing, which indicated that he was able to generalize his 
learned responses for sequentially presented circles to the same number of simultaneously 
presented circles.   
255 
In the second experiment, a group of monkeys receiving consistent reinforcement 
regardless of presentation method (sequential or simultaneous) required approximately the same 
number of trials to reach the accuracy criterion as a group of monkeys receiving reversed reward 
contingencies, which provides no evidence of numerical transfer.  Overall, these experiments 
indicate that some rhesus monkeys have an abstract concept of number that reaches across 
presentation mode, but that concept is not automatically activated in all numerical situations.  
The fact that the monkeys typically work on several different tasks each day might have 
interfered with any natural tendency to transfer knowledge from one task to another, regardless 
of how similar the tasks appeared.  It is also possible that monkeys, unlike humans, do not have a 
true concept of number that allows them to abstract number across different contexts, and 
therefore the ability is only exhibited by some monkeys under limited conditions.   
Together, these studies demonstrate that monkeys have a numerical concept that allows 
them to perform a wide range of numerical tasks.  Although the monkeys have had extensive 
numerical experience over the course of their lives, they are not a part of the same number-rich 
culture as their human relatives, who must represent and use number to interact with their world 
on a daily basis.  The success of these monkeys and other nonhuman animals on numerical tasks 
demonstrates that some numerical capacity is not an entirely cultural construction limited to the 
human species.  Instead, humans and nonverbal animals share a basic system for representing 
numbers as continuous magnitudes.   
Although the numerical abilities of humans and nonhuman animals share an evolutionary 
past, this does not mean that we should think of animal numerical abilities simply as lesser 
versions of human numerical abilities.  In the field of numerical cognition, as with other fields of 
cognition, we should be cautious about directly equating nonhuman animal abilities to the 
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abilities of humans at different ages because the different species may have unique capabilities 
and mental representations.  For example, rhesus monkeys and preverbal human infants exhibit a 
similar ability to differentiate between small quantities of items (e.g., Hauser & Carey, 2003; 
Starkey & Cooper, 1980; Washburn & Rumbaugh, 1991; Wynn, 1992), but they appear to differ 
in their ability to abstract number across different contexts.  Several studies have shown that 
infants with no formal number training have a spontaneous ability to abstract number across 
different presentation methods (Jordan, Brannon, & Gallistel, 2006; Starkey, Spelke, & Gelman, 
1983, 1990), whereas the majority of numerically-sophisticated monkeys in our laboratory had 
difficulty abstracting number from one task to another.  The disparity between infants and 
monkeys could be a function of the different methodologies used in the studies, but it could also 
represent a fundamental difference between the two species. 
Another critical difference is that monkeys trained with Arabic numerals understand the 
symbolic meaning of the numerals, but there is no evidence that human infants can use symbols 
to represent quantities.  The fact that monkeys use Arabic numerals to perform numerical tasks, 
however, does not mean that they perceive numerals in the same way as adult humans.  Whereas 
humans use numerals to symbolize precise quantities, we have seen overwhelming evidence that 
nonhuman animals perform numerical tasks using imprecise magnitudes representations.  Thus, 
it appears that animals map Arabic numerals onto their inexact quantification system rather than 
using the numerals to develop precise representations.  Although studying this inexact system 
can help us understand the roots of human mathematical abilities, it can also help us understand 
how monkeys and other animals think and interact with their environments in ways that are 
unique to them. 
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Given the results of these studies and findings from the rest of the literature, what do we 
now know about animal numerical cognition?  First and foremost, we know that a wide range of 
species can perform simple numerical judgments, even when confounding factors such as time 
and area are taken into account.  This knowledge has allowed the field of animal cognition to 
move well beyond the shadow of Clever Hans.  Instead of focusing on whether or not animals 
can use number, today’s research focuses more on how animals use number, including the nature 
of their numerical concepts and the underlying mental mechanisms.   
The area of research involving experimentally naïve animals has provided a wealth of 
evidence that the numerical sensitivity exhibited by animals is present without training.  
However, number is often confounded with other variables in the natural environment so 
researchers continue to debate whether number is a highly salient cue, or one that is used as a last 
resort when all other cues fail to provide reliable information.  It also remains unclear whether 
studies involving experimentally naïve animals and small quantities of food items activate the 
same mental mechanisms as laboratory studies that involve extensive training.  
The majority of laboratory studies have shown that animals demonstrate an 
understanding of both the relative numerical properties of numbers and their approximate 
cardinal values.  These studies also have shown that animals represent cardinal number using an 
analog magnitude mechanism, but the exact nature of this mechanism remains under debate, with 
some researchers arguing for a logarithmic mental number line and others for a linear mental 
number line.  In addition, recent research has provided evidence that nonhuman primates 
understand the symbolic nature of Arabic numerals and other abstract symbols associated with 
numerical quantities, and can use these symbols to perform a variety of tasks.   
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Another important finding from the field of animal numerical cognition is that animals 
can perform a wide variety of numerical tasks including visual quantity judgments, sequential 
quantity judgments, and auditory numerical discriminations.  Although there is some evidence 
that animals have an abstract, amodal representation that can be transferred across tasks, the 
contexts under which animals exhibit or do not exhibit this transfer ability have yet to be 
specified.   
Not only do these studies provide greater perspective on the current state of the field, but 
they also provide insight into potential future directions for animal numerical research that would 
enhance our overall knowledge and accelerate progress in the field.  It is clear that animal 
numerical cognition is a highly interdisciplinary area of research that includes investigators from 
a variety of backgrounds including comparative psychology, developmental psychology, 
cognitive science, neuroscience, anthropology, and biology, who research a wide range of animal 
species.  Although research backgrounds and subject species vary widely throughout the field, 
individual researchers tend to narrowly focus on one research paradigm when conducting 
numerical studies.  For instance, one researcher might rely on tasks involving visually presented 
quantities whereas another relies on tasks involving sequentially completed movements and yet 
another focuses on ordinal sequencing paradigms.  These divisions within the field hinder the 
ability of researchers to integrate findings from different facets of numerical research. 
The studies in this dissertation demonstrated how findings from simultaneous, sequential, 
and ordinal studies conducted with the same monkey population could be combined to increase 
our knowledge of larger trends in numerical cognition.  For example, the lack of numerical 
transfer from one type of study to another prompted the formal study of numerical abstraction in 
Chapter 6.  This trend would not have been evident if we had not presented the same population 
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of monkeys with tasks involving a wide variety of paradigms.  In addition, the fact that widely 
varying tasks each produced results that conformed to the predictions of the analog magnitude 
model provides evidence that this may be an overarching mechanism involved in all numerical 
judgments.   
The flexibility of the analog magnitude model, along with the predictions it makes 
regarding distance and magnitude effects, is one of the reasons it has been widely respected since 
it was first proposed by Meck and Church (1983).  As opposed to other models, such as the 
subitizing model which describes numerical processing mainly in terms of visual perception, the 
accumulator mechanism easily accommodates data from both simultaneous and sequential tasks.  
According to the analog magnitude model, organisms possess an internal pacemaker that emits a 
stream of pulses at a steady rate into a mental accumulator.  In a simultaneous task, the gate to 
the internal pacemaker is opened and closed after each individual object in the array is 
enumerated.  Thus, the level of the accumulator is correlated with the number of objects in the 
array.  In a sequential task, the gate is opened and closed after each object is encountered, which 
also produces an accumulator level that is correlated with the number of objects in the set.  In an 
ordinal or relative numerous task in which the subject must compare or order two or more 
quantities, without necessarily knowing the absolute value of either quantity, subjects need only 
compare the two mental magnitudes generated by the accumulator.  This judgment becomes less 
accurate as the numerical distance between the quantities decreases and the value of the 
quantities increases because the memory for the magnitudes is imperfect and defined by scalar 
variability.  
Although there is a great deal of evidence that animals use analog magnitude 
representations to perform numerical tasks, questions remain regarding the exact form of those 
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representations.  In other words, when a monkey thinks about number, what exactly does that 
mean?  Does the monkey visualize a physical quantity with area and density, a point along a 
mental number line, or something completely different?  Do their numerical representations 
always take the same form, or do they differ based on the context?  Varying forms of numerical 
representations could explain the negative findings in the numerical abstraction study.  It is 
possible that the monkeys were not able to generalize numerical learning from the sequential to 
the simultaneous task because the two tasks activated different analog representations.  In 
addition to questions about the exact form of the analog representations, there are also questions 
regarding the potential for other forms of representation. 
According to the triple-code model proposed by Dehaene (1992), adult humans represent 
numbers in a visual, verbal, or analog magnitude code depending on the task.  These different 
types of numerical representation, which are processed by different areas of the brain, are 
supported by specific comprehension and production mechanisms and connected by pathways 
that allow translation from one type of representation to another.  In this view, the visual 
representations used to process Arabic numerals in multi-digit operations consist of strings of 
Arabic digits.  The verbal representations used to process spoken and written number words, as 
well as to count and solve simple addition and multiplication problems, consist of sequences of 
number words.  Finally, analog representations used to perform approximate calculations and 
relative numerousness judgments consist of mental continuums that are compressed near the 
larger numbers.   
It is clear that nonverbal animals do not have verbal representations they can use to count 
and perform simple calculations, but things are less clear regarding visual representations.  
Although animals trained with Arabic numerals can learn decision rules that allow them to assign 
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a specific symbol to a range of accumulator values, there is currently no evidence that they have 
visual representations, similar to those proposed for humans, which would allow them to perform 
precise numerical judgments and calculations.  It is interesting to note, however, that humans 
learn the meaning of visual symbols such as Arabic numerals through constant training and 
experience at school and at home.  In fact, several developmental researchers have stated that a 
major part of learning to count involves learning to map back and forth from magnitude 
representations to numerals (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Whalen et al., 1999).  If humans can 
learn to represent number precisely using symbols over the course of development, then it is 
possible that rhesus monkeys, with the right training and experience, may also be able to make 
this conceptual leap.  Thus, it is possible that monkeys, like humans, may be able to build on the 
foundations of the analog code and learn to use other forms of numerical representation.    
In conclusion, the studies in this dissertation further defined the extent of numerical 
ability in rhesus monkeys and the nature of their numerical concept.  It is clear that numerical 
ability is not based on low-level associative or perceptual processes and that stimulus control by 
the numerousness aspect of stimuli is not the same as control by other dimensions.  Instead, 
rhesus monkeys have conceptual numerical knowledge that guides behavior in a variety of 
number-related contexts, and in some cases, allowed the monkeys to generalize a response rule 
across presentation mode.  In addition, the monkeys recognized that the Arabic numeral cues 
used in the tasks symbolized numerical quantities with ordinal and approximate cardinal value. 
Collectively, these studies provide evidence that rhesus monkeys view Arabic numerals as more 
than conditioned stimuli with specific response-reward histories, but that numerals do not have 
the same precise symbolic meaning as they typically do for humans.  
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